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The aim of this thesis is threefold: to examine critically previous
attempts (taxonomic and generative, syntactic and semantic, etc.) to
analyze 'modality' phenomena; to propose an integrated theoretical
framework for analyzing such phenomena; and to examine in detail the
syntax and semantics of modality in simple and complex sentence types
in English and, to a lesser extent, in German.
The term 'modality' is taken first as a cover-term to include the tra¬
ditional terms: 'mood' and 'modal', since it can be seen from an exami¬
nation of published grammars of a cross-section of the world's languages
that these terms involve considerable semantic and pragmatic overlap,
and in some cases their tokens may even stand in a commutation relation¬
ship. It is suggested that 'modality' should be ascribed to various com¬
binations of elements in an abstract illocutionary (111) system and an
abstract modality (Mod) system; a distinction is drawn between 'modal¬
ity' ascribable to 111 and Mod, and that which can be said to be 'ob-
jectivized', i.e. part of the proposition (Prop), over which 111 and
Mod operate. The tripartite analysis of the utterance that this yields
bears some similarity to that of Lyons (Semantics Cambridge: CUP 1977),
but it is argued that a greater number of terms is required in each
system and that certain significant divergences need to be made in
order to account for the data presented.
The illocutionary system, relating to the 'world' of the speaker and
hearer and the moment of speaking (wQ, tQ) contains operators for
stating, questioning and 'world changing', plus the principle of
'over-riding' to account for the non-equivalence of illocutionary
potential and illocutionary force. The modality system, relating to
the speaker's conceptual world and time (w^, tj_) , i.e. his view of
object world and time (w■, tj), may be seen as containing a number of
sub-systems: reality, potentiality, factuality, social necessity, etc.
Reality relates to the tense system (t^), and arguments are presented
for a 4-term, rather than a 3-term, system (cp. Lyons 1977) . Under
factuality it seems to be necessary to distinguish: assertive, non-
assertive and mandative, all of which may be either negative or posit¬
ive. With the potentiality system, a distinction is made between
certainty and necessity, while probability is treated as a modification
of possibility, distinct in its negation properties.
Examination of 'modality' in hypotaxis leads to a number of syntactic
discoveries, f. ex. the patterning of may and should as 'subjunctive
substitutes', and to the establishment of 2 logical connectors: > 'se¬
quencer' and^" 'results in' (in addition to the more familiar con¬
junction and disjunction), which in some cases may fall within the
scope of Mod.
The data is presented in the form of paradigms of mood and-or modals,
taking account of a number of different interpretation possibilities:
of modal verbs: epistemic (subjective and objective); deontic ('per¬
formative', subjective and objective); dispositional (external and
internal); and 'subjunctive substitute'. On this basis it becomes clear
that the degree of distinctiveness in any one paradigm, given a parallel
interpretation, is small, despite the fact that the inventory of 'modal'
verbs in English is quite large compared with other languages.
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... You know, Life — Life, it's rather like opening a
tin of sardines. We are all of us looking for the key.
Some of us -- some of us think we've found they key,
don't we? We roll back the lid of the sardine tin of Life,
we reveal the sardines, the riches of Life, therein and
we get them out, we enjoy them. But, you know, there's
always a little piece in the corner you can't get out.
I wonder -- I wonder, is there a little piece in the
corner of your life? I know there is in mine.
(Alan Bennett in: Beyond the Fringe)
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1.2.3 Translational fallacy - cognitive vs. translational equi- 9
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predicate types, time, etc., participant relations
1.2.5 Competence vs. Performance - pragmatics part of competence 11
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synonymy
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x, V
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1.4.0 Introductory remarks 20
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implication - expectation: cancelled vs. actual - anti¬
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1.4.2 'Pragmatic relations' pace Keenan - universal vs. language 29
specific semantic relations - 'conversational postulates'
1.4.3 Translational rules 31
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2.0 Introductory remarks 32
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2.1.1 Voice and action-type - only syntactic passivity is re- 32
levant to modality - action-types: King, Quirk et al. -
'do', 'motion', 'state' , 'cause' - durative vs. punctual
2.1.2 Aspect - perfective vs. imperfective - inceptive vs. pro- 35
spective - action frequency - cp. quantifier system: one-
several-all - instantial vs. iterative - habitual
2.2 Tense and Modality
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ceptual time or world
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2.2.3 Explanation of t :t.:t. - past t. and past t. - future t. 40
o i j i ~i i
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2.2.4 Demonstration on basis of ft Lakoff's examples - comparison 42
with McCawley
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tional subjunctive and volitional future - prospective
subjunctive and prospective future - current situation: loss
of subjunctive - 'conditional' - English mandative subjunct¬
ive - comparison of the functions of subjunctive in French
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rora quotative - Japanese system: rejection of 'alternative'
as a mood - Tairora: rejection of Vincent's tense vs. mood
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tionary function and modality function of mood
vi
3.1.4 Word order and intonation as markers of mood - English 58
'dubitative'
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3.2 Modal Expressions
3.2.0 Introductory remarks - meaning of 'modal' 6 3
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modal verbs and anomaly - irregular paradigm language-
specific - irregular complementation pattern not signific¬
ant, cp. Persian - modal verbs and modal adjectives in
Russian - impersonal expression - modal adverbs and partic¬
les - weakness of 'modal' as syntactic category - usefulness
as notion
3.2.2 Meaning parameters of modal expressions in IE - English, 66
German and Icelandic compared - parameters of meaning:
ability, capability, permission, possibility; requirement,
duty, obligation, necessity; volition, intention, determin¬
ation, futurity - functional extensions: copula future/
necessity, inchoative —»future, possession —>duty/obligation/
necessity; obtaining permission/ability, knowledge -^abil¬
ity - ramifications - parameters not universal
3.2.3 levels of modal meaning - deontic vs. epistemic - subjective 69
vs. objective epistemic - subjective vs. objective deontic
- 'performative' meaning - dispositional - quantification
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4.1.4 Stoddart - assertive functions: 'enunciative' and 'passion- 88
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4.2.1 Deutschbein - Jespersen 90
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vii
4.2.3 Gonda - Kuryiowicz 94
4.2.4 Kantor 9 5
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position adopted in thesis
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Modality
5.0 Introductory remarks 98
5.1 The 'Performative' Analysis
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and Fraser - performative not necessarily highest S - two
performatives possible in one S - some performatives not
deletable - for certain speech acts no performatives -
Rutherford's claims - Bolinger's claim - Boyd/Thorne
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whether; distinction between Tell me if ... and Tell me
that ... - not all imperatives command
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and 'performative interpretation'
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5.1.5 Recapitulation - the 'performative' analysis and the node 113
111
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and status of paraphrase
5.2.3 Critique of Lakoff - problem of deep structural irregular- 120
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5.2.4 Presentation of Householder's proposal 123
5.2.5 Critique of Householder - status of Q - problems with tag 125
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5.3.0 Introductory remarks 128
5.3.1 Little treatment of subjunctive - Burt's phrase structure 128
account of English modals compared with Bierwisch's PS
account of German modals
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category M or Md - tense problems: should, could, might
treated as past - problems with passive
5.3.3 Later modifications - Hakutani/Hargis's proposal - Bier- 133
wisch's alternative proposal cp. Ross, Hoffmann, Kraak,
Newmeyer, Perlmutter, etc. - the Main Verb analysis
viii
5.4 The Approaches of Jenkins and Jackendoff
5.4.0 Introductory remarks 137
5.4.1 The category M - arguments against 138
5.4.2 The syntactic behaviour of modals and certain adverb 139
types
5.4.3 The 'Control Problem' - 'interpretist' solution - weakness 141
of Jackendoff's claims
5.4.4 Jackendoff's rejection of predicate logic - problem of 145
specific vs. non-specific readings - Jackendoff's formal¬
ism - 3 types of scope - Jackendoff's claim is theory-
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5.4.5 Doubts about the status of Jackendoff's class of modal- 152
ities
§6 §§mantic_Aggroaches_to_Modality
6.0 Introductory remarks 154
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6.1.0 Introductory remarks - Joos, Ehrman, Bech: all attempts 154
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- opacity of terms - problems of applying operations to
logical system - implausible cancellations
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closed and-or symmetrical set; ii) difficulty of application
to other languages (non-translatability)
6.2 Structural Semantic Accounts
6.2.0 Introductory remarks - 175
6.2.1 Seuren: differences from TG - Poss, Nec, Perm - doubts on 176
tense assignment - other queries - 3 fruitful lines: i)
interplay of complex tense with modality, ii) modal ad¬
verbs and modal verbs from same source, iii) principle of
sentence and clause qualification to account for sententence
types and mood
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discussion of paraphrase relations - set of features:
COMPLEX, FUTURE, CONDITIONAL, EXTERNAL, POTENTIAL - discuss¬
ion of semantic consequences of the system - paraphrase re¬
lations and their weaknesses
6.2.3 Leech - causation, authority, volition, ability - present- 190
ation of system and its pitfalls - 2 basic doubts: i) nature
of ability system, ii) validity of weak and strong con¬
straint with reference to volition
6.2.4 Halliday: system and critique of his conclusions - Butler's 195
proposal - Halliday's separation of 'probable' from 'poss¬
ible-certain' - incorrect identification of will with
probable - further objections





7.0 Introductory remarks - list of items considered 213
in English and German - contradictory results of
published accounts
7.1 The Syntax and Semantics of Epistemic Expressions
7.1.0 Introductory remarks - definition and scope of the term 216
'epistemic'
7.1.1 Epistemic expressions of the I know and It's possible types 216
- tense and aspect patterns in complement - objectivity,
i.e. propositionalizing associated with non-present tense
of I know and It's possible - Mod and Prop - 4 questions:
commitment of speaker to truth of p; conclusion; nature of
degree of modality; subjective or objective modality -
introduction of symbols: V = possible, A = necessity,□ =
certainty - 'probability' is V modified - Table I lists
results of analysis
7.1.2 Synthetic epistemic expressions - complement patterns and 226
ambiguities of time reference - justification for including
seem, be said to, etc. - list of restrictions - justific¬
ation for distinguishing certainty and necessity; for treat¬
ment of probability; questionable status of should/ought to
- exemplification of"iT-modality system - Table II summarizes
results
7.2 The syntax and semantics of deontic expressions
7.2.0 Definition of deontic - exclusion of dispositional 235
7.2.1 Paradigms of I require and X is required types with that- 235
complements, with NP-infinitive complements - time refer¬
ence of complements, cp. epistemics, cp. imperatives -
distinction between performative and non performative inter¬
pretations - multiple time reference in Prop with 'descript¬
ive' modal expressions
7.2.2 Synthetic expressions with II-person subjects - performativ- 241
ity - paradigm of non-performative deontics - speaker-orien¬
tation
7.2.3 Analysis - S-modality established - requirement is modifi- 248
able term - O categorical; A requirement/obligation; V per¬
mission/concession - Table III of results
7.3 The syntax and semantics of dispositional
expressions
7.3.0 Introductory remarks - definition and range of 'disposit- 252
ional' - external vs. internal - speaker's actual dispos¬
ition and reported disposition - volitional and non-volition¬
al - descriptive and 'conversational' use
7.3.1 Verbal I hope and adjectival I'm willing types - disposit- 252
ional expressions where external disposition impossible
excluded - tense and time reference restrictions of dis¬
positional expression, of complement - generally past re¬
ference excluded but not with need, be able, be capable:
these are complexes of epistemic (subjective) modality and
propositional modality - conversational want: complex of
deontic (subjective) modality and propositional modality
7.3.2 Can and will and will - German werden - arguments against 257
volitional interpretation of will and werden
x
7.3.3 'Volition', 'intention', 'requirement' - criteria for 260
distinguishing negation patterns: be resolved/determined,
intend vs. be willing/prepared, want - be willing related
to want to probable - /3-modality system illustrated -
no basic term except perhaps want - remaining items fall
into 3 sets: expect, hope; feel like, would like, wish;
need - their differentiation
7.4 Recapitulation
7.4.1 'Attitudinizing' expressions and performative expressions 279
distinct from 'reporting'/'descriptive' expressions - sub¬
jective modality assigned to Mod, rest to Prop - 3 systems:
TT-, Ti-, and /S-modality - (3possibly covert - could be used
to explain speaker orientation: shall, must vs. will, have
to
7.4.2 Redefinition of modality and the modality node (Mod) - 281
reflexes of t,Tl , 5 , (b and factuality in Prop
§8 Further_aspects_of_mo^al_§xpr§||iQp|
8.0 Introductory remarks 282
8.1 Modal Expressions in Special Constructions
8.1.1 The there-construction - fluidity of epistemic/deontic 282
distinction
8.1.2 Passivization - 2 possible reasons for greater ambiguity 285
of deontics in passive: i) nature of passive itself, ii)
nature of subject nominal - paradigms of analytic express¬
ions under passive - synthetic expressions (epistemic,
deontic, dispositional) - doubt about status of participant
relations as underlying specification
8.1.3 Clefting - a low-level and general phenomenon - not 292
attributable to a natural class (semi-modal)
8.2 The Combinability of Modal Expressions
8.2.0 Introductory remarks - Halliday and Bierwisch 295
8.2.1 Combinability of modal verbs inter se - selection of 296
modal items and meanings - Table IV: paradigms combining
two items - dubious sequences: S+d, d + d, d + ^>, 5 + £,
d + £ , 5+ S - acceptable: £ + 6, 6 + 5 , 6 + d - in 6+6
second modal objectivized - 6 + S" + d apparently natural
order - notable points in patterns with 3 items - further
generalizations: performative deontic precedes objective
deontic - subjective epistemic precedes objective epistemic
8.2.2 Combinability of modal verbs with modal adverbs - select- 306
ion of adverbs for consideration - positions delimited -
paradigms with non-modal predicates in these positions -
ambiguities especially in final position - necessarily -
syntactic-functional classification of adverbs - examinat¬
ion of behaviour with modal verbs - epistemic (must per-
haps) - deontics - special nature of perhaps and of course?
- question of cumulative modality with epistemics and de¬
ontics
8.3 'Logical' Modality
8.3.0 Introductory remarks - Karttunen's notion of logical 329
modality
8.3.1 Discussion - logical modality as what potentially could be 329
instead of actual state of affairs - separation of may, must
from can, have to - hypothesis that role of necessity is





9.0 Introductory remarks 335
9.1 Tense and Time Reference in Modal Expressions
9.1.1 Tense and time reference with epistemic expressions - 335
time reference of complement (indefinite, present, future,
past) - time reference of analytic modal expressions -
special status of present tense-form in epistemics -
tense of it's possible under Mod, modality under Prop
9.1.2 Tense and time reference with deontic expressions - pre- 338
dictability of future time reference in the complements
of deontics - tense-form possibilities of analytic de¬
ontic expressions greater - natural exclusion of past for
performative deontics - morphological pasts (could, etc.)
vs. suppletive pasts (was able to, etc.) - suppletive
forms past tj with propositional modality - 3 possible
treatments of morphological past forms
9.2 'Future Gap'
9.2.1 Givon's description of the phenomenon - its relation to 340
tense and time reference - its relevance to the question
of full and quasi-predicates - scope of time adverbials -
future in the past - a problem with the analysis of would
9.3 Establishing Tense from a Set of Examples
9.3.1 The examples - their interpretations - the role of voice 345
- the exceptional nature of can in paradigms - the dubious¬
ness of its epistemic status - may 'possibly the case';
can 'the case that possibly'
9.3.2 Might and could - might not normally conditional, could 351
may be conditional - rejection of gloss 'it is possible
for ..." - reanalysis of Anderson's ambiguous example
with could
9.4 Past Interpretations
9.4.0 Introductory remarks 355
9.4.1 Reported speech past (Table V) - the details of must and 356
had to - some unclear cases - pragmatics of speech situation
- needn't and daren't
9.4.2 Narrative past - problems of drawing notional distinction 364
- epistemic narrative past (Table VI) - past-referring
complements have a different pattern - deontic narrative
past (Table VII) - dispositionals - 'past modal' could
9.5 Conditional Interpretations
9.5.1 Could and would as only really conditional items - arguments 375
against Palmer's inclusion of ought to - might have, could
have, would have, ?needn't have also conditional - the case
of should have and ought to have - past tenses
9.5.2 Table VIII 381
§10 Negation_and_Modality
10.0 Introductory remarks - discussion of negation 384
vis-a-vis pragmatics - 3 treatments in current
lingusitic literature: i) single operator over
Aux, ii) complex negation, iii) negation as high¬
er predicate
xii
10.1 Modality Negation and Proposition Negation
10.1.1 Denials - argument via double negation phenomena for 387
need for modality and proposition negation - arguments
against complex negation under Mod - the case of may not
and can't - topic negation
10.2 Stress and Negation
10.2.0 Introductory remarks 391
10.2.1 Examination of stress vis-a-vis interpretation (Table IX) 391
certain epistemics typically stressed; certain deontics
typically unstressed - reduction of not pushes stress
onto modal verb - pairs: can't/can not; mustn't/must not
10.3 An Analysis of Modality Expressions with
respect to Negation
10.3.0 Introductory remarks - 3 questions: i) modality or pro- 394
position negation? ii) where is modality negation indis¬
tinguishable from proposition negation? iii) where are
there gaps vis-a-vis positive modality?
10.3.1 Analytic epistemic modality with negation - basically 395
resolvable into 4 types (I think-paradigm) - the it's
possible type - synthetic modal expressions - paraphrase
test for modality negation
10.3.2 Deontic modality introduces problem of possible negative 401
illocutions - discussion - non-performative analytic de¬
ontics - 2 kinds of negation, both propositional - test
for epistemic modality negation doesn't work with deon¬
tics - difference between may not and mustn't - test for
modality negation
10.3.3 Dispositional modality - some items resist negation - 409
difference between needn't and don't need to
10.4 'Negative Transportation' and the Question of
Equivalence
10.4.1 Logical equivalences don't (necessarily) give linguistic 412
equivalences - possibility that negative propositional
attitudes, if not analyzed under Prop, must be treated
as negation under 111
10.4.2 Conclusion and summary 418
§11 Mood_in_Main_Clauses
11.0 Introductory remarks - interrogatives, imper- 419
atives and hortatives
11.1 The Illocutionary Node
11.1.0 Introductory remarks 419
11.1.1 3 parameters of illocutionary meaning - the illocution- 419
ary marks: •, ?, ! - differences in participant relations
11.2 'World Changing' Utterances
11.2.0 Introductory remarks 422
11.2.1 Interpretations of imperatives and related forms (will, 423
^e to) - imperatives sub-class of 'world changing' type
of utterance - can be authorative or permissive
11.2.2 Paradigms of imperative constructions - co-occurrence with 425
please, do/don't, etc. - the Mod specification for imper¬
atives? - futurity alone not sufficient - non-factuality
- negative imperatives - modality or proposition negation?
- prohibition: modality negation; negative command: propos¬
ition negation
xiii
11.2.3 Hortative Let's and German equivalents - paradigms 430
11.2.4 Let-constructions - German independent subjunctives 432
also 'world changing'
11.2.5 May-constructions - future Mod? - comparison with 434
let-constructions (cp. hope) - would that and if only
- irrealis Mod
11.2.6 Time reference with will, shall and may can be past with 436
respect to t - not so with imperatives, let's and let
11.3 Questions and Interrogative Tags
11.3.0 Introductory remarks - exclusion of echo-questions and 438
exclamatory expressions
11.3.1 Definition of open and non-open question types - yes/no 438
questions - arguments in favour of disjunctive analysis
of Prop - non-factual Mod symbolized - relevance of
some/any distinction - declaratives with question inton¬
ation - expected answer - summary of types
11.3.2 Wh-questions - Mod over wh-element ^ ; Mod over rest of 4 44
question • - relevance of topicalization
11.3.3 Interrogative tags on statements - 4 possibilities with 445
combinations of negative and positive, and fall vs. rise
intonation - arguments for one-clause analysis with speci¬
al translation rule - rejection of Sadock's proposal of
conjoined illocutions - principle of overriding illocution
- overrider = illocutionary force; overridden = illocution-
ary potential
11.4 Requests, Hortatlves and Interrogative Tags
11.4.0 Introductory remarks
11.4.1 Syntactic arguments for separating off requests based on
some/any patterns and negation - analyses of 3 different
types
11.4.2 The syntax of let's and shall we contrasted - suggested
two-clause analysis
11.5 Modal Verbs in Questions
11.5.0 Introductory remarks - exclusion of dispositional
11.5.1 3 types of interpretation: open, non-open and challenging
questions - exclusion of challenge type
11.5.2 Epistemically interpreted analytic modal expressions and
synthetic modal expressions
11.5.3 Deontically interpreted analytic and synthetic modal ex¬
pressions
11.5.4 Wh-questions - paradigms reflect broadly those of





12.1.1 Sequence of tense rules for reported speech (Table X) -
restrictions and exceptions
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§ 1 Some Theoretical Preliminaries
1.0 This dissertation is both speculative and explora¬
tory. It is speculative in that it attempts to speculate
upon the abstract structure of modality in universal terms
and it is exploratory in that it will examine empirically
the potentiality of modality under certain specific lingui
tic conditions to a greater extent than has been done in
previously published studies.
The theory of language adopted here is one that is genera¬
tive (§§ 1.1.1, 1.3.5), but it is not transformational in
the sense of Chomsky 1965 (the standard model of trans¬
formational grammar), or in the sense of later develop¬
ments of this model. In order to have a theory that is
adequate to the task of analyzing modality, certain dis¬
course features such as those discussed in Halliday 1967/8
and 1970a, to an extent taken up by transformationalists
(Jackendoff 1972, Schachter 1972, etc.), will have to be
taken into account.
In view of the size of the topic and the tentative nature
of many of the deductions made, a non-formal approach prov
es to be more useful than a formal one. The aim is, ul¬
timately, to present a view of modality that is at least
representative of the totality of the subject, rather than
exhaustive of one aspect of the subject.
Saying this, of course, raises the question: what is mod¬
ality? Definition of this term itself demands some discuss
ion (see §§ 2, 4, 7). For the time being, we may give it
a reference that includes aspects of the verb phrase tra¬
ditionally called 'mood' (1 subjunctive', 'indicative',
'imperative', etc.) and 'modal' (auxiliary, adverb, adjec¬
tive , etc.).
§ 1.1 A Model of Natural Language
1.1.0 In the following I outline a view of language that
is, in many respects, in accordance with the views of lan¬
guage to be found in Lakoff 1971 and in "Montague Grammar"
(cp. Partee 1975). This view of language is intended as
orientation for the discussions in later chapters. I shall
not enter into a discussion of the justification of this
view, but will confine myself to references to where such
discussions are to be found.
1.1.1 Natural languages may be regarded as infinite sets
of utterances related by means of finite, re¬
cursive grammars (G^ Gn) to a (presumably) open-ended
set of references to worlds (W^ W ...). (Taking utter¬
ance instead of sentence as the basis is, of course, non-
Chomskyan . )
The utterance may be analyzed as a structure with an illocu-
tion (111) commanding a modality (Mod) commanding a proposi¬
tion (Prop):
YL= 111 (Mod ( Prop ) )
111 specifies the communicative function of an utterance.
Mod specifies the speaker's conceptualization of, orienta¬
tion towards, the proposition contained in the utterance.
Thus 111 establishes the mode of the utterance, while Mod
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establishes the 'world' (cp. § 2.2.3) of an utterance. This
view should be compared to Hare's 1970 distinction between
'tropic', 'neustic' and 'phrastic' (cp. also Lyons 1977).
The proposition itself may be regarded as an adjunction (cp.
§ 1.1.2) of a topic, i. e. psychological subject, (Top), a
focus, i. e. new information (cp. Halliday 1970), (Foe)
and a thesis (0):
Prop = Top: Foe: ©
Associated with every utterance are a set of presuppositions,
a set of implications, a set of inferences, etc. (cp. §
1.3.3). Implications and inferences are in part respon¬
sible for the sequencing of utterances, i. e. the construc¬
tion of discourse.
The grammar of a natural language (G) consists of three le¬
vels of representation. These may be termed, for the sake
of simplicity, the semantic, the syntactic and the phono¬
logical. Within each level there is a set of abstract re¬
presentations governed by a set of formation rules. Ab¬
stract representations are related to a set of specific
representations via a set of operations. Within each level
there is a set of abstract terms (lexicon); operations may
introduce further, non-abstract terms and also introduce
structure. They need, therefore, to be accompanied by rule
reflexes which record the effects of the operation per¬
formed. These reflexes serve as a basis for specific con¬
straints on the power of the grammar; formation rules con¬
strain globally (cp. Lakoff 1968 b). Level-to-level move-
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ment is achieved by mapping rules.
This informal model of natural language may be summarized
by the following diagram, which should be compared with
the models (of grammar) to be found in Katz/Postal 1964,


































Operations at the semantic level I have termed 'translat-
tional rules' (cp. § 1.3.5).
1.1.2 In discussing the analysis of modality in subse¬
quent chapters, I shall find it necessary to distinguish
six types of structural relation, not all of which are curr¬
ent in transformational grammar.
co-ordination Examples: John and Mary, John or Mary







Example: give the book to me
Symbolized: (v n1 . . .n11)
Examples: that book, very good
Symbolized: nn
Example: try to go, want to go
Symbolized: v (v ...)
Example: John, who won, ...
Symbolized: n: n
Example: I like seeing her
Symbolized: v n C v n1...]
n n
The status of these relations is open to question: I find,
however, that those models of transformational grammar that
have tried to work with three relations: co-ordination,
adjunction and embedding (the standard model, for example)
are not powerful enough to capture certain readily observ¬
able processes for sentence-building.
1.1.3 The thesis (0) of a proposition is to be regarded
as a predicate containing a predicate constant (v) and a
set of predicate variables (n1 n11) as arguments in a
dependency relation. Predicate variables include: time-ref¬
erence, aspect, action frequency, manner, location, agent,
instrument, goal, source, etc. Maximally one occurrence of
each member of this set of variables is found per thesis.
Complex theses arise as a result of embedding, as in the
example: I like seeing her, i. e. ( 1 like ' ' I',x( ' see 1 ' 11 , ' she ' ) .
Compound propositions arise from complementation as in the
example: I tried to find her, i.e. ('try' ('find' 'I', 1 she') 'I 1) .
In the latter case it will be seen that try is treated as
an operator over a predicate. This differs markedly from
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the treatment of 1quasi-predicates' (Anderson 1972) to be
found in Lakoff 1971 and McCawley 1971b, etc., where only
one kind of predicate is recognized (S) .
§ 1.2 'Generative Semantics', meaning and universals
1.2.0 It will be apparent from the foregoing that the
kind of grammar I envisage would be classified as 'gener¬
ative semantics' (cp. Lakoff 1971 and Chomsky 1970). The
debate between the 'generativists' and the 'interpretiv-
ists' (see especially McCawley 1971b, Lakoff 1971, Katz
1970, 1971, 1973, Fodor 1970) centered on whether there
is a semantic component and whether semantics is incorpor¬
ated into the grammar as part of the generation or part
of the interpretation of strings and structures. In the
sketch in § 1.1.1 a semantic component with generative
power is envisaged; but there is also a means of constrain¬
ing this in the form of constraints on operations, which
must, presumably, be interpretive. (Lakoff 1971 foresees
a set of conditions associated with each (transformational)
rule constraining that rule; Montague 1970 a set of seman¬
tic rules (reflexes of syntactic rules) which control well-
formedness. The positions, though formally distinct, are
functionally similar.)
It is, however, a mistake to suppose that only one issue
separates the 'generativists' and the 'interpretivists'.
There are, in fact, at least six, which, although they may
interrelate, are nevertheless sufficiently distinct to re¬




3) constraints on generative power (cp. above and
§ 1.1.1)
4) structural relationship of equivalent utterances
5) primitiveness of semantic rather than syntactic
categories
6) competence and performance models
1.2.1 The existence of universals (i.e. substantive uni-
versals in Chomsky's terms (Chomsky 1965)) and the uni¬
versality of the abstract structure have been much dis¬
cussed and disputed (see especially Greenberg 1963, Bach
1968, McCawley 1968a, McNeill 1970, etc.). Even if one in¬
clines to the view that all languages have at least a uni¬
versal core of abstract structures and categories (as I
do in § 1.1) it is still possible to distinguish a strong
and a weak hypothesis. The strong hypothesis follows logi¬
cally from the view occasionally to be found that semanti-
cally equivalent utterances under conditions of contextual
identity or similarity have identical abstract structures.
We may summarize this view:
P. = P . iff ( X. , C.) = ( X. , C.)
1 j x x j j
where P stands for abstract structure
The weak hypothesis, to which I incline, is that the ab¬
stract structure of semantically equivalent utterances un¬
der conditions of contextual identity or similarity must
be derivable one from another (i.e. derivable via trans¬
lation rules). This view may be summarized:
P. P. iff (£., C.) EE (£., C.)
The second aspect of universality is the claim that at the
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most abstract level the grammar operates in terms of the
same abstract categories. This is, of course, entailed
by the strong hypothesis, but not by the weak hypothesis.
It is less controversial than the claim for structural uni¬
versality and I assume that it is a tenable position.
1.2.2 On the basis of certain syntactic and semantic re¬
lations 'generativists1 claim that many superficial lexi¬
cal items may be 'decomposed' into more abstract elements
(the principle of 'lexical decomposition'). The classic
instance is the analysis of kill as (CAUSE(BECOME(NOT(ALIVE))))
(cp. Lakoff 1965). Clearly, languages like Hindi and Tur¬
kish with a distinct analytic morphological structure in
their translation equivalents of kill 'cause to die' lend
support to this claim.
Connected with this claim, and with that of universality,
is the establishment of meaning postulates. Lakoff 1970b:
"Conclusion I: There is more to meaning than logical
form. Meaning postulates, as well as other logical
apparatus, are needed.
Conclusion II: There are empirical limits on the use
of meaning postulates. There are some cases where
lexical decomposition is required on linguistic grounds.
Hypothesis: Natural language employs a relatively small
finite number of atomic predicates that take sentential
complements (sentential operators). These do not vary
from language to language. They are related to each
other by meaning postulates that do not vary from
language to language." (p. 353)
This hypothesis is regarded as being essentially correct.
It should, however, be noted that the term 'sentential' re¬
quires modification. The atomic predicates Lakoff refers
to take other predicates as complements. The
atomic predicates may be quasi-predicates in terms of § 1.1.
- 8 -
1.2.3 Claims for the universality of abstract structures
lead easily to the 'translational fallacy' of supposing
that the translation of an utterance in one language in¬
to an utterance of another language automatically involves
the identity of their abstract structures. This, of course,
is nonsense in the case of the following translation pair:
1.1a. Guten Appetit!
b. I hope the meal's to your liking.
even allowing for the possibility of relating 1a via cer¬
tain rules of ellipsis to: Ich wunsche(dir/euch/lhnen)
einen guten Appetit. There is no cognitive equivalence in¬
volved, merely cognitive similarity - though there may, of
course, be situational and behavioural equivalence.
On the other hand, a pair like:
1.2a. Du siehst aus wie deine Mutter,
b. You look like your mother.
might be plausibly related to one another by means of an
identical abstract structure. Bilinguals, it should be noted,
recognize such pairs as cognitively equivalent, even though
the superficial lexical form does not suggest this. And
even if one has reservations about this kind of approach
to semantics, it is heuristically justifiable to assume
identity of abstract structure if only to arrive at a mini¬
mal distinction by putting such an hypothesis to the test.
There is, then, no one-to-one relationship between cogni¬
tive equivalence and translation equivalence. The latter
is always subject to the arbitrary effects of language-
specific conventions. Although we may, on the basis of cog¬
nitive equivalence, postulate an identical abstract struc-
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ture for two utterances in two separate languages, there
is no a priori reason why one language should realize this
structure in one way and the other language in some other
way. Moreover, beyond the level of purely objective communi¬
cation there seems to be no a priori reason for the equi¬
valence itself. Thus, while German has the form in 1a, Eng¬
lish has neither a corresponding syntactical form nor a
cognitive equivalent: ? I wish you a good appetite is, of
course, grammatically perfectly well formed but behaviour-
ally anomalous.
1.2.4 If we accept the 'generative semantics' view of
lexical accidence as outlined in § 1.2.2, we must pose the
question: what is semantically primitive?
Some possible candidates - many of them relevant to later
sections of this dissertation - are:
certain pronouns ('I' 'thou' 'one') cp. Postal 1966
certain other deictic elements ('here' 'there' 'this'
'that' 'yon') cp. Lyons 1975
certain predicate types ('event' 'state' 'identity')
cp. § 2.1.1
certain predicate variables ('time', the set of aspects
'frequency') cp. §§ 2.1.2, 2.2.1
certain participant relations ('agent' 'goal' 'expe-
riencer') cp. Anderson 1971a, Fillmore 1969, Halli-
day 1970a; cp. § 2.1.1
In addition to these, certain aspects of modality will be
suggested as candidates for semantic primitiveness (cp.
§§ 3, 7, 15).
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1.2.5 One of the suspicions aroused by 'generative se¬
mantics' is that it represents an attempt to set up either
a production grammar or a grammar of performance, thus
running counter to the Chomskyan orthodoxy (Chomsky 1965)
of a grammar of competence. But an attempt to move beyond
the Chomskyan sentence grammar to a grammar sensitive to
certain discourse or text features does not alter the prin¬
ciple of a grammar of competence. What characterizes a
grammar of competence is that it explains a speaker's
knowledge of his language; a performance grammar, on the
other hand, may be said to describe how a speaker uses his
language taking into account all manner of performance er¬
rors; and a production grammar is merely the complement of
a recognition grammar - the two together constitute algo¬
rithms that are dependent on the more general algorithm,
the grammar of competence.
It is a part of the ideal speaker's knowledge about his
language, and thus part of a grammar of competence, that he
finds certain sequences of otherwise acceptable utterances
meaningful and others not; that he knows that, for example,
a falling nuclear tone signifies something different from
a rising one; that he finds, for example, It's *VJohn who
ji did it appropriate in certain contexts and *VJohn did it
in others; and that when he hears, for example, I was able
to sing yesterday, he infers something different from when
he hears I could sing yesterday.
1.2.6 The term 'meaning' with regard to linguistics may be
understood in at least three ways: 1) as the relation between
- 1 1 -
utterances and the world, i.e. reference; 2) as the inven¬
tory and combinatorial properties of meaningful elements
in a language, i.e. semantics in the Katzian view (Katz
1966); and 3) as the use of utterances in the speech situ¬
ation, i.e. speech acts (Austin 1962).
What transformational grammar has been primarily concerned
with is meaning as in (2), though the development of 'gene¬
rative semantics' was largely a result of transformational
grammar's inadequate handling of (1) and (3). In studying
modality, meaning as in (3) is of cardinal importance.
It might be objected that (1) and (3) concern pragmatics
rather than semantics - taking 'pragmatics' to refer to re¬
lations between the linguistic and the extralinguistic - and
as such do not constitute a part of the grammar. Within the
range of (1) and (3), however, there are definitely a num¬
ber of phenomena that are linguistically relevant, for ex¬
ample, politeness factors (in particular the use of forms
like: Would you open the door? as a request, and the use of
honorifics); style; register; the use of 'performative' verbs,
etc.
In principle, we cannot exclude from linguistic description,
i.e. from the grammar, such linguistically relevant factors
simply because, in some views, they fall into the category
of pragmatics. If they are systematic - and this is implied
by the use of the expression 'linguistically relevant' -,
then the grammar must take account of them. And if the term
'pragmatics' is used, then the epithet 'linguistic' should
be applied to it.
In the following section I look more closely at what under
the heading of 'meaning' is systematic and therefore to be
handled by the grammar.
§ 1.3 Meaning and Acceptability
1.3.0 In this section I shall examine certain aspects of
meaning that are of immediate relevance to the topic of mod-
u
ality and which we must accordingly require the grammar to
handle.
1.3.1 It is obvious that the form can when used as a verb
1
can be said to represent two different words: can - a modal
2
verb denoting (various types of) possibility; can - a 'le¬
xical' verb denoting the action of putting something into
tins/cans in order to preserve it. This intuition, that we
have two separate words, is reflected in linguistic terms
by recognizing two distinct lexical items which happen to
1 2
be homophonous: can is a homonym of can .
There is, however, a controversial aspect of meaning with
regard to the modal verb can , namely its polysemy. The
senses: 'ability', 'permission', 'possibility', etc. are
frequently distinguished. Katz/Fodor semantics (Fodor/Katz
1964) would presumably distinguish these senses in terms of
semantic distinguishers not unlike the glosses given above.
Some writers on modal verbs (Ross 1969, for example) have
tended to treat the various senses of modal verbs as sepa¬
rate items which they associate with different syntactic
structures (transitive vs. intransitive). The implication of
this is that there are separate entries in the lexicon for,
1 ' 1 •'
sayf can and can (cp. Perlmutter's (1 970) comments on
(1 )"the two verbs begin" and their extension to must).
The latter position is mistaken, even if a structural ap¬
proach is plausible, in that it confounds sense distinctions
with lexical or even syntactic distinctions. But there is
a more important question raised by it. When examining the
semantics of modal verbs it soon becomes clear that we not
only have 'subsidiary' senses but also 'intermediate' senses:
rubrics like 'possibility', 'permission' and 'ability' for
can either require further refinement (cp. she can do it:
she can be nasty ('able to' vs. 'capable of') or else can¬
not be realistically distinguished (cp. she can go if she
likes = 'able'?/"permitted1?) .
The greater the number of examples and sentence-types we
examine, the more the meaning of modal verbs seems to look
like a continuum with no discrete senses. But this kind of
view would lead us back to the unproductive relativism of
pre-structural semantics. It should, I think, be taken as
axiomatic that a grammar must be capable of distinguishing
senses of modal verbs insofar as speakers of the language
are capable of doing so, everything else being equal.
The position taken by Ehrman 1966 was an attempt to solve
this problem. She distinguished a basic meaning, the "low¬
est common denominator" of meaning, which can be determined
independently of context, and an array of overtones, which
are "all conditioned by elements of the context which cannot
- 14 -
be identified, isolated, and listed" (Ehrmann 1966, p. 10).
1
The basic meaning of can would thus be more abstract than
the glosses indicated above, i.e. whatever it is they have
in common.
Although I cannot accept Ehrman's account in full (cp. §
6.1.3) it is acceptable to the extent that it tries, inform¬
ally, to set up an abstract meaning. Let me suggest what
this would mean in terms of the grammar outlined in §§ 1.1
and 1.2.
1
The variety and the potentiality of application of can to
situations is reflected in the grammar by the mapping of
1
can onto semantic specifications all containing the same
semantically primitive element. Different senses will be
associated with the basic configurations discoverable in
the set of specifications: there will, for example, be a
configuration basic to epistemic interpretations of modals.
The semantic specification of certain participants in the
configuration may introduce some of the subsidiary senses,
for example, the 'willingness' sense of will possible only
with a subset of animate agents (cp. § 7.3.2).
Semantic specifications, however, may differ not only in
their configurations but also in their degree of semantici-
ty (the amount of information and the preciseness of the
information contained in them). Can may be mapped onto
these specifications if one of its structural descriptions
containing its semantically primitive element is met. This
reflects the potentiality of application with respect to
1
can , the level of 'overtone' or semantic complexity that
is an observable aspect of meaning. Thus the potentiality
of application is related to the power of the grammar to
generate semantic specifications (cp. Ehrman 1966 quoted
above).
In addition to the question of potential application there
1
is also the question of potential opposition. Mapping can
onto a particular semantic specification may be a choice of
1 1
can over may; with another semantic specification can might
be chosen over be able. The items may and be able, however,
would not themselves be in competition as possible mappings
for one and the same semantic specification. There is ob¬
viously a degree of overlap between lexical items with re¬
gard to their potential application. To this extent there
1
is synonymy: but we could not say that can is absolutely
synonymous with may, since it has a partially distinct set
of structural descriptions to be met. Obviously, such se¬
mantic overlap is important in discovering the meaning of
individual lexical items (cp. paraphrase relations § 1.3).
1.3.2 Having outlined how the grammar reflects the various
aspects of meaning, sense, subsidiary sense or overtone, I
shall now try and illustrate its relevance to certain in¬
formal terms that I shall use in later chapters.
Neutralization: this term, which is to be found in the field
of phonology in Trubetzkoy 1939 and Martinet 1960, can be
conveniently taken to cover the situation that arises when
two lexical items with at least partially differing sets
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of structural descriptions but with a common semantic ele¬
ment appear to be synonymous. This would appear to be the
case in some dialects with will and shall with first per¬
son subjects.
Semantic shift: this notion is introduced because it seems
particularly relevant to the question of meaning with re¬
gard to modality, though it is by no means confined to that
area of language. Semantic shift is the historically observ¬
able process by which a semantically "transparent" construc¬
tion becomes "opaque" (to use the informal terms used in
Ullman 1962). The use of verbs of motion to indicate futur¬
ity in English and French: be going to + infinitive and al-
ler + infinitive is a case in point. From the strictly physi¬
cal sense of the verb of motion that at one stage of English
was interpretable in: I am going to fight i.e. 'for to fight'
a non-physical sense has developed: I'm going to make break¬
fast, which is interpretable as the inception of an action,
this being normally the sense of be going in NEng. In what
is sometimes called 'Black English' or 'Black English Ver¬
nacular' the process has extended gonna (<— be going to) to
cases not only of inception but also of prediction normally
covered by will in standard English, will being said to be
non-existent in 'Black English' (Fickett 1970). Surprising¬
ly similar processes are discoverable in many languages, re¬
lated and unrelated (cp. § 3.2.3).
Semanticization: by this I mean the tendency of language
to assign distinct meanings to items that at one stage of
a language may have been in free variation and hence syn-
onymous. Thus although to an extent the English adject¬
ival suffixes: -ic and -ical are, or have been, in free
variation as in older NEng. scientific scientifical,
some dialects distinguish between historic and historical.
Semanticization seems to have operated recently with needn't
and don't need to, haven't to and don't have to, at least
in some dialects.
Sense and interpretation: it will have been seen from § 1.3.1
that various senses of lexical items are associated with
different structural configurations, assuming these struc¬
tures to be semantic. In using the word 'sense' I thus mean
a structurally distinct aspect of the meaning of a lexical
item. The term 'interpretation' is used more loosely and
from another viewpoint. An interpretation is a possible
reading of an utterance without any consideration as to
how that utterance is structured. It is thus a pre-analyti-
cal term.
Preferred interpretation: it is observable that certain
utterances are more readily interpretable in one way than
in another. This is a question of intuition and is, to a
considerable extent, subjective. The subjectivism can be
offset by the fact that many speakers of a language share
the same intuitions. Whilst aware of the dangers of such
a notion, I find it useful heuristically.
Dialect: this term is used neutrally, that is, without re¬
ferring specifically to either a regional or a social dia¬
lect. It may be defined as a group of idiolects having a
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particular feature in common.
Acceptability: an acceptable utterance is one that under
normal conditions is semantically interpretable and gram¬
matical without reference to non-conventionalized metaphor
or metaphorical processes.
1.3. !* He risked to lose his job.
is ungrammatical in Standard English though semantically
interpretable in the same way as the grammatical:
1.4. He risked losing his job.
But:
1.5. * Silence drummed in my ears.
is not semantically interpretable, though it is grammatical,
without reference to metaphorical processes.
Conventions for marking various types or degrees of accept¬
ability differ: I employ the following:
!* ungrammatical in the language/dialect referred
to
* semantically uninterpretable under normal
conditions
?* questionable acceptability: no application
conceivable
? marginal/unidiomatic: native speakers at
variance
Occasionally I use t/ and x for acceptable utterances which
are respectively interpretable and uninterpretable in a
specific way; otherwise, where I establish paradigms on the
basis of a particular interpretation type, I enclose in
square brackets those utterances that are acceptable but
are not interpretable in parallel fashion to the rest of
the paradigm. Thus establishing a paradigm of epistemic in¬
terpretations :
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1.6a. She may go tomorrow.
b. £she shall go tomorrow]
c. £She needs to go tomorrow]
means that the forms with shall and need to may not be
interpreted epistemically.
Judgements for English are, except where otherwise noted,
my own; for German they are those of native speakers study¬
ing humanities.
Use of the symbol * for various types of unacceptability
excludes its use for reconstructed forms: where necessary,
I have used f .
§ 1.4 Meaning Relationships
1.4.0 In the literature on semantics it is usual to distin¬
guish meaning relationships such as: presupposition, entail¬
ment, and equivalence. In this section I shall discuss some
(2)
relations that ar6 obviously semantico-logical. In § 1.4.2
I shall look at meaning relationships which have been termed
'pragmatic' (Keenan 1969).
1.4.1 If we consider the utterance:
1.7. John opened the door.
we may make certain claims about what we necessarily know
when the utterance is used felicitously. These may be divided
into the proposition (what is asserted), presuppositions and
entailments: Thus:
presupposes: the existence of a particular identified door
the existence of an individual John
asserts: John initiated an action which resulted in
the door becoming open
entails: the door's previously being shut
the door's being open after the action
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Entailment corresponds to logical implication, i.e.
P —> =def {1 01 1 } P^
i.e. p entails q iff p is true, q is true.
Presupposition may be defined:
p presupposes q iff p is true, q is true
and p is true, q is true (cp. Keenan 1969)
which has the truth value of logical postpendence, cp.
P ^ q =def 0 1 0 1 pq
I propose to use the symbols —> and IZD for entailment and
presupposition respectively.
The utterances:
1.8a. John opened the door.
b. John didn't open the door.
apparently share the same presuppositions; they have differ¬
ent entailments. 8b does not entail the door's being shut
or open, though it is consistent with either.
The utterances:
1.9a. John opened the door.
b. The door was opened by John.
may be said to paraphrase each other: they share the same
presuppositions, propositions and entailments. Logically,
they are equivalent:
P O q =def {10 0 1} pq
Whether we would wish to say that 9a and b are linguistic¬
ally equivalent, I leave open for the moment (cp. below).
A further type of relationship can be observed between:
1.10a. The door was open,
b. Someone oppened it.
Excluding the possibility of something (rather than someone)
opening the door, which represents a further complication,
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we could say that 10b is an inference from 10a given that
at some time 'the door was shut' was true. This kind of
inference corresponds to logical reverse implication (re¬
plication) :
P 1 =def t 1 0 1} P<3
But the relationship does not conform exactly to the logic¬
al definition. The logical relation does not capture the
essentially directional nature of arguing from 10a to 10b,
where 10a has primacy and where 10b is just one of a number
of valid inferences. The process of inferring 10b from a
is much more powerful than a reverse implication. This
raises the question of just how applicable dyadic truth
value functions are to semantic relations in natural lan¬
guage use, a problem discussed to some extent in Lakoff/
Gordon 1971, Grice 1967, etc. There are many semantic re¬
lations discoverable, which we need to capture, I think,
in a semantic theory, that, while similar in some respects
to one or other of the 16 dyadic truth value functions of
propositional calculus, differ in two important respects:
they are probabilistic and they are inductive. Strict analy¬
sis of them would require a many-valued logic or a modal
logic, irrespective of the question of extensionality and
intensionality (cp. Montague 1970, Partee 1975). The looser,
but more powerful relation between 10a and b I shall refer
to as supposition; and I shall symbolize it: .'. . Further
examples of suppositions may be seen in the relationships
between 11a and b and between 12a and b:
1.11a. The door opened.
b. Something caused the door to open.
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1.12a. John opened the door.
b. John had some reason for opening the door.
The following should serve as a working definition of
supposition:
p .'. q iff q entails p
and p is consistent with q or q
(alternatively: q is one of the set of poss¬
ible inferences from p)
I will make use of three other relationships: what I call
'linguistic implication', expectation and consistency. Con¬
sistency is the most straightforward and is definable in
terms of modal logic:
P 0 q =def ^(P ^ q)
The following are examples of consistency: 13a is consistent
with 13a' and a"; 13b with 13b' and b".
1.13a. She may be going,
a'. She's going.
a". She's not going.
b. She's supposed to go.
b'. She's going.
b". She's not going.
'Linguistic implication', in contradistinction to logical
implication, is the kind of relationship that exists between
the following pairs:
1.14a. She's to be appointed chairman tomorrow,
b. She'll be appointed chairman tomorrow.
when they are applied to exactly the same world.
If we try to assign this relationship to strict logical re¬
lations, we would arrive at equivalence or tautology, de¬
pending on the interpretability of:
1.14a'. She's to be appointed chairman tomorrow but
she won't be (appointed chairman tomorrow).
b'. She's not to be appointed chairman tomorrow
but she will be (appointed chairman tomorrow).
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My own view is that 14a is inconsistent with the negation
of 14b; and that 14b is inconsistent with the negation of
14a, assuming of course that 14a and b refer to the same
world. This gives us the truth table for equivalence: <->,
i.e. 1 0 0 ij. If, however, (as other people I have dis¬
cussed this problem with maintain) 14a' and b' are inter-
pretable under the conditions stated above, then we have
the truth table for tautology: "T", i.e. ^1 1 1 1^.
And yet 14a and b are by no means linguistically equivalent,
nor are they tautologous. The relationship between 14a and
b is contingent, not necessary. In everyday language use,
we would say that 14a implies 14b and for this reason I
suggest the term 'linguistic implication' ('weak implica¬
tion' would be another possibility). Definition of 'linguis¬
tic implication' is a little difficult. I have adopted the
following:
p linguistically implies q iff p is inconsistent with'vq
and p entails ^ q
Frequently, linguistic implication involves modality, as in
14a; hence its significance for this dissertation. We may
distinguish two cases, I think: simple linguistic implica¬
tion and mutual linguistic implication, symbolized: ,
An example of simple linguistic implication can be seen in
the pair:
1.15a. You may go.
b. I permit you to go.




b. She's going to go.
Leech (1974) distinguishes a relationship that he calls
'expectation', subdividing it into ' cancelled expectation'
and 'actual expectation' on the basis of utterances like:
1.17. The door was not shut.
This, according to Leech, would cartel the 'expectation':
1.18. The door was shut.
and would have the 'actual expectation':
1.19. The door was open.
I prefer to use the term 'anticipation' for 'cancelled ex¬
pectation', which is no more than the semantic reflex of
the juxtaposition (in this case) of not and shut, and keep
the term 'expectation' for what Leech terms 'actual expecta¬
tion', which seems to be a more useful relationship for the
discussion of modality.
That expectation is not the same as entailment can be seen
from the fact that an expectation can be denied without al¬
tering the truth value of the original proposition.
1.20a. Not many people know John,
b. Some people know John.
20a expects 20b. But the expectation may be denied:
1.20c. Not many people know John; indeed no one knows
John.
The difference between expectation and presupposition lies
in the fact that the relationship between a proposition and
its expectation is one of consistency, while that between
a proposition and its presupposition is always one of en¬
tailment .
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Leech's examples all involve negation (and also usually
quantification) and it is on the basis of negation that
(3)
he defines the notion of expectation. Since I think ex¬
pectation is a more general phenomenon, related to modal-
ization in general, not negation in particular, I will at¬
tempt to redefine it.
My justification for this is taken from patterns like:
(4)
1.21a. She's supposed to visit her grandma tomorrow,
a'. She's supposed to visit her grandma tomorrow
but she isn't going to.
a". She's supposed to visit her grandma tomorrow
and she's going to.
(4)
b. She was supposed to visit her grandma tomorrow,
b'. She was supposed to visit her grandma tomorrow
but she isn't going to.
b". She was supposed to visit her grandma tomorrow
and she's going to.
We may say that in the case of 21a:
p(p) o (pV-vp)
where |i is a modality
and p is a proposition 'she visit her grandma tomorrow'
With 21b the modality is complex, the modality itself is
modified:
p.' (p (p) ) where p' ^ p




(In fact, in this case p'(p(p)) also linguistically implies
/vp) .
The pattern we have seen in 21a and b shows certain similar¬
ities to the pattern of negation illustrated by Leech (op.
cit.).
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Definition of anticipation is as follows:
li (p) anticipates (p)
where n £ the set of modality operators over (p)
This definition may seem trivial, but this, I suggest, is
the nature of anticipation. It may be objected, and I think
validly, that logical expressions like Op and Dp do not an¬
ticipate p. This does not apply, I maintain, to natural lan¬
guage expressions like: perhaps she's there, she must be
there, etc. where a stand is taken with respect to the truth
(validity) of 'she be there'.
Definition of expectation is somewhat problematic. Leech
1974, who is of course only concerned with the expectations
of negatives, avoids a definition and offers instead a 'rule
of expectation':
"If X is a negative assertion
and if F is the most communicatively significantfeature
within the scope of negation in X
and if Y is an assertion identical to X except that it
is positive and does not contain F
then X expects Y"
(Leech, 1974, p. 323)
Apart from the undefinied nature of 'most communicatively
significant' and 'identical', this rule would not apply in
those cases where expectations are dependent on certain other
modalities: 'de-actualizing' past tense form as in: She was
to go there tomorrow; conditional tense/mood form as in: She
would go there tomorrow - Leech himself includes some forms
of counterfactual under expectation rather than under pre¬
supposition. Thus, whereas: She's not going expects some¬
thing like: She's staying, She was to go there tomorrow ex¬
pects She's not (now) going there tomorrow and: She would
go there tomorrow expects: She won't go there tomorrow (un¬
less ...) .
I find it impossible to arrive at one strict definition for
these three cases - and there are presumably more. Each mod-
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ality appears to have a differently structured expectation.
I suspect that expectation is in fact a cover term for a
number of (definable) relations. What does seem to be in¬
volved in some way in the above examples is the notion
'contrary of'. Thus I offer as a partial working definition:
p(p) expects (p')
where p' is the contrary of p
This, I grant, is incomplete: it leaves out of account the
fact that p' may also be modalized, though not by the same
modality as operates over p, i.e. p. I use the notion of
expectation fully aware of its questionable theoretical
status.
I return now to the question of strong and weak paraphrase
and via this to the principle of linguistic equivalence.
is a strong paraphrase of 512
iff 211 an^ ^2 share the same set of presuppositions
and entailments
and the propositional content of 21 ^ <-> the propositional
content of £2
2.^ is a weak paraphrase of
iff the relationship between the propositional contents
of I1 and Z2 i-s weaker than that of mutual entailment «-»
and-or £-] anc^ Z2 have different suppositions, implications,
anticipations, expectations or consistency relations.
On the basis of such a definition the utterances containing
sollen and English Vbe_ to, for example, would not, on ana¬
lysis, turn out to be strong paraphrases in:
1.22a. Sie soil morgen ihre Oma besuchen.
b. She's to visit her grandma tomorrow.
when interpreted deontically, because 22a and b differ with
respect to their implications:
1.22a'. Sie soil morgen ihre Oma besuchen, wird's aber
nicht tun.
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b'. ?* She's to visit her grandma tomorrow, but she
won't (do so).
In my view, linguistic equivalence can only be based on a
strong paraphrase relation. Linguistic equivalence is ac¬
cordingly defined:
If £-j is a strong paraphrase of 212
then the structural descriptions of 2. and 51 „ are equi¬
valent ( £ 1 = 212 )
Thus if 22a and b are not strong paraphrases, they are not
equivalent and do not have identical semantic specifica¬
tions. This is a rather more restricted view than that of
accredited 'generative semanticists' such as McCawley and
Lakoff, who would, for example, equate dead with not alive
(cp. Lakoff 1965) when, in fact, there is a difference which
is, at least provisionally, expressible in terms of expecta¬
tions .
1.4.2 Keenan (1969) draws attention to certain presupposi¬
tions connected with the status and relations of participants,
with the age, sex and consanguinity of participants, with
their location with respect to items mentioned etc. Such
presuppositions cannot be said to be logically related to
an utterance, even though it can be demonstrated that there
is some kind of exclusive relationship between them and the
utterance. Consider, for example:
1.23. Tu es degoutant.
From this utterance we know that the addressee is an animal,
child, social inferior or intimate of the speaker. We also
know, if we are competent speakers of the language, that
the addressee is not known to be female, otherwise the
speaker would have said:
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1.24. Tu es degoutante.
'Pragmatic' in the sense used here refers to systematic phen¬
omena that have to be included in an utterance in a particu¬
lar language without being logically necessary for the mess¬
age of that utterance. That is, it refers to the speaker's
knowledge of the language rather than his knowledge of the
world as reflected in logical relations. Under such a defi¬
nition even the cases of implication I noted in § 1.3.3 could
be termed 'pragmatic'. Obviously both kinds of relation,logi¬
cal and 'pragmatic', are subject to the rules of logic and
are therefore, in this respect, equally logical. I prefer
not to distinguish between 'logical' and 'pragmatic' rela¬
tions. To me both are semantic relations, and semantic re¬
lations may be divided into those that have a universal
basis and those that are specific to a particular language.
If such a distinction is necessary, it may be re-stated in
terms of 'universal semantic relation' and 'language-speci¬
fic semantic relation'.
We may also look here at what Gordon and Lakoff have called
'conversational postulates' (Gordon/Lakoff 1971), which is
a 'pragmatic' relation with a more conventional use of the
word 'pragmatic'. Gordon and Lakoff claim that certain utter¬
ance types may be used and interpreted in a way that deviates
from the uses and interpretations usually associated with
that utterance type. Thus:
1.25. Why don't you go to the cinema?
is first and foremost a suggestion or proposal, despite its
form, unless don't is stressed. Gordon and Lakoff would say
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that 25 conversationally entails:
1.26. I suggest you go to the cinema.
This is a useful notion, but I shall not establish it as
one of the basic semantic relations I shall work with in
this dissertation, since I think it can be covered in terms
of relations already defined in § 1.3.3 - either entailment
or linguistic implication. (In § 11.4.1 I suggest an alter¬
native view of utterances like 25.)
1.4.3 Finally I should comment on what I conceive of as a
translational rule. Given the strong paraphrase pair:
1.27a. John opened the door.
b. The door was opened by John.
we posit the existence of rules which permit both utteranc¬
es to be generated from a common semantic specification. ^
Given the translation pair (not a strong paraphrase pair):
1.28a. John soil gehen.
b. John is to go.
we posit the existence of rules which can relate the dis¬
tinct semantic specifications^^.
Since it is mainly my intention to discover more about the
systems of modality in English and German, without an under¬
standing of which even the basic terms for the semantic spec¬
ification of modality are lacking, I make no attempt to
establish translational rules for modality; I mention them
only as a guide to my conceptualization of what a grammar
will ultimately look like.
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§ 2 The Semantics of the Verb Phrase
2.0 Since a discussion of modality presupposes that we can
separate off modality from other linguistic systems involved
in verb constructions, namely tense, aspect,action-type (i.e.
aktionsart), etc., I shall give a sketch here of the verb
phrase and its categories.
§ 2.1 Non-modal systems in the verb-phrase
2.1.1 Voice and action-type are, to a considerable extent,
interrelated. We may distinguish:
i) notional activity and passivity
f. ex. He got a knife, (active ) i.e. 'fetched'
He got knifed. (passive)
ii) notional and syntactic passivity
f. ex. He received a phone call, (active form)
He was called up. (passive form)
iii) stative (= adjectival) and non-stative passive
f. ex. It was woven.
It was being woven.
Fortunately, only the question of syntactic passivity is
immediately relevant to modality. Voice is essentially a way
of viewing an action or event, determined, I believe, by
topicalization; more abstract, apparently, is the question of
action-type. Action-types refer to the kind of action, event
or state denoted in a predicate; action-type is intimately
associated with patterns of case relations (cp. Anderson
1971a, Fillmore 1969).
The exact nature of abstract cases, and even whether they
exist, is uncertain: Anderson, for example, distinguishes
four basic case features which may combine in various con¬
figurations to give other 'cases'; Fillmore distinguishes
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seven autonomous cases. The question of case is only part¬
ly relevant to the question of modality and so I shall note
here only those cases that I require for my analysis of mod¬
ality, leaving the question of their universal status open.
These are: Ag for agent (the initiator of an action or event),
Aff for affected (the participant affected by an action),
Exp for experiencer (of a state), Loc for locative, and Obj
for objective (the neutral participant).
The number of action-types is also open to debate. King
(1969, 1970) and Quirk et al. (1972) analyze actions in
terms of a basic stative/non-stative distinction that is
standard in the transformational literature since Lakoff's
(1965) account of the progressivizability of certain verbs
in terms of this distinction. King goes further than Lakoff
and, to an extent incorporating suggestions made from a phil¬
osophical viewpoint by Vendler 1967, suggests a system of
six action-types analyzed in terms of four features: _+ stat
(stative vs. non-stative) , _+ DUR (process vs. non-process),
_+ PUNCT (event vs. non-event), and _+ VOL (activity vs. non-
activity) . His system is exemplified:
i) My driving licence expired yesterday, (event)
ii) I read a book last night. (process activity)
iii) I fetched my certificates from home. (event activity)
iv) The wet blanket dried out in the sun. (process)
v) I belong to Glasgow. (state)
vi) I sang yesterday. (activity)
These are specified:
i' ) -STAT -DUR +PUNCT -VOL
ii' ) -STAT +DUR +VOL
iii' ) -STAT -DUR +PUNCT +VOL
iv' ) -STAT +DUR -VOL
V' ) +STAT
vi' ) -STAT -DUR -PUNCT +VOL
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Quirk et al. establish five classes of dynamic verb, i.e.








Apart from the discrepancies between these systems ('activi¬
ty' and 'process' are used in rather different senses) and
their inadequacy (verbs of motion are not discussed, nor
are verbs like pride oneself - stative?), we may observe
that King introduces features which appear to belong to the
field of aspect (_+ DUR) and case (+VOL) . This kind of ap¬
proach suggests that the number of action types may, in fact,
be quite small, the differences between verb types being dif¬
ferences in aspectual and other features.
In the analyses in ensuing chapters I shall take a similar
standpoint to King without using his feature systems. In¬
stead, I shall treat action-types as abstract predicates. I
think it is possible to describe all action-types in terms
of the following predicates either alone or in combination
with the addition of aspectual and frequentative elements.
The predicates I use are: '(do...)' for actions and activ¬
ities such as he jumped, he killed her, he played, '(mo¬
tion ...)' for changes of state, transitions and motion -
he came, it grew, he became hot, and '(state ...)' for states
and relations. Actions may be related to changes of state
by means of the quasi-predicate '(cause ...)'. The difference









ed, assuming the latter to be a deliberate action, may be
expressed in terms of an inherent feature 'durative' for
play and 'punctual' for jump. The aspectual difference be¬
tween play and jump, i.e. non-perfective vs. perfective is
discussed below (§ 2.1.2).
2.1.2 Under aspect I include the system of viewing actions
and events as complete or incomplete. A distinction between
'perfective' and 'imperfective' is generally accepted in
the literature (cp. Comrie 1976, Kury^owicz 1964, Lyons 1977,
etc.); it covers, for example:
2.1a. John was going to the door. 'imperfective'
b. John went to the door. 'perfective'
Less conventional, probably because it is only partially
grammaticalized in English, is 'inceptive' aspect. Examples
of this include:
2.2a. John is going to France tomorrow.
b. He's about to leave.
c. In two years' time he was to become the world's
most famous jew's harp player.
Here the action, even though in the case of 2a it may not
yet actually be in progress or even imminent, seems to be
(8)
pre-determined . Consider also:
2.3a. He had to wait six years,
b. He'd got to wait six years.
In some dialects of English, including my own, 3a may be
'inceptive' or 'imperfective', i.e. may be uttered with re¬
ference to a situation where the six-year period of enforced
waiting was imminent or where it was already under way, while
3b may only be 'inceptive'.
Action-frequency is paralleled by the quantification system
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in noun phrases, particularly by the system: one-several-
all. The distinction between one and several instances of
an action can be seen in:
2.4a. Frank has slept with Julie.
b. Frank has been sleeping with Julie.
2.5a. He jumped up and down.
b. He was jumping up and down.
2.6a. He hit him.
b. He was hitting him.
c. He beat him.
2.7a. She gave her hair a brush.
b. She gave her hair a brushing.
In 4 - 7a it is possible to interpret the verb as referr¬
ing to one action or several, for example in 6a one hit or
several hits. In the b examples, however, the possibility of
and interpretation where there is only one instance is ruled
out (or is at least unlikely without more context, cp. 6b;
6c can of its nature only refer to several hits). Compare:
2.6a'. He hit him once/several times.
b'. * He was hitting him once/several times.
On the basis of the above it would be wrong to say that the
a examples refer to inherently singular actions. The fact
that only 4 - 7a can appear with a frequency specifying ad¬
verbial indicates rather number neutrality; 4 - 7b which are
all also imperfective, may however be inherently iterative.
I shall therefore distinguish between 'non-iterative' or
'instantial' and 'iterative'.
Corresponding to universal quantification is 'habitual'.
This can be seen in non-future and non-perfective interpre¬
tations of:
2.8a. He works in Freiburg,
b. He attends school.
and in a non-future-in-past interpretation of:
- 36 -
2.9. He worked in Freiburg.
§ 2.2 Tense and Modality
2.2.1 The term 'tense' has, in transformational literature,
been taken to refer to something abstract, i.e. what under¬
lies a particular surface structure 'tense-form' (cp. Seuren
1969). For example the utterance:
2.10. She's leaving tonight.
might be said to have 'future tense' even though the 'tense
form' is termed present. This use of 'tense' means effective¬
ly 'time reference'. But 'time reference' is not the only
function of tense: it may also function as a kind of modality.
Consider:
2.11a. There was, said the Prime Minister, a growing
sense of dissatisfaction in the country today,
b. I asked if she was on her way.
The underlined tense-forms in 11a and- b are not present, yet
their time reference is, or may be, present. The choice of
tense indicates a particular view of the validity of the pro¬
positions 'there is a growing sense of dissatisfaction in the
country today' and 'she is on her way' conditioned by the
reported-speech situation. Similarly, what might be called
a future tense-form in 12 (it might also be called a present
tense modal) does not refer to future time as such but, if
anything, to the present moment.
2.12. They'll have been on holiday, I expect.
That is, the speaker makes an estimation of the likelihood
of: 'they have been on holiday' being true.
Given such phenomena, it will be useful to distinguish be¬
tween 'tense-form' (the surface structure form), 'time refer-
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ence', and 'tense', which we may gloss as conceptual time
or conceptual world (cp. § 2.2.5).
2.2.2 Analysis of the complex: 'tense^time referenced
tense-form' in transformational studies are inadequate in
a number of respects. The standard account, that of Chomsky's
1965 model, treats tense as a subcategory of Auxiliary. Since
each sentence embedding may have a tense marking, certain
complex patterns of tense may be generated. Unforunatelyr
this model of transformational grammar cannot distinguish
those cases of embedding where multiple time reference is
impossible from those where it is not.
* =? He began to have gone.
For further comments on the treatment of tense and modality
in transformational grammar see § 9.
Another suggestion within a generative framework based main¬
ly on Ross 1969 and developed by McCawley 1971a treats tense
as a higher predicate, like a time adverbial, which may be
lowered onto a verb by transformational rule. McCawley notes
that "the occasion would hardly ever arise for one to use so
many subsidiary 'reference points' as to require tenses piled
more than three deep" (p. 103 op. cit.).
McCawley analyzes the English perfect, past and pluperfect
as follows:
Compare:
CltJ- he Past go IjL
It was possible that he had gone.
38
£Past I phone]"] I have phoned.
Jpast _Past Jl phonejJJ I phoned.
Jpast ^Past [past £l phonJJJJ I had phoned.
On other words, the perfect is treated as the past of the
present, the past as a double past, and the pluperfect as
a triple past configuration. In fact, however, to have three
reference points for the pluperfect is counter-intuitive in
some cases. Consider:
2.13. He had already arrived when I phoned.
On McCawley's analysis this would look something like:
£past jj?ast ££past J^he arrivejj Jjvhen £l phoneJJJJ^
On a graphic representation only two reference points are
necessary:
a x 1
he had when I moment of
arrived phoned speaking
In this respect alone, McCawley's analysis is unsatisfact¬
ory. Compare now:
2.14. Before he had come to see me that time, he,g>
had gotten blind drunk.
This would seem to require four reference points in McCaw¬
ley ' s system: three would be more realistic:
Kx^ 1
he had (that time) narrator's moment
gotten he had reference of
blind come to point speaking
drunk see me
A more serious complication resulting from McCawley's ana¬
lysis is that there is no mechanism for distinguishing high¬
er tense nodes from higher predicates. I would claim, and
later arguments will show, that some of these higher predi¬
cates (quasi-predicates in my terms) cannot be independently
tensed. Precisely how these tense nodes could be interspersed
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with other predicates and how they would come together by
raising or lowering rules is mysterious. If we try to ana¬
lyze in McCawley's way the utterance:
2.15. John had killed Bill,
using his analysis of kill, namely:
(cause(become(not(alive)))), where do we put in the tense
nodes? The solution:
[past [past [past[_[do John] cause [become [not £alive Bil
is counter-intuitive, because the causation is surely prior
to the 'becoming-not-alive'; if one Past node occurs lower,
i.e. above 'cause1 we have a problem not only with the tense-
lowering rule but also in getting the correct structure for
predicate-raising to produce kill out of 'cause become not
alive':
[past £past£[j?ast£[do John] causej become Lnotjalive Bill]JJJ]3
In other words the proposal does not seem to lead anywhere
except to counter-intuitive embeddings.
2.2.3 An analysis which avoids the major problem with Mc¬
Cawley's analysis, that is, more time reference points than
are intuitively necessary and, I believe, also avoids the
problem of tense nodes interspersed with quasi-predicates
can be constructed on the basis of a tripartite tense system.
Under such an analysis, the moment of speaking is taken as a
neutral reference point (tQ), a second reference point (t^)
relates to conceptual time 'tense'; and a third point re¬
lates to actual time, 'time reference' proper (t^). Such an
analysis has been suggested by Lyons 197T, though I depart
somewhat from his formulation.
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Since t is intimately related to the speech act, we may
assign it to the illocution node (111). And since t^ re¬
fers to the actual time of occurrence of an action or time
of existence of a state, we may assign it to the proposition
node (Prop). The function of 'tense' (t^) is to indicate
the speaker's conceptualitation of, or orientation towards,
propositions and should, therefore, be associated with the
modality node (Mod).
With this analysis we may treat the English simple past, at
least in main clauses, as past tense t^ under Mod: this in¬
dicates a no longer existing or no longer valid conceptual
world. The English present perfect, in contrast, relates to
a still valid or actual conceptual world but refers to a
past point in time; this is analyzed as present t. with
past tj. Such an analysis preserves McCawley's (and others')
valid observation that the perfect is past with respect to
the present, while eliminating the weakness of having a
double past to analyze the simple past tense form.
The difference between futurity in t^ and t^ may be illus¬
trated with the following examples:
2.16a. ?* I'll ask you a question any minute now.
b. I'm going to ask you a question any minute now.
The unlikelihood of combining a will-future tense-form with
a time adverbial any minute now, which refers to the future,
is explained by the fact that will refers not to future time
but to a state of affairs or 'world' that is not actual but
envisaged or predicted; actuality is associated with the
present under t.. Any minute now, though future, suggests
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immediacy and seems to belong to the actual world not an
envisaged world: the form be going to is actual and refers
to future time t..
3
We may give a few more examples of the possibilities of
this analysis:
(10'
ut He'll be going to go to Wales,
pres He'll go to Wales.
^ ^*past He'll have been to Wales.
^fut He's going to go to Wales
t t pres 1 .<^ pres He's going to Wales (now).
*past He's gone to Wales,
<£ut He was going to go to Wales,pres He went to Wales,past He had gone to Wales.
This by no means covers all possible forms: He would go to
Wales (the next day); He's going to have gone to Wales (by
then), for example, are not distinguished. We will have
cause to revise this analysis later (§ 13.3.2).
In complex sentences we need to allow for the possibility
of multiple time reference (14 in § 2.2.2, for example). In
such cases, it is, of course, in the proposition that the
multiple time references are contained. Multiple t^ is not
excluded but it involves particular sentence types (§§ 13, 14)
2.2.4 As a demonstration of the superiority of this ana¬
lysis I shall take some examples from R. Lakoff 1970 and
show how they may be re-analyzed.
R. Lakoff's examples are designed to illustrate the differ¬
ence between tense and time reference. Thus in:
2.17a. What I just stepped on was a kitten. (Lakoff's
1 4a)
b. What I just stepped on is a kitten. (Lakoff's
14b)
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the form was is not normally used to indicate that the
kitten is no longer a kitten but simply to indicate that
the identification of the kitten is no longer relevant:
the speaker knew immediately what he had stepped on. The
use of is. in 17b, however, suggests that the speaker has
just stepped on something he could not identify and has gone
back or turned around to find out what it was:
the identification is actual.
If we attempt an analysis in terms of conception of tense
and time offered above, we would have the following con¬
figuration of t^ and t.:
2.17a'. t^: past t^: pres (It(I step on it) be a kitten)
b'. t^: pres t^: pres (It(I step on it) be a kitten)
The present under t. should perhaps be given as zero, i.e.
unmarked, but this is of secondary importance. Most import¬
ant are two facts: i) t^ differs, i.e. the conceptualization
of the event differs; ii) t. is identical, i.e. the time re-
1
ference remains constant: a prior event ('stepping on some¬
thing'), hence past, and a current state ('being a kitten'),
hence present. It is the conceptualization, i.e. the mod¬
ality, that determines the surface forms 17a and b.
Another pair of examples given by Lakoff is:
2.18a. The animal the sorcerer got hold of was a
chipmunk. (cp. Lakoff's 5b)
b. The animal you saw was a chipmunk: see, there
he is running up a tree. (cp. Lakoff's 4a)
The fact that we can replace was by used to in 18a but not
in 18b:
2.18a'. The animal the sorcerer got hold of used to
be a chipmunk.
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b'.?* The animal you saw used to be a chipmunk:
see, there he is running up a tree.
is attributed to the fact that the state of being a chip¬
munk is truly past (cp. 18b, where the animal is still a
chipmunk). In terms of time reference 18a is ambiguous.
It can either mean that the animal was a chipmunk at some
time before the sorcerer got hold of it but no longer was
when he got hold of it, or it can mean that the animal was
a chipmunk until the sorcerer got hold of it and that the
sorcerer changed it into something else. We might then sug¬
gest the following analyses:
2.18a'. t.: pres t.: past (the animal (the sorcerer
1
get hold of wh-animal) be a
chipmunk)
a". t.: pres t.: past (the animal (the sorcerer
get hold of wh-animal) past
be a chipmunk)
b'. t.: past t.: pres (the animal (you see wh-1 -1 animal) be a chipmunk)
& See!
St.: pres t.: pres (there he be (he running up1 -'a tree) )
The superiority of such an analysis as the one outlined here
can be seen if we compare the kind of analysis possible with
McCawley's approach. For a start, McCawley's analysis can¬
not distinguish tense (cp. 18b) from time reference (cp. 18a):
2.18a'". [Past [past [the animal [the sorcerer get hold
of wh-anima]J be a chipmunk}]}
b". [Past [Past [the animal [you see wh-animalj be
a chipmunk]]]
Secondly, McCawley's analysis could not disambiguate 18a. It
would not, for instance, be possible to re-locate Past in
1 8a"':
2.18"". [past [the animal J~Pas t £the sorcerer get hold
of wh-animal] be a chipmunk]]]
because an isolated Past would produce a perfect tense form:
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2.19. ?* The animal the sorcerer got hold of has been
a chipmunk.
2.2.5 Finally I wish to consider the system in the light
of a non-Indo-European language, Hopi, and evaluate its
candidacy for universal status.
Hopi, it is reported (Whorf 1938), has three "assertions".
These would fall under the heading modality as defined in
§ 1.1.1 - they indicate not time but the speaker's concept¬
ualization of an event or action. Whorf terms these mutually
exclusive categories: 'reportive1 (base form), 'expective'
and 'nomic'. Reportive reports on a situation irrespective
of time, and the nomic states general (but not necessarily
actual) truths. Expective, however, indicates the anticip¬
ation of a situation - in some ways it is like the English
future, but does not necessarily refer to future time; it
may easily indicate an anticipated situation in the past.
This three-way system is not dissimilar to the situation in
many European languages, though the terms and to an extent
the associations differ. But a one-one allignment of Hopi
and English categories does not work: present and past and
reportive and nomic cross-classify. Nomic may be expressed
by a present or past simple tense-form in English; reportive
by a present (usually progressive) or a past tense-form in
English. And, to an extent, pragmatics may be involved in
the points where the systems diverge, that is, although the
basic categorization may be clear, there are always cases
that cannot be assigned unambiguously. In such cases, one
language may conventionalize one categorization, another
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language a different categorization. This might be called
the fuzzy area of universal categorization.
A fundamental difference between English and Hopi is that
in English, time reference is grammaticalized in the verb
form while in Hopi it is not. But time reference is second¬
ary (and incidental) in many uses of English tense-forms:
the will-future primarily and necessarily predicts, typical¬
ly but not necessarily it refers to the future. In Hopi time
is not, apparently, grammaticalized in the verb but may, of
course, be inferred.
If we try to analyze Hopi in terms of the analysis suggested
in § 2.2.3, the label 'tense' with its connotations of time
is perhaps unfortunate; 'conceptual world' would be more
appropriate. Since time reference is associated with t^ we
could, of course, re-label the English categorization: 'pre¬
dictive' (for future), 'narrative' (for past), and 'indica¬
tive' or 'assertive' (for present) - this I shall regard,
however, as a nominalist problem: the terms future, present
and past for t. are equally misleading. What remains is that
the three-way distinction in t. between fut, pres, and past
can largely be upheld in Hopi.
Let us suppose that this is so, ignoring other factors. What
then do we do with cases like English 'conditional' or 'past
subjunctive'. These have no direct parallel in Hopi - Whorf
notes that Hopi expresses such things as 'If I were king' by
the addition of an impotential marker (^as) to a verb form
including a 'conditional' affix, which indicates an 'if ...
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then' structure, thus: ?as ni 'm-tP 'if he were to go home'
cp. ni^ m-e7 'when/if he goes home'. A distinction between
future and conditional apodosis like that in English (cp.
§ 13) is not made: mi • " nat t'lwa'nl 'he would/will see/have
seen the river'. In § 13.3.2 I shall argue that it is necess¬
ary to posit a category, which we may call 'irrealis' or
'conjectural', in order to account for the facts of English.
This presents us with a problem if the three-way system is
considered to be universal, because English, along with a
number of European languages, appears to have a four-way
system. There seem to be three possible explanations for
this:
i) both three-term and four-term systems have universal status
- there is a fundamental typological distinction between
languages. (This might be compared with the apparent fun¬
damentally (and irreducibility) of both three-vowel and
four-vowel phonetic systems (Trubetzkoy 1939).)
ii) A four-term system is basic, which English reflects,
while Hopi neutralizes the distinction between two terms.
iii) A four-term system is derivable from a basic three-term
system.
This, like many other questions, will have to be left open.
We may note, however, that a four-term modality system has
been postulated by Kurylfowicz 1 964 and that such a system
has a parallel in a four-term time system t^. Thus:
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-fzu-t. jpredictive,
<< J--n-'cati'. _ _
^narrative/^








§ 3 Modality in Various Languages
3.0 In this chapter I wish to examine the kind of surface
structure phenomena that has been or could be classified as
modality in accordance with the definitions in § 1.1.1 in a
number of languages both related and unrelated to English.
Since we are concerned here with surface structure, I shall
use traditional terminology: 'mood' and 'modal'.
§ 3.1 Mood
3.1.1 I look first at morphological mood in Indo-European
languages. In living Indo-European languages the 'imperative'
is most generally distinct in morphological form; but it is
also typically subjectless and restricted to cases where the
addressee is the notional subject of the utterance, as in:
be good; seid nett zu einander; soyez calme.
Historically the form (or the base-form) of the imperative
represents the base-form also of the 'present subjunctive',
and in Latin there appears to have been a complementary re¬
lationship between the use of the imperative and the 2nd
person present subjunctive: positive - imperative; negative
- ne + present subjunctive.
•
More interesting than the occurrence of the imperative is
the fact that practically all languages in the Indo-European
group exhibit, or have done so at some stage in their develop¬
ment, a distinction between 'subjunctive' and 'optative'
forms, or alternatively between 'present subjunctive' and
'past subjunctive' forms. These may be provisionally dis¬
tinguished as: non-factual, realizable and non-factual, non-
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realizable respectively.
Let us look first at the functions of these moods historic¬
ally. In this I shall rely on accounts by Kury^owicz (1964)
and Krahe (1972).
In Classical Greek, which is generally taken to be typical,
both subjunctive and optative had volitional and non-voli¬
tional interpretations. This situation may be summarized
using feature specifications as a provisional analysis:
'intention' +vol -fact + realizable
subjunctive^
'expectation' -vol -fact +realizable
<'wish' +vol - fact - realizable'potentiality' -vol - vact - realizable
In other languages a degree of overlap is to be seen between
the future and the (present) subjunctive.
,i) temporal cp. it'll rain
future^ ii) general property cp. oil will float on
water
iii)a 'volitional' cp. you will go!
b 'prospective' cp. that'll be John
There appears to be a definite parallel between the 'voli¬
tional future' and the 'volitional subjunctive' and-or im¬
perative ('adhortive' let's, 'jussive' let him ...; 'pro¬
hibitive' be not; 'imperative' be, for example) on the one
hand and between the prospective future and the prospective
or expective subjunctive on the other. Krahe suggests another
function of the future and subjunctive that is parallel, name¬
ly to indicate a 'deliberative' utterance: what am I to do,
for example. This, however, is intimately bound up with the
nature of questions and may be ignored here. There is, how-
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ever, the 'concessive' function of the optative, which may
be added to the range of functions of that mood, though it
does, it is true, relate to hypotaxis in a more essential
way than the 'volitional' or 'potential' functions.
The present situation in Indo-European languages is one
where both 'subjunctive' and 'optative', especially 'sub¬
junctive', are tending to become obsolescent. Russian, for
example, unlike Czech and Polish, has no reflex of a present
subjunctive, its function having been taken over by tense:
'present' or 'future indicative'. French and Scandinavian
languages, especially, and English to an extent, have given
up 'past subjunctives' in if-clauses and expressions of un¬
realizable wish: I wish I were you I wish I was you. In
Were I the King of Siam, ... and similar constructions the
subjunctive still seems to be obligatory. On the other hand,
the analytic 'conditional' is tending to oust the optative.
In Urdu (Grahame Bailey 1950), the same 'optative' mood still
appears in both protasis and apodosis of counterfactual (un¬
realizable) conditional sentences. In English the conditional
is used exclusively in the apodosis in such sentences; and
in colloquial German the conditional is possible, and often
preferred (except with auxiliary verbs), in both protasis and
apodosis. Russian expresses counterfactuality or condition¬
ally by means of a semi-enclitic particle Jb« (by) .
A comparison between the remaining uses of (present) subjunct¬
ive in English, French and German reveals certain essential
conceptual differences.
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English has productively only the 'mandative' subjunctive
left, and even this is in a variance relation with the
'subjunctive substitute' should, f. ex.: It is essential
that she (should) come. In formal English the subjunctive
occasionally occurs in if-clauses (not counterfactual ones)
and concessive clauses.
In French the subjunctive is used mandatively and also pro¬
spectively; in German, only non-factually, mainly in report¬
ed speech and occasionally jussively as in: XYZ sei ein Drei-
eck.
Compare the following, where I have taken somewhat arbitrary
feature specifications suggested by the usual grammatical ex¬
planations, in this case Mansion 1952, from whom I have also




il est certain qu'il
viendra
es ist sicher, da6 er
kommt
-fact
-certain es ist moglich, daB
er kommt




il est peu probable qu'il
vienne
es ist kaum moglch,
daB er kommt
-fact il n'est pas vrai qu'il
ait dit cela
es stimmt nicht, daB
er so was gesagt hat
-fact
+mandative
je veux que vous y alliez
demain




je regrette que tu sois
malade






il a dit gu'elle est
malade
er sagte, sie sei krank
We may conclude that mood in Indo-European languages in
general operates in terms of the following tentative para¬
meters: factuality (factive vs. non-factive); actuality
(real vs. potential vs. unreal); volition (volition vs. non-
volition); emotional reaction (pleasure/surprise vs. neutral¬
ity); speaker's view of truth (truth presupposed vs. open
truth value). These will be discussed further in later chap¬
ters .
3.1.2 On non-Indo-European languages I have consulted works
on Basque (Van Eys 1883, Lafitte 1944), Chinese (Piasek 1956,
Chao 1968), Eskimo (Hinz 1944), Fijian (Milner 1956), Finnish
(Whitney 1956), Hausa (Kirk-Green/Kraft 1966), Hopi (Whorf
1938), Japanese (Miller 1967), Swahili (Ashton 1947), Tairo-
ra (Vincent 1962), Temne (Sumner 1922), Thai (Lanyon-Orgill
1955), Tswana (Cole 1955), Turkish (Lewis 1953, 1967), Viet¬
namese (Thompson 1965) and Yoruba (Ward 1952, Bamgbose 1966,
Rowlands 1969). Some of these languages are, in traditional
terminology, agglutinating languages, which seem ipso facto
to produce many more verb forms than the synthetic or partly
synthetic languages of Indo-European. What these languages
reveal under the category of mood, however, appears to sup¬
port the hypothesis of § 1 that mood is a surface reflex of
underlying illocution and modality and also that the notion¬
al categories involved are not dissimilar to those of Indo-
European. Turkish, for example, has an 'inferential' mood
(Lewis 1967) equivalent to English: 'is/was said to
thus: irrtig 'he's said to be' or 'I infer that he is/was'.
This may be regarded in terms of non-factivity and report-
edness.
The 'quotative' moods in a number of languages are comparable
to an extent to the German use of present subjunctive in de¬
pendent clauses. Thai, a language where verbs are claimed to
have a base meaning (primary meaning) and a dependent meaning
-4
(secondary meaning) uses such a secondary verb wa 'to say'
as an introducer of quotations, narrations, facts, etc. after
verbs of saying, thinking asking, knowing, etc. (Lanyon-Orgill
4
1955). Similarly, haj 'to give, allow, let' follows primary
verbs of calling, telling, teaching, commanding, ordering,
etc. (ibid) to introduce a subsidiary proposition. It would
not be unreasonable to term these markers of 'quotative' and
'mandative' mood respectively, such moods being indicated in
other languages by catenative verbs, whether performative or
not. As is reported in Whorf (1938) and also in Weinreich
(1961), Hopi also has a quotative mood expressed by means of
the particle ya Nw; Tairora has a reported speech suffix uro
(Vincent 1962).
Modern Japanese (Miller 1967) has a system of moods which is
in many respects similar to the Indo-European system:
Japanese gloss classification metatype
taberu 'eats' -past indicat. it is so
tabeta 'ate' +past indicat. it was so
tabeyo 'let's eat' -past presumpt. be it so
tabetaro 'probably ate' +past presumpt. it would be so
tabereba 'provided x eat' provisional if it be so
tabetara 'provided x eats' conditional if it is so
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Although the system in Japanese is by no means identical
to that of English, and naturally there are considerable
pragmatic differences, it seems that the same set of para¬
meters is capable of semantically classifying both.
In addition there is in Japanese a strange mood,termed in
Miller's account 'alternative', which it is difficult to in¬
clude under the definition we have given in § 1. The mean¬
ing of this putative mood is said to be "that an action is
taking place among other actions", f. ex. tabetari 'eating
amongst other things'. Since this does not reflect any direct
attitude of the speaker, nor any illocution, but rather a
modification of the reference of the verb from one action,
or a set of like actions, to a set of unlike actions, we
should not, I think, consider it as a mood.
For Tairora, a language very different in construction and
allegedly in category, Vincent (1962) attempts to distinguish
two types of suffix: i) mood-person-number and ii) tense-
person-number. The two appear, however, to overlap extensive¬
ly. Under (i) we find 'imperative', 'avolitional', which is
glossed as 'speaker wishes something not to happen' f. ex.
ru?u 'tubu-arora = fall-down + I-should-not i. e. 'I must be
careful not to fall down', and 'dubitive', f. ex. 'hura bu-'
arera = tomorrow go + I-might i.e. 'I might go tomorrow'.
Under (ii), however, we find, apart from tense forms like
'neutral', 'future' (includes the senses of 'want to' and
'intend'), 'past', 'far past', 'perfect' and the aspectual
notion 'customary', mood notions like 'contrary-to-fact'
f. ex. 'nai maa '7aini ba-'itivi 'utu-'ma bi-itivi = his own
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home is + contrary-to-fact cease + ma go + contrary-to-fact
i.e. 'if he had stayed at home he would have died', and mod¬
al notions like 1abilitative1 f. ex. 'kai^a bara-'rera =
work get + I-will i.e. 'I would like work'.
Vincent's distinction does not appear to stand up notional-
ly: in both his types of verb morphology reflects mood, mod¬
ality and tense, which is equally true of Indo-European.
Moreover, the same kind of relationship between futurity
and volition seems to be present.
3.1.3 So far I have only cursorily distinguished between in¬
dependent mood, such as imperative, and dependent mood, such
as the German subjunctive in reported speech. There are a
number of languages where mood, in fact, has a similar role
to sentence structure in the more familiar European languages.
In Hopi, for example, there is, in Whorf's terminology, a
"conditional mode" (as there is in Turkish) indicated by the
verba suffix - £P, which functions like if or whenever in the
protasis of English conditional clauses. There are, further¬
more, more affixes for 'correlative' (cp. because, since, as,
for) -qaY, 'concursive' (cp. while, as, and) karj, -kakaij,
'sequential' (cp. after, and then) -t.
Whereas in some Indo-European languages, mood in if-clauses,
etc. can be regarded as dependent, it is clear that in sur¬
face structure terms we would have to treat these Hopi moods
as some kind of independent mood.
It might appear that the interrogative, which is sometimes
called a 'mood' and sometimes a 'mode' in latinate grammar,
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is by its nature an independent mood, since it reflects a
difference between utterance types. In Tairora, for example,
there is a high-level distinction between 'indicative' sen¬
tences and interrogative sentences signified by the choice
of the suffix: -ma for 'indicative' and ~e_ for interrogative.
But Gaelic treats the interrogative differently. There is a
special 'dependent' form of the verb used in questions and
subordinate clauses. And Russian, partially, constructs
questions with the help of a question particle Jin (li). Such
particles occur in many languages and are frequently related
to (or derived from) a subordinating conjunction.
It is, ontogenetically, easy to see how conjunctions may be¬
come question markers, if we consider the elliptical use of
ob in German for a 'second-try' question:
3.1. — Kommst du?
— Wie bitte? (Was?)
-- Ob du kommst? (< ich fragte, ob du kommst)
If such a use were to displace the normal form for questions
with subject-verb inversion, the situation becomes very close
to that of languages with a question marker.
Such considerations might lead us to suppose that interroga-
tives do not represent an independent mood.
The problem is only apparent, however. The notions of inde¬
pendent and dependent mood are purely formal distinctions
determined by the morphology and syntax of a given language.
If a language has both a syntactic marker (conjunction, for
example) and a morphological marker (mood, for example) of
various types of hypotaxis, then the morphological marker may
be said to be dependent. In the case where there is only a
morphological marker, it may be said to be independent. De¬
pendent markers may often be redundant and tend to become
obsolesecent as is the case, for example, with the present
subjunctive in if-clauses in English: if there be no good
reason, ... .
The real distinction to be drawn is between moods, like in¬
terrogative, which reflect utterance type, i.e. the illocu-
tion of the utterance, and those, like subjunctive, which re
fleet the speaker's conceptualization of his proposition, i.
the modality. The two are, however, not unrelated. An inter¬
rogative utterance has consequences for the range of mod¬
ality (cp. § 11).
And the significance of the phenomena discussed above for a
study of modality is that the scope of the inquiry should be
extended to include clause relations (cp. §§ 12, 13, 14).
3.1.4 Two surface phenomena that have not been mentioned so
far are word order and intonation.
Word order is commonly a marker of interrogative, as in Eng¬
lish: Are you going? with subject-verb inversion, but also
sometimes of imperative, as in German: Gehen Sie nach Hausel
or in East Anglian English: Be you careful 1 In Thai, word
order may apparently distinguish a factive from a non-fact-
ive potential:
3 4 4 1
3.2a. phom ma] daj pa]
I not achieve go 'I didn't (manage to)
, ,3 .1 .4 , .4
b. phom paj ma] da]
I go not achieve 'I cannot go'
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Intonation is a poorly researched area of language with the
added complication that no real agreement has been reached
as to where grammatical intonation ends and affective-cum-
idiosyncratic intonation begins. I shall not handle this
realization of illocution and modality in this dissertation,
but I offer the following example as a demonstration of the
function of intonation within the illocution and modality
systems.
English makes frequent use of a fall-rise intonation which
might be said to constitute a 'dubitative-concessive' mood,
since it indicates some kind of reservation. Frequently, a
but-clause follows, but this is not essential. This intona¬
tion pattern does not occur regularly in German, for instance.
Consider:
3.3a. She Mmay come
b. She's v^there
These are glossable roughly as:
3.3a'. 'it's true she may come but ...'
b'. 'it's true she's there but ...'
3.1.5. In § 3.1.2 I noted a general agreement across lan¬
guages in the parameters of meaning involved in morphologic¬
al mood systems. Here I wish to give more detailed and con¬
crete examples of this in languages where contamination by
Indo-European patterns is excluded, - the similarity between
the use of Finnish 'potential' mood and Germanic use of sub¬
junctive substitutes may, mogen, etc. may be attributed to
historical contact rather than language universality (cp.
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Whorf's notion of SAE (Standard Average European), Whorf
1 938) .
The first case is the use of the Yoruba particle ki, which
may be compared with English should and 'mandative subjunct¬




ki $ tete de
let you quickly arrive i.e.
ki louwa ki o p£luu yin
let God let he with your i.e.
'You should
arrive quickly'
'May God be with
you'
c. o y? ki gbogboo wa lp
it necessary let all us go i.e. 'it's necessary
that all of us
(should) go
d. wqn n sare ki wpn bale tete dele
they ing run race let they i.e. 'they're running
can quickly reach house (in order) to get
home early'
'they're running
so that they should
be able to get
home early'
Even with the one English equivalent may, we can understand
why it fits into the pattern of ki contexts; may here is an
expression of volition, and we can think of archaic construct¬
ions involving a subjunctive which seem even closer to the
structure of the Yoruba expression, for example:
3.5. 1*Pray God be on your side
In Fijian (Milner 1956) we find the same kind of context for
the particle me, for example:
to, for + noun (benefactive)
in order to (purpose infinitive)
'let' (jussive)
that + purpose (purpose clause)
shall/should/be to' (purposive modals)
There are two other contexts where the semantic relationship
is less clear:
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'as' (cp. Latin qua)
'can' (permissive)
Even in the latter case, we can perhaps see why a 'purposive-
volitional' particle is used. Compare:
3.6. sa rawa me tolu na nomu ibe
'you can have three mats'
There are uses of ^be to and shall in English which do not
differ all that significantly from the use of can in the
above gloss, namely: 'you shall have three mats' or 'you're
to have three mats'. English grammaticalizes distinctions in
the role of the speaker as passive authority (conceding a
right), as active authority (granting a right) and enacter
of remote authority; these distinctions are subordinate to
the notion of authority.
Hinz (1944) distinguishes the following morphologically ident¬







We discover that the 'optative', perhaps not surprisingly
since no imperative label appears in this list, includes
among its functions the expression of adhortivity, jussivity
and imperativity cp. the use of subjunctive in Latin, for ex¬
ample. Under 'infinitive' we find a double function: an 'im¬
perative/optative' sense cp. English: to be or not to be,
and a dependent use in in complementation. Of the 'conjunct¬
ive' we discover that it can occur in the kind of context
where English has conjunctions like: because, as, when, for;
and of the 'subjunctive' that it occurs where English would
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have: if, in case, future when. These last two moods are re¬
miniscent of the Hopi 'correlative' and 'conditional' re¬
spectively (Whorf 1938). Indeed, they are reminiscent of
Indo-European in that insofar as there is a mood distinct¬
ion between such contexts, the indicative occurs after be¬
cause , since, as, past when, for, while the subjunctive oc¬
curs after if, in case, etc. Even though a subjunctive may
not occur after if, in case, etc. — in many languages of
the Indo-European group the indicative occurs -- an indi¬
cative is the rule after because etc. Indeed it would be
very surprising if we were to discover a language with the
opposite assignment, a non-factive mood in because-clauses
or when-clauses and a factive mood in if-clauses.
Let me quote one further case, one which bears on the ques-
2
tion of futurity. Thai has a particle: ca9 which is glossed
as 'will/shall' in Lanyon-Orgill 1955. This particle may com¬
bine with a number of other particles to produce the follow¬
ing senses:
1 2khuan ca9 should/ought to
^ad^ car?2 may/might
jag4 ca9 2 wish to/want to
tDq ^kan ca9 want to/need to
kho,- ca9^ sure to/bound to
mag^ ca92 liable to/usually
hen^ ca°2 seem to/apparently
jo m^ ca9^ 2 likely to/apt to
kam laQ ca9 be about to
What is common to these, and hence may be seen as the function
2
of ca9 , is not future time reference but future tense (t^)
as defined in § 2.2.3. Except for the gloss 'usually' they
all seem to be non-factive, i.e. they do not presuppose the
factivity of whatever proposition they modify, though in some
cases the factivity may be asserted. We would predict on the
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basis of such examples that there is no combination with
2
ca7 which has an equivalent meaning to the English pro¬
gressive with present time reference: be V-ing now.
3.1.6 The foregoing sections have demonstrated not only
considerable interaction between illocutionary and mod¬
ality notions within a language itself but also the over¬
all similarity between one language and another, if not in
the mood system per se, then at least in the notional terms
that underlie the system. Such similarities lend support
to the universalist hypothesis. The analysis of the sys¬
tems of a few languages, or even one language, we may
suppose, will provide insights into the systems of other
languages with respect to mood: other languages will not
present systems irreconcilable with what we have already
studied.
§ 3.2 Modal Expressions
3.2.0 In this section I turn to phenomena that have gen¬
erally been referred to as 'modal' with the exclusion, of
course, of those phenomena to which 'modal' has sometimes
been applied as a synonym for 'manner' in 'manner adverb'.
3.2.1 The somewhat irregular syntax of modal verbs in
English and other Germanic languages in comparison with
other verbs has resulted in anomaly in morphology and com¬
plementation pattern being taken as a criterion for estab¬
lishing 'modality'. Such anomaly, however, is language spe¬
cific. English 'modal' verbs like: can, will, etc. have
only two distinct forms: a base form and an oblique form:
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could, would, etc. Their cognates in German: konnen, wol-
len, however, though morphologically irregular (but no
more so than the non-modal wissen), have a set of forms
which is, with the exception of their lack of a present
participle, identical to that of regular 'strong' and 'weak'
verbs.
Moreover, comparison with French and Italian reveals not
only no particular lack of forms but also no complement¬
ation pattern peculiar to 'modal' verbs. English modals
(11)
have a complement infinitive without to , German modals
one without zu, but, although equivalent expressions in
French and Italian are commonly without a complement a (a)
or de, there are other non-modal expressions which follow
the same pattern. More strikingly, in Persian the comple¬
mentation structure after modals is a dependent clause
with the verb in the subjunctive mood as it is in Modern
Greek and Bulgarian. Thus:
3.7. Man mitava nam "anj£ beravam
In Russian, apart from modal verbs like MoMb (mo6'), modal
concepts can also be expressed adjectivally (or rather by
an anomalous predicate form which is inflected as a pre¬
dicate adjective (cp. Russian past tense forms): flOJOKBH
(dolSen).
In many Indo-European languages there are also impersonal
adjectival constructions which express modal concepts:
I am-able that (I) go there
i.e. I can go there
Similarly: bayad 'it must be so'
sh^yad 'it may be so'
it's possible that...fes ist moglich, daB....
We may also note the use of adverbs and particles as a
means of modal expression. In German the particle wohl
(sometimes classified as an adverb) can, for example, have
the effect of turning an assertion into a predictive or
speculative statement. Compare:
3.8a. Er ist schon weg. 'He's gone'
b. Er ist wohl schon weg. 'I presume he's gone'
wohl, like English wellfmay also have an intensifying func¬
tion in combination with other modal expressions. Compare:
3.9a. Das kann er tun.
b. Das kann er wohl tun.
3.10a. That may have cost a lot.
b. That may well have cost a lot.
Sentence adverbs like: perhaps, maybe, wahrscheinlich, etc.
are in many cases equivalent to expressions with modal
verbs; they thus supplete the modal verb system.
The conclusion we should draw is that neither complemen¬
tation pattern nor morphology nor even surface syntactic
category is a necessary criterion for determining modality,
though it is possible perhaps to inventarize the set of
surface structure types and the set of grammatical cate¬
gories, as above, that may be found to express modal con¬
cepts. An important question raised by the establishment
in any language of a syntactic category 'modal verb' or of
a syntactic modal system (which is, of course, heuristic-
ally justifiable) is: what modal concepts are not included
in the syntactic modal system and what non-modal verbs are
included in it? In German, wollen would have to be classified
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as modal, syntactically speaking; in English, its equi¬
valent want would have to be classified as non-modal. In
both languages, however, there are uses where, at least
on the definition in § 1.1.1, we have cases of notional
modality.
3.2.2 In this and the following section I shall look
closer at what I have termed 'modal concepts'. I am inter¬
ested primarily in parameters of meaning and semantic de¬
velopment and-or change in this section; and in function
in discourse and the overlap with mood in § 3.2.3.
Let me take as a starting point the set of auxiliary and
semi-auxiliary verbs in English and compare the kind of
notions involved in their meaning in number of other Indo-
European languages.
be copula - imperfective (be -ing) - determinat¬
ive future (be -to)
have possession - perfective (have -en) - necessity
(have - to)
can capability - ability - permission - possibility
must requirement - obligation - necessity - inferred
certainty
may permission - possibility
daren't lack of courage - lack of justification
needn't lack of requirement - lack of necessity
will predictive future - volition - imperative -
persistent behaviour
shall future - intention - imperative
ought to duty - tentative prediction
(I have excluded here oblique forms, which sometimes have
a specialized meaning, and a number of suppletive forms:
be going to, etc. I have also simplified the number of
meanings and-or functions to an extent.) Compare now German
and Icelandic - the Icelandic data is from Glendenning 1961
sein copula - stative perfective - necessity/possi¬










possession - non-stative perfective - duty
(haben - zu)
inchoative - future - volition/imperative
capability - ability - permission - possibility




requirement - obligation - duty - reported claim
volition
The inclusion of the infelcted from diirfte would add 'prob¬
ability' .
vera copula - imperfective (vera - a )
hafa possession
veHa inchoative - obligation (ver^a - a )
geta ability
eiga possession - duty (12)"fa obtain - causative ability - permission
mega permission - possibility
|)urfa obligation - necessity
munu future
skulu future - intention - obligation
vilja volition
Already we can establish certain parameters of meaning as
well as certain typical functional extensions. The para¬
meters of meaning include:
ability % capability v permission possibility
requirement ^ duty tv obligation & necessity
volition w intention « determination tz futurity





We would probably add to the parameters of meaning the
notion 'knowledge' if we extended the survey to French,
Russian, Czech, etc. where verbs of knowing: savoir,
(umet'), um£t 'know how to' are juxtaposed with those of
ability: pouvoir, MOMb (mo£'), moci 'be able/can' (Etymol-
ogically, English can and German konnen are cognate with
verbs of knowing.)
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Such parameters of meaning and functional extensions may
be observed to an extent in most other Indo-European lan-
(14)
guages. But there are a number of ramifications.
1) Some languages separate off parts of the parameters.
German distinguishes konnen from diirfen; English, to an*
extent, shall from will (future intention from future of
volition).
2) In some cases the terms of the parameters are not auton¬
omous. Icelandic skulu, Norwegian skal have meanings ranging
from futurity and intention to obligation; cp. English:
shall, be to, be supposed to, should, must. Norwegian fd.
has senses like 'get', 'be able', 'manage', 'may' but also
weak obligation like 'had better' and even futurity (Sommer-
feld/Marm 1943). Norwegian md 'must/have to' can be used
in polite questions with the sense of 'may' (cp. the his¬
torical development in English: OE mot, cognate with must,
previously had the meaning 'permission' as in: he mot gan.).
3) There are some contradictory relations. French falloir
originally 'to be lacking/wanting' has developed into an
expression of necessity: il faut 'it is necessary'. On the
other hand Welsh eisiau 'need' is employed to express vo¬
lition: y mae eisiau + locative expression 'there is a
need on ...' i.e. 'X wants'.
4) There are some cases where it is difficult to see what
kind of semantic or functional extension has taken place.
German mogen expresses 'conceded possibility' in: Das mag
wohl sein, but 'lack of desire' in: Sie mag nicht gehen.
It is difficult to draw any very precise conclusions from
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the above. Although it often seems that there are certain
general, if not universal, semantic processes or relations
to be discovered, there are perhaps almost as many contra¬
dictory cases. It is, of course, incorrect to assume, as
I have tacitly done above, that the glosses used represent
semantic primitives. Parameters of meaning, while reflect¬
ing to a certain extent the system of modality in a given
language, do not have any theoretical status. It is necess¬
ary, in order to explain the complexity of the modal sys¬
tems discussed, to establish a set of interrelating sem-
antically primitive categories underlying superficial mod-
als. A particular modal is presumably a superficial reflex
of a configuration of such categories, some of which or
one of which may have a certain primacy. It is, for example,
arguable that 'possibility of occurrence' or 'lack of pre¬
vention of occurrence' is in some way fundamental to may;
on the other hand the development of the modern meaning
of must out of OE mot 'permission' may be explicable if
the fundamental, and presumably primitive, category in OE is
taken to be the existence of 'authority', irrespective of
whether that authority is permissive or restrictive.
3.2.3 Frequently a distinction is drawn between 'epis-
temic' and 'deontic' uses of modal verbs, 'epistemic' re¬
lating to judgments of possibility, certainty, etc. and
'deontic' relating to the exerting of authority.
But this distinction only describes in part the various
functions or uses that modal verbs may have in discourse.
Below I shall give other uses that are to be found in
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English and German. It should be borne in mind that not
all languages necessarily employ modal verbs or other
modal expressions in the same functions. In particular,
epistemic uses are thought to have developed later since
they are not attested in all languages - moreover, the
historical development of modal verbs in Germanic lan¬
guages seems to indicate an extension from lexical verbs
denoting dispositions via dispositional modals (see below)
to deontic uses and then epistemic uses (Vallentin 1974).
Taking first the epistemic vs. deontic distinction, it
seems that we need to refine it to cover 'subjective' and
'objective' varieties. Consider:
3.11a. Maybe Mary's gone,
b. Perhaps Mary's gone.
3.12a. Mary may have gone.
b. It's possible that Mary's gone.
If we compare the illocutionary nature of these utterances,
it is possible to distinguish between those that make an
assertion or a judgment about probability and those that
suggest a possible line of thought. 12b, it seems to me
is of the first kind, while 11a and b are of the second
kind; 12a appears to allow both interpretations. For in¬
stance, maybe seems more appropriate than it is possible
in the following context:
3.13 Now, where on earth's Mary? (commenting on
her absence)
- Maybe she's left already.
? - It's possible that she's already left.
while the situation is, I think, reversed in the following
exchange:
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3.14. Now tell me, where do you think Mary is?
- Maybe she's left town.
- Well, it's possible she left town.
Here I think the utterance with maybe is a less likely
response, unless one wanted to be flippant. On the other
hand, the utterance with it's possible strikes me as a
probable, objective reply.
Consider now deontic uses:
3.15a. Mary, you may leave.
b. Mary, you're allowed to leave (if you wish).
In 15a it seems that the speaker is typically giving his
permission - we might say the utterance is 'performative' -,
while in 15b the speaker is stating that permission exists
(not necessarily his own), thus we might call it, follow¬
ing Austin 1962, 'constative'.
Modal verbs like can, need in English and wollen in German
also have what I will call a 'dispositional' interpretation,
f. ex.
3.16a. Jane can ride a bicycle now.
b. Jane can be nasty.
c. Jane can walk to the office now she lives in
town.
d. Jane can see twice as far as I can.
These examples may be glossed as follows:
3.16a'. 'knows how to'
b'. 'tends to be/is capable of being'
c'. 'is in a position to'
d'. 'is able to'
In these examples, with the possible exception of 16b, which
may be a question of modal used to express quantification
over time, i.e. 'is at times', we may not only understand
the modals to relate to dispositions on the part of the
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subject but also distinguish internal and external senses.
Thus in 16a, Jane's ability is something purely dependent
on Jane. In 16c, however, Jane is enabled to do something
by circumstances that are external to Jane. Consider also:
3.17a. Jane needs to go to the dentist,
b. Jane needs to get out and about.
Here 17a may be a statement about Jane's personal require¬
ment; it may also, as 17b probably has to, be interpreted
as an expression of what the speaker thinks is good for
Jane. Compare also the use of want in:
3.18. You want to get a hair-cut.
said to someone who clearly has no desire and no intention
of getting a hair-cut. Compare again:
3.19a. Jane doesn't dare to open her mouth when
Harry's bad tempered,
b. Jane daren't say a word.
19a has the interpretation that Jane is totally intimidated,
but 19b may in addition have an interpretation something
like: 'Jane has no right to say anything".
I believe that the distinction between what I have termed
'external' and 'internal' interpretations here is also the
line of demarcation between modality and non-modality in
terms of the definition given in § 1.1.1. Thus can, need,
want, dare may be used modally and non-modally. When used
modally, i.e. with an 'external' interpretation, they are
nonetheless distinct from deontic uses.
In addition to the uses noted above, we may determine two
others of a rather different nature, one of which is par-
(15)
ticularly important in this study . This is 'subjunctive'
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use. By this I mean the use in English of may, would and
should and in German of moge, solle (present subjunctive
forms) and mochte, sollte (past subjunctive forms) as a
kind of subjunctive replacement, f. ex.
3.20a. May they be happy!
b. Would she were here!
c. I'm glad you should think so.
The second is what might be called 'aspectual' use. Compare:
3.21a. He sees the plane flying over the mountain top.
b. He can see the plane flying over the mountain
top.
In the case of 21a, we have a form typical of narration.
It is referentially indefinite and aspectually perfective.
It might be compared to the Ancient Greek aorist. In the
case of 21b, however, we have a form typical of description.
It is referentially present and aspectually imperfective.
It may be compared to the use of progressive aspect-form
with non-stative verbs. Compare:
3.22a. He enters left, sees the murderer and hides,
b. ?* He enters left, can see the murderer and
hides.
3.23a. * Watch out, John sees you/watches you.
b. Watch out, John can see you/is watching you.
It is arguable that this is explainable in terms of dis¬
positional can:
can see 'in a position to'
cp. is watching 'in the process of'
though neither 'in a position to' nor 'is able to' would
be idiomatic alternatives to can in this use.
It is my contention that the analysis of the various dis¬
course functions discussed above is intimately involved
in the specification of 111, Mod and Prop. Only certain
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functions of modal verbs may be associated with Mod. One
of these is probably subjective epistemic use. Other func¬
tions will be associated with 111, and yet others with
Prop. I will discuss the question of assignment in the
course of §§ 7, 11, 12, 13, 14.
Distinguishing discourse features with regard to modal
verbs allows us to see more clearly what is involved in
the overlap between mood and modal verb. In particular,
objective epistemic use bears a considerable similarity
to some of the parameters of meaning noted for mood in
§ 3.1.1, namely factuality and actuality. There are pa¬
rallels, too, between volitional mood and volitional mod-
als.
3.2.4 Here I wish to discuss a little further what was
established in § 3.2.3 and speculate upon its consequenc¬
es for the analytical framework laid out in the course of
§§ 1 and 2.
I shall first summarize the range of meaning involved in
each of the discourse functions I have distinguished.
Examples are taken from English; in some cases I indicate
expressions that are not technically modal verbs.
Under subjective epistemic functions I think we can trace
senses involving: possibility (perhaps, maybe), likelihood
(I guess) and necessity (must) (cp. § 7.1) .
Under objective epistemic modality we find: futurity (will),
possibility (may), likelihood (should), necessity (of course).
Subjective deontic functions (cp. 'performative' modals
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§ 7.2.2) include: permission (may, can), obligation
(should, ought to), requirement (must, have to), determ¬
ination (will, shall). Similarly for objective deontic
functions we find: permission (be allowed to), obliga¬
tion (be supposed to), requirement (have to), determina¬
tion (be to).
Under dispositional functions we find: ability etc. (can,
be able), tendency (be apt, be liable, be prone), volition
(want, wish, hope, be willing, be prepared), intention
(intend, plan), requirement/physical necessary (need),
expectation (expect) and defiance (dare). Finally under
subjunctive replacement (cp. §§ 12.2, 13, 14) we have:
voluntative (may), potential-concessive (may), necess-
itative/mandative (should), emotive (should) and contingent
(should).
Particularly the dispositional function shows a confusing
array of meanings. It is certain that only a few of them
may be modal given the restrictions noted in § 3.2.3. On
the other hand, we may find for most of them certain par¬
allels in the range of meanings among deontic or epistemic
functions, even though there the number of distinct mean¬
ings is apparently smaller.
It could be that the meanings represented in deontic and
epistemic functions are complexes of elements contained
in the meanings involved in dispositional use. I will leave
this possibility unexplored for the moment (cp. § 7.3).
In what might be called the typical functions of modal
verbs (or related constructions) i.e. epistemic, deontic
and subjunctive replacement, there is apparently a system
of from three to five contrasting meanings. What is observ¬
able in the English examples is that subsidiary modifi¬
cation may add apparently new modal meanings. Compare
the use of English may with may well and will with should
- should being historically an oblique form of shall:
3.24a. Her dress may have cost a lot. (possibly)
b. Her dress may well have cost a lot. (probably)
3.25a. They'll be there by 10. (certain prediction)
b. They should be there by 10. (tentative prediction)
Compare also must and should used deontically:
3.26a. He must work harder. (speaker's requirement)
b. He should work harder, (speaker's recommend¬
ation)
This suggests that certain modal distinctions may be sub-
^:->p^rcNxixr- ota
sumed under a hyponymous modality.
It is, of course, evident from this discussion that modal
meaning is very much prejudiced by the kind of gloss given
a modal item (cp. § 1.3.1). Thus saying that epistemic
should denotes 'likelihood' and also that English may well
and German diirfte denote 'likelihood' gives an entirely
false impression:should is not synonymous with either
may well or durfte. This only emphasizes the importance
of an approach to modal meaning that takes account of
linguistic-contextual and paradigmatic factors as well as
the semantic relations of the modals inter se (as is at¬
tempted in §§ 7 - 14) .
Let me now suggest certain additions to the number of cate¬
gories included under Mod. It will be recalled that we
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have distinguished fut, pres, and past under Mod. These
all relate to various kinds of reality. In § 13.3.2 I
will argue that we will need to include irrealis in order
to account for the data of English and German; and in
§ 11.3 I will argue that a distinction with regard to
these four modalities needs to be drawn between assertion
and non-assertion. This leaves unaccounted for the kind
of modal system we have discussed in this section: poss¬
ibility, probability, necessity, etc. and their deontic
counterparts. I propose that in addition to the tense sys¬
tem of t^ we incorporate under Mod a potentiality system
(16)
"fT^. Subdivisions of this system will be discussed in
§7.1.
3.2.5 As a kind of postscript to the discussion in the
preceding sections I wish to look at the system of modal
items in Hopi (data, as before, from Whorf 1938).
Whereas with the tense system of Hopi it was possible to
relate the categories quite closely to those of the hypo-
statized universal system, the task is somewhat more diffi-
(17)
cult with regard to modalities, which Whorf views as
"moduli of moduli" (Whorf 1938, p. 118), since they com¬
bine with assertion-type and clause-type elements).
The negative 'expective' of Hopi is so"?on and its nega¬
tion so"?on qa" has a necessitative meaning: 'must/have to/
necessarily/naturally/inevitably 1. Importantly, the 'ne¬
cessitative ' does not include obligation, duty or compul¬
sion: it may frequently be used to indicate a necessary
consequence. Compare:
3.27. k'l" r ni'm-1° m'i •' nat t'iwa 'ni
• •
k'ir ni'm-f ■ so' 'on qa ~ m'i •'nat t'iwa'ni
concess-I he gotcondit-J neg.- I not I river I he see J expect,
-ive J home |-ional | expect.| I '
If he goes home he'll (obviously) see the river.
We may note in this connection that English must/have to
are rarely used to express this kind of logical necessity,
but usually represent inferential necessity or deontic
necessity, i.e. compulsion, etc. On reflection it seems
that the most usual way of expressing such logical necess¬
ity in English is by means of the indicative in some tense-
form (perhaps with emphatic intonation) and by means of
adverbs like of course. If it is necessary to posit a mod¬
ality 'necessity' to account for Hopi, it would also be
necessary to posit a translational rule very similar to a
rule of modal logic to account for English:
□ p —> p
i.e. if something is necessarily the case then it is the
case. A further rule very similar to one in modal logic
would be needed to account for the double negative of Hopi:
op >~
'Potential' in Hopi is expressed by the negation of 'in-
hibitive' k'trhi'n. Thus k'irhi'n qa * expresses a lack of
any hindrance to the realization of an action, event, etc.
It excludes epistemic possibility and the sense 'know how
to'. It appears to be closest to English can without any
connotation of permission. For this case a rule something
like:
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— Qp s Op
would apply, even though the Hopi 'inhibitive1 does not
appear to contain an overt negative.
English epistemic may may be expressed in one of two ways
in Hopi: 'advisory' k£_ or 'indeterminate' s$n. The former
denotes a positive possibility (whether or not the propos¬
ition is syntactically positive - k£ qa" is equivalent to
may not), while the latter covers cases where the sense is
roughly 'may or may not' (cp. English may with dubitative
(fall-rise) intonation) . For let and kf, qa" the logical
structure is presumably:
and ^ rJ p
whereas for s$n the following kind of translational rule
may apply:
p v vp ^p
Hopi distinguishes between factive and non-factive reports
in a way that is similar to the German subjunctive-indicat¬
ive distinction in dependent (reported) clauses (cp. § 12.1):
'quotative' ya Nw (cp. § 3.1.2) indicates a report where the
speaker doesn't (or cannot) confirm its truth; 'concessive'
k'i'r indicates that the speaker accepts the truth of the re¬
port. Thus:
3.31a. n't 7 navo' t-q yavw m'j'nV (quotative)
b. n't9 navo't-q k'i'r m't'nV (concessive)
The 'concessive', however, has other functions. In independ¬
ent clauses it is equivalent to 'it seems that, apparently'.
In conditional constructions it distinguishes hypothetical
protases from temporal ones, i.e. 'if' from 'when'. It is
important to note that both the 'quotative' and the 'con-
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cessive' are non-assertive, that is, they do not assert
the truth of p - though the 'concessive', of course, may
presuppose it (cp. § 14.2.3).
Finally, we may consider the Hopi 'impotential' 7as. This
has a number of functions. In independent clauses it has
the sense of 'to do something to no avail' 'try to do some¬
thing'. In complex sentences it has senses of counter-fac¬
tuality as in:
3.29. 'as ni'm-i' so' 'on qav m'l •' nat fiwa'ni
expect.
If he had gone home he would have seen the river,
or adversativity:
3.30. n i " 'as qat'c'' -karj
I
The go con¬ neg. - not river he see
I home dit¬ expect.
ional
ma • 'jj'i' "i
impot- 1sitt-l concur-I feel-tired
ential ling | sive |
Although I was sitting I felt tired.
Despite the fact that I was sitting I felt tired,
In the latter case there is an expected causal connection
between two actions or states which is aborted. As with
necessary consequence, which may be supposed to be a mod¬
ality over a clause relation rather than over a clause it¬
self, this adversative use of Hopi 'impotential' seems to
be over a clause relation.
In the case of independent clauses the 'impotential' appears
to indicate the impossibility of implication such as:
He ran away _/"X^.He escaped.
Only in the case of counter-factual conditional is 'as
comparable to English or German 'past subjunctive'. Though
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its analysis may not be immediately obvious, that is,
whether it is irrealis or or both, it is clear, I
think, that its analysis lies within the potentiality or
the kind of modality system that I have so far distin¬
guished (cp. § 3.2.2). Indeed, allowing for the business
of negation, all the Hopi modalities that Whorf mentions
seem to lie within the scope of such a system.
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§ 4 Views of Modality within the European Grammatical
Tradition
4.0 In this chapter I shall give an outline of how the
surface phoenomena mood and modal verb have been viewed
within the European grammatical tradition up to the C20th.
§ 4.1 The Tradition
4.1.1 In Graeco-Roman grammatical studies we can discover
two principles of analysis - one purely morphological, the
other syntactico-morphological. As an example of the first
we may take Dionysius Thrax's "Tekhne Grammatike" reported
in Robins 1967 and Dineen 1967. Here 'mood' (enklisis =
'inclination') is taken to be one of a number of prop¬
erties of verbs. Five moods are distinguished: indicative,
imperative, optative, subjunctive and infinitive.
Writers like Donatus ("Ars minor") and Marius Victorinus
("Ars grammatica") distinguish moods on the basis of morph¬
ology and sentence structure. Thus M. Victorinus distin¬












(Nuchelmans 1973, p. 129)
The inclusion of infinitive, impersonal and gerund is to
be repeated later (cp. § 4.1.3).
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4.1.2 The term 'mode' (or rather 'modus') received a
very different meaning in the speculative grammar of the
Modistae, approximately that of 'way (of being, of things,
of signifying, of viewing)' cp. 'modus esse', 'modus rei',
'modus significandi', "modus intelligendi'. Basic to the
speculations of the Modistae was the notion of proposi¬
tion and the way what is said ('dictum') is viewed and
how it is said.
The understanding, therefore, of mood as a grammatical
phenomenon developed in a direction rather like that of
speech act theory (cp. § 5). In Abelard, for example, we
find, in addition to statement-making utterances, other
kinds of 'oratio perfecta': 'oratio interrogativa' (ques¬
tions), 'deprecativa' (prayers), 'imperativa' (orders),
'desiderativa' (wishes), 'admirativa' (admirations), 'vo-
cativa' (addresses/calls), 'hortativa' and 'dehortativa'.
It is noted that the same form may stand for different
ways of viewing the proposition. Moreover, it is claimed
that, for example, overt commands or prayers (adesto, Petre)
have the same 'intellectus' as performative utterances like:
praecipio, ut adsis mihi, Petre or: deprecor, ut adsis mihi,
Petre. (Nuchelmans 1973, p. 147) Although later medieval
philosophers attempted to make a distinction between judg¬
ments of truth and falsity, on the one hand, and judgments
of likelihood, on the other, in the earlier period proposi¬
tions were viewed as being verum (true), falsum (false),
possible, impossible, necessarium or contingens (Nuchel¬
mans 1973, p. 173).
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We have here a division which coincides with the distinc¬
tion made in § 1 between 111 and Mod. The view of the
Modistae is essentially a notional one.
4.1.3 The Port Royal Logic (Arnauld/Nicole 1683), which
sets out the philosophy underlying the rationalist Port
Royal Grammar (Lancelot/Arnauld 1660) indicates the use
of 'mode', and hence 'modal', to refer to one of the four
modifications of a proposition: possibility, contingency,
impossibility and necessity.
"les philosophes ont ... remarque celles propositions
complexes, ou la complexion tombe sur le verbe, non
sur le sujet, ni sur l'attribut qu'ils ont appelees
modales, parceque 1'affirmation ou la negation y est
modifiee par l'un de ces quatres modes, possible, con¬
tingent, impossible, necessaire."
(Lancelot(Arnauld 1660, p. 130)
Since each mode may be affirmed or denied and may be ad¬
joined to an affirmative or negative there are four per¬
mutations for each mode and 16 for all four. This, the
basis of modal logic and traceable back to Aristotle and
the Scholastics, is to be found in many accounts of modal
verbs (§§ 5 and 6). Beauzee in "Grammaire Generale" defines
'mode' in a similar way to the Modistae:
"Les modes sont differentes formes introduites par
1'usage, pour caracteriser les differentes manieres
dont la signification du verbe peut etre envisagee."
(Beauzee 1767, Vol. II, p. 205)
A distinction is drawn between personal modes: indicative,
imperative, suppositive ("en enongant directement 1'exis¬
tence intellectuelle d'un sujet avec relation a un attri-
but, y ajoute 1'idee accessoire d'hypothese ou de supposi¬
tion"), subjunctive ("en enongant 1'existence intellectuel¬
le d'un sujet avec relation a un attribut, presente la pro-
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proposition qui en resulte comme incidente & subordonee
a une autre") and impersonal modes: infinitive and parti¬
cipial. What Beauzee means by the 'suppositive' is what
today is usually termed in French grammars the 'conditional',
Whilst Beauzee remains strictly tied to form in distinguish¬
ing moods, the definitions he offers are distinctly notion¬
al .
The conflict between notional and formal criteria becomes
more evident, however, in the writings of English Grammar¬
ians in C18th. Burnet (1774) for example, defines "modes or
moods of verbs" as:
"no other than those energies of the mind of the speak¬
er, (18) which j have said are essential to the verb ex¬
pressed by different forms or inflections of it."
(Burnet 1774, p. 161)
He continues:
"... I have only mentioned three; affirmation, expressed
by the mood called the indicative; wishing or praying,
expressed by the optative ^ ), and command, expressed
by the imperative. ... The subjunctive I rank under
affirmation; for it expresses an affirmation qualified.
The indicative affirms absolutely; but the affirmation
of the subjunctive is connected with, or dependent upon
some other affirmation. I therefore divide affirmation
into two moods; the indicative, affirming absolutely;
the subjunctive, affirming relatively or conditionally."
(Burnet 1774, p. 161)
Burnet thus attempts to subsume moods under 3 illocution
types (cp. Austin 1962, Searle 1969, Boyd/Thorne 1969).
White (1761) on the other hand takes up a different stand¬
point. He defines 'mood' as:
"the various Manners whereby the Verb is capable of
describing or representing any person or thing as ex¬
isting, possessing, acting or being acted upon ..."
Of these there are Many in English."
(White 1761, p. 1)
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He distinguishes: indicative, subjunctive and, further¬
more, an 'elective' mood = may, a 'potential' mood = can,
a 'determinative' mood ("because it expresses the resolu¬
tion of the agent, or person acting") = will, an 'obligat-
ive' mood = should, a 'compulsive' mood = must, and finally
the 'imperative' = let. This is one of the first accounts
I have found where an attempt is made to subsume both the
mood system (indicative, subjunctive, optative, imperative,
etc.), and the modal system (possibility, necessity, con¬
tingency, etc.) under the general category mood. Ward (1765)
and Webster (1784), which make very similar statements
claim that there is a 'potential' mood which
"... declares the liberty, power, necessity, inclina¬
tion and obligation of the agents, which are expressed
by the signs, may, can, must, would, should & C."
(Webster 1784, p. 22)
In other words all the "moods" added by White to the usual
scheme of four (personal) moods, are subsumed under 'poten¬
tial'. Such subdivisions of the 'potential' mood
"denote states merely as imagined, or foreseen, or re¬
membered, or some way collected by induction from the
states which are denoted by the signs, or from other
circumstances ... Thus in the expression, 'they must be
at their journey's end by this time.' Their state of
being is only imaginary in the speaker; but he has such
reasons for what he only imagines, that the imagined
consequence appears to him as necessarily true."
(Ward 1765, p. 193)
Harris (1771) in his "philosophical inquiry concerning uni¬
versal grammar", claims:
"We have observed already that the Soul's leading Powers
are those of Perception and those of Volition ... We
have observed also, that all Speech or Discourse is a
publishing or exhibiting some part of our Soul, either
a certain Perception, or a certain Volition ... hence
I say the variety of MODES or MOODS."
(Harris 1771, p. 140)
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Harris considers, the mood system to consist of two as¬
sertive moods:
DECLARATIVE/INDICATIVE "simply declare or indicate
something to be or not to be (whether a Perception
or Volition, "is equally the same") (op. cit., p. 141).
POTENTIAL: "if we do not strictly assert, as of some¬
thing absolute or certain, but as of something possible
only, and in the number of Contingents this makes that
Mode: in main clause and often in subjoined clauses
after indicative" ... "in such case, it is mostly used
to express the End, or Final Cause (Ex. "Thieves rise
by night that they may cut men's throats") contingent¬
ly".
(op. cit., p. 142)
Thus he considers the potential and the subjunctive to be
one and the same.
And of two moods which "require return or response":
INTERROGATIVE:
REQUISITIVE: a) "to inferiors: IMPERATIVE", b) "to
equals or superiors: PRECATIVE/OPTATIVE"
(op. cit., pp. 143-4)
In addition he retains the Infinitive:
"The application of this Infinitive is somewhat sin¬
gular. It naturally coalesces with those verbs, that
denote any Tendence, Desire or Volition of the Soul,
but not readily with others. Thus 'tis Sense as well
as Syntax, to say: ... I desire to live; but not to
say: ... I eat to live, unless by an Ellipsis, instead
of, I eat for to live. The Reason is, that though
different Actions may unite in the same Subject, and
therefore be coupled together ... yet the Actions not¬
withstanding remain separate and distinct. But 'tis
not so with respect to Volitions, and Actions. Here
the Coalescence is often so intimate, that the voli¬
tion is un-intelligible, til the Action be expresd."
(op. cit., p. 167)
Burnet (1774) rejects both the innovation of including
the interrogative and the continued inclusion of the in¬
finitive. The interrogative is dismissed because:
"it is not expressed by any different form of the verb
but only by particles, or by a certain arrangement of
the words."
(Burnet 1774, p. 161)
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and "for the same reasons" he dismisses a potential mood
"which even in Greek is denoted by no inflection of
the verb but by the potential or contingent particle
and in Latin it is not expressed at all, (other than
by a circumlocution)"
(op. cit. , p. 161)
Thus despite Burnet's initial division of the moods ac¬
cording to their illocutionary types, it is ultimately
surface form which determines for him whether a mood
exists or not. His objection to the infinitive is that
"it expresses no energy of the mind of the speaker,
but simply the action of the verb, with the addition
time."
(op. cit., p. 162)
This we must set against Harris's insight.
4.1.4 In the period of rationalism the conflict between
formalism and notionalism is of singular importance. The
desire to make sense of language and the interest in uni¬
versality resulting from the rise of historical and com¬
parative philology in C18th and C19th, which brought many
more languages within the purview of the grammarian, how¬
ever, helped to re-establish notionalism as the rationale
of language study. Thus we find Stoddart (1849) defining
'mood'.
"The mood however is not to be determined by the form,
but by the signification; for it often happens that
particular languages do not possess distinct forms for
the different moods; and where they do, the form of one
mood is frequently used with the force of another."
(Stoddart 1849, p. )
Stoddart takes "assertive function" of sentences as a
basis, and of these there are two: "enunciative" and "pa¬
ssionate". An enunciative assertion may be categorical i.e.
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1 indicative', or hypothetical, i.e. 'conjunctive' ( = sub¬
junctive) . A passionate assertion may be made when a) the
"object of passion is within the influence or power of
the speaker", i.e. 'imperative', or b) "when the object
of passion is within the desire or aversion only", i.e.
'optative'. The term "assertive function" is apparently
used in an equivalent way to 'illocution'. The modernity
of Stoddart's account may be seen further in his discussion
of interrogative as a candidate for inclusion under mood:
"I reflect that the mental energy exercised by an
interrogator is altogether different from that exer¬
cised by a respondent or narrator; and that it is mark¬
ed in all languages either by a change of the arrange¬
ment or accentuation of the words, or by some additonal
word or particle, or even perhaps by a peculiar inflec¬
tion, I cannot but agree with those who add an inter¬
rogative mood to the four above mentioned ... This mood
may be said to partake both of the enunciative and of
the passionate character."
(Stoddart 1849, p.
A similar precursing account of the performative analysis
(cp. Boyd/Thorne 1969, Ross 1970) is to be found in Ward
(1 765) .
"There are three instances in which this subject is al¬
most constantly understood; as the subject is always the
speaker himself. These instances are, "a question - a
command and a wish" ... a question always depends on
the words, 'I would know' or 'I would be told' ... a
command always depends upon the words, 'I direct - I
ordain - I command' ..."
(Ward 1765, p. 189)
We may compare this approach with that of the German philo¬
sophical tradition. Following Wolff and Kant, Hermann dis¬
tinguishes between the 'indicative' (real, existing) the
'conjunctive' (objective possibility) the 'optative' (sub¬
jective possibility) the 'imperative' (subjective necess¬
ity) and a mood of "objective necessity" to be found in,
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f. ex. Greek adjectives ending -teos. Such a view turns
the mood-modality relation on its head and conceives of
the mood system as a part of, that is, as explainable in
terms of, the modal system i.e. logical modal system.
§ 4.2 C20th accounts
4.2.0 I shall examine here four approaches to the ques¬
tion of mood and modality: 1) the logical-philosophical
2) the formalist-syntactical 3) the philological and
4) the behaviourist-psychological.
4.2.1 Deutschbein (1918) attempts to develop a maximal
system based upon a set of four mood types: Kogitativus
(= indicative), Optativus (- optative), Voluntativus (=
imperative) and Expectativus (= potential/subjunctive?).
These are defined in terms of the relation of the speak¬
er's consciousness of thought or wish (W) to reality or
realizableness (R).^^ The expression W/R for each mood
may have one of four values: (necessity) , = 1 (reality) ,
<1 (possibility), = 0 (unreality/impossibility), giving
an optimal set of 16 distinctions. The following is an
illustration using English examples taken from Kantor
(1 952) .
He is ill
He would come, if he
weren't ill
This may be true
He must be ill
May I never see him again!
I wish he were dead!
I should like to know
what you have learned









c) Voluntativus i) simple: Speak!
ii) augmented: You must go!
iii) future: I will go
iv) irrealis: I ought to go
d) Expectativus i) simple: He's due to come
ii) augmented: He surely must have arrived
by this time
iii) dubitative: I doubt whether he knows
iv) irrealis: I do not expect that a
child should know any¬
thing about death
(cp. Kantor 1952, pp. 282-3)
Such an a priori system is open to many questions: I
shall content myself with the following:
a) why the magic number 4, or 4x4 = 16 - a number prev¬
iously arrived at by the Rationalists and later
arrived at by Joos (1964)
b) why should certain modal verb expressions be included
and others excluded, such as: he shall do it, he
needn't do it.
c) what evidence is there for >1, = 1, <1, = 0?
d) as Jespersen (1924) observes, this system conflates
2 probably distinct scales:
i) necessity - possibility - impossibility
ii) real - unreal
Jespersen's criticism of Deutschbein (Jespersen 1924) leads
him to propose an alternative system based on the presence
or absence of an element of Will. (This again reflects the
"enunciative" and "passionate" distinction of Stoddart
















he has to go
he ought to go, we should go
you should go
go, please Jj? = Please goj
let us go
you may go if you like
I will go, it shall be done
may he be still alive
would that he were still alive
in order that he may go
twice two must be four




presumptive he is probably rich, he would/will
be rich
dubitative he may be rich
potential he.can speak
? conditional if he is rich
hypothetical if he were rich
? concessional though he is rich
?? subordinate (it surprises me) that he should
say this
(Jespersen 1924, pp. 320-1)
Jespersen does not present his system as being in any way
complete, or with, apparently, any great faith as to its
validity, for he concludes his somewhat unsatisfying sec¬
tion on Mood with the remark:
"There are many 'moods' if once one leaves the safe
ground of verbal forms actually found in a language."
(op. cit., p. 321)
Jespersen's position on mood shows an ambivalent attitude
towards notionalism. He claims that the mood expresses:
"the attitude of mind of the speaker towards the
content of the sentence."
(op. cit. , p. 313)
or else is purely determined by the "nexus" to which the
clause containing it is dependent. This leads him to the
view:
"it is very important to remember that we speak of
'mood' only if this attitude of mind is shown in
the form of the verb: mood thus is a syntactic, not
a notional category."
(op. cit. , p. 313)
For this reason Jespersen should be included under the
heading "Formalist-syntactic".
4.2.2 Much of Jespersen's discussion is devoted to taking
Sonnenschein to task for his attempts to establish a common
(21)
Indo-European syntax . Sonnenschein's approach, although
suffering from a considerable lack of rigour when dealing
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with abstract concepts, is an interesting move in the
direction of universal grammar. He conceives of 'indica¬
tive' , 'imperative', 'subjunctive' and 'optative' with
their "proper" meanings, and 'indicative', 'subjunctive'
and 'optative' with "acquired" meanings. Thus, the indica¬
tive proper is "generally factual", but not in the future
or after if. Its acquired meanings are: 1) unrealizable
wish, f. ex. French: si nous etions a leur place; 2) if-
clauses with implied unreality; 3) conditioned futurity,
f. ex. hesiter serait une faiblesse.
On the basis of the unclear distinction between 'will' =
subjunctive and 'wish' = optative (and the loss of opta¬
tive in Greek is taken as evidence for this), Sonnenschein
collapses subjunctive and optative into one category:











clauses of result, time,
cause contrast.
(Sonnenschein 1927, pp. 86 f.,
105-9)
Not all languages pattern in the same way - a fact which
does not disturb Sonnenschein's conception of a general
Indo-European syntax. Although it is unclear and only im¬
plicitly drawn, the distinction between an universal deep
structure and the arbitrariness of surface structure, under¬
lies Sonnenschein's treatment.
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"There is then such a thing as a common European syntax
- common to all the languages of the family, modern as
well as ancient - and its importance, both theoretical
and practical, is great. For upon the recognition of a
fundamental community of syntax depends the scientific
justification of the principle of uniformity of gram¬
matical terminology and classification Q= formal uni-
versals? cp. Chomsky 1965J ..."
(Sonnenschein 1927, p. 115)
He suggests further that there are "syntactic types" common
in ancient and modern languages which permit of varieties
"linked together by that mysterious formative principle
which controls their development and maintains their
identity amid all their vicissitudes of external form"
(op. cit., p. 115)
a formulation which in essence suggests a much more recent
notion, namely a semantically based universal deep struc¬
ture .
4.2.3 Under the heading "philological" we may include
Gonda 1956 and Kuryiowicz 1964. Gonda attempts a defini¬
tion to distinguish mood and modality along the following
lines:
mood: "Verb forms intimating the speaker's view of the
relation between the process described by the verb and
reality"
(cp. Deutschbein 1918)
modality judgements: "logical qualifications of the
assertion expressed in a proposition"
(Gonda 1956, p. 9, fn. 1)
Under his definition he excludes forms like: be able, will,
shall, and Sanskrit 'desiderative1 plus "moods" like 'desi-
derative', 'promissive', 'benedictive1, 'cohortative', 'pro-
positive', 'optative' in Korean.
Kuryi'owicz draws a distinction between subjective moods
(22)
"in the proper sense of mood" and objective moods
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A subjective mood reflects the attitude of the speaker,
an objective mood that of the agent, f. ex. May he go vs.
He wants to go. A further distinction drawn by Kury^rowicz
involves the illocutionary function of a sentence. Follow¬
ing Damourette and Pichon he distinguishes delocution
s (23)
("plan delocutaire") from locution ("plan locutaire")
To the former belong the 'subjunctive', 'indicative' and
'optative', and to the latter only the 'imperative'. In
these terms he claims, unlike many others (f. ex. Deutsch-
bein 1918), that the distinction between an 'imperative'
and an 'optative' is not a gradable one between a real and
unreal desire, but a qualitative one between a command
(locution) and a wish (delocution).
Although in Kury3?owicz's view the origin and evolution of
an objective mood (f. ex. 'desiderative', 'potential') and
of a subjective mood (f. ex. 'optative', 'subjunctive') are
different, he notes that it is possible to find a transi¬
tion between the two expecially with "semi-auxiliary" verbs,
f. ex. even though he (may) be rich and he may be rich
express the speaker's subjective opinion about the possi¬
bility of someone being rich, whereas he may go, in its
permission sense, expresses, if I have interpreted Kury-
•iowicz correctly, the attitude of the agent of go to the
possibility of his going, i.e. 'he is permitted/enabled to
go' = 'it is possible for him to go'.
4.2.4 As an example of a behaviourist approach to mood
I shall take Kantor (1952). Reviewing the history of gram¬
matical treatises on mood, he states:
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"When we regard moods in varying psychological types
of linguistic adjustments, we cannot escape the ques¬
tion whether linguistic patterns are in fact limited
in number. There is a tremendously large range of lin¬
guistic situations and we have not found in grammars
any good reason for fixating a definite number of forms
by an exclusive mood designation. No good reason is
given for throwing out the interrogative, the emphatic,
the negative, or any number of others. The limitations
of moods is nothing but a tribute paid by grammarians
to the modes of propositions."
(Kantor 1952, p. 288)
He decides: i) that moods are nothing but "accidental and
variable styles of particular languages" and ii) that there
is no way of justifying mood as a distinctive linguistic
phenomenon.
"When we deny moods a special place among grammatical
phenomena, we treat the subject matter usually presented
under this heading as a problem in the classification
of utterances."
(op. cit., p. 289)
His proposal then is an analysis of utterances along the
following lines:
1) circumstances of speaker
2) relation of speaker to hearer (intimacy, age, econ¬
omics , etc.)
3) contacts and connections between speaker and objects
spoken of
4) specific settings in which speaker, hearer and objects
spoken of are interrelated in concrete situations (24) _
There is considerable similarity between this and the no¬
tion of "context of situation" (Gardiner 1932, Firth 1937).
This view should be compared with the comments on the lin¬
guistic status of some areas of pragmatics in § 1.2.6.
4.2.5 The accounts of 'mood' and 'modality' in this chap¬
ter show considerable diversity, though some of the prob¬
lems may be more a question of methodology and terminology
than theory. It is, however, possible to detect general
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areas of consensus among writers of different persuasions.
Thus 'mood' is taken to be notionally:
kind of speech activity/mental attitude
and-or truth-falsity/reality-unreality judgments.
While 'modality' is taken to be:
judgements of probability
and-or modification of a predicate.
By far the majority of writers who conflate the categories
'mood' and 'modality' take mood to include modality rather
than vice-versa.
Let me here recapitulate how I conceive of mood and mod¬
ality. Mood and modality are surface categories that are
language specific - they cross classify. Underlying both
are the abstract modes 111 and Mod. Ill determines the
speaker's mode of uttering, what he is doing by uttering;
while Mod determines his view or orientation towards a pro¬
position. Thus both truth-falsity/reality-unreality judg¬
ments and probablity judgments (cp. above) belong under
Mod. I have already pointed out (§ 3.2.3) that not all
modifications of a predicate can be regarded as modality.
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§ 5 Generative and Transformational Accounts of Modality
5.0 In this chapter I make a survey of a number of recent
transformational approaches to mood and modals. I deal
first with the question of speech acts, illocutions and
moods, discussing the 'performative analysis', the 'ab¬
stract verb analysis' and the 'pragmatic analysis'. These
bear upon the question of 111. I then turn to modality
and the modal verb system, taking the standard TG account
and the Jackendoffian concept of modal structure, in contra¬
distinction to functional structure, and the main verb
analysis.
§ 5.1 The 'Performative Analysis'
5.1.1 The by now established transformational account of
'performatives', Ross' 1970 'performative analysis' of
declarative sentences, which has since been extended to
questions by Bach (1971) and Baker (1970) and to impera¬
tives by Lakoff 1970b, 1971, relies heavily on Austin 1962,
Under this analysis any declarative sentence contains a












(cp. Ross 1970, p. 219)
Ross presents evidence for the independent existence in
deep structure of all three items: 1st person subject;
abstract performative verb of saying; 2nd person (indirect)
object. These mainly involve constraints of sentence ad-
verbials and attitudinal phrases such that only logical
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reference to the speaker of the sentence is possible;
certain reflexivization phenomena; reported speech phe¬
nomena in Arabic; obligatory speaker referring particles
in Thai; hearer-gender-referring verbal infixes in Basque,
etc. I do not propose to give details of the individual
arguments, but I do draw attention to the most signifi¬
cant aspect of Ross' analysis, namely the claim:
"All declarative sentences occurring in contexts where
first person pronouns can appear derive from deep
structures containing one and only one superordinate
performative clause whose main verb is a verb of say¬
ing. " (Emphasis mine)
(Ross 1970, p. 252)
Ross' evidence has been questioned by S. Anderson (1971),
who also presents counter-evidence, i.e. evidence for the
non-existence of a higher performative verb of the declar¬
ative type, involving the patterning of reported speech
in Icelandic, which has different surface moods according
to whether the subject of the verb of saying is identical
or not to the subject of the statement, and also in Igbo,
which has different pronominal forms in reported speech.
But far more significant is Fraser's (1971) critique of
that part of Ross' claim that I have underlined in the
quotation above.
Fraser's arguments attack Ross' account on four points:
i) where there is a performative, it is not necessarily
in the highest clause. The sentence:
5.1. Obviously I concede that I've lost the elec¬
tion .
is semantically related to:




5.1". I concede that I have obviously lost the
election.
The established transformational analysis of sentence
adverbials, first proposed in Katz/Postal (1964) requires
that they derive from a higher S:
5 . 1 P £ . . . . Ij. is obvious ^
ii) there are instances of two performatives within one
sentence:
5.2a. I admit that I'm late and promise that I will
be on time from now on. (overt performatives)
b. Why wash your car, since it's going to rain
tomorrow, (covert performatives: question +
statement)
iii) certain performatives are not deletable:
5.3a. I strongly agree that Suzan is the best,
b. * Strongly, Suzan is the best.
This should be compared with Schreiber's (1972) example:
5.4a. I tell you frankly Suzan is the best,
b. Frankly, Suzan is the best.
for certain speech acts there are no performatives:
5.5a. I'll kill you. (a threat)
b. * I hereby threaten /to kill you.
\that I'll kill you.
5.6a. I did it. (a boast)
b. * I boast that I did it.
or even, we might add:
5.7a. Ugh! (an expression of disgust)
b. * I hereby ugh
c. * I hereby express an ugh
With regard to the first and second points, that perform¬
atives may not constitute the highest clause and that
there may be instances of two performatives within one
sentence, we should take note of Rutherford's (1970) pro¬
posal for restrictive and non-restrictive subordinate
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clauses, which modifies Ross' account such that, although
more than one performative may appear in a deep structure,
only the uppermost may be deleted. The sentences:
5.8a. He's not coming to class because he's sick,
b. He's not coming to class, fbecause he just
phoned from
San Diego,
because his wife just
told me.
are distinguished:
5.8a'. |l (declar^ £ pie not come to class ^ because
he be sick "^3
b'. jl [declare] pr say £ He not come to clas
because ...
where ' . . . ]Tl say . . . ^ ' is a deletable non-performative
verb of saying. The sentence:
5.9.
cos
would have the structure:
5.9'.
He's not coming to class because he's sick,
(because^, . . _ . , , , ,' >his wife just told me.
I declare
because his wife just told me
he not come to class
Rutherford claims, however, that there are instances where
a performative may be embedded in another performative,
and cites as examples:
5.10a. I declare that I (hereby) promise to stop
smoking.
b. I (hereby) declare that I promise to stop
smoking.
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He accordingly claims that Ross' rule of performative de¬
letion should be made obligatory for the topmost S, which
always has a [+performative3 verb of saying (cp. Ross,
where the rule applies optionally), and inapplicable in
the case of an embedded verb marked £+performativej , which
is then lexicalized, and optional when a verb of saying is
marked ^-performativej .
Finally it is worth noting Bolinger's (1973) claim, which
opposes another aspect of Ross' analysis, namely that not
all declarative sentences have an underlying performative
'from the speaker's standpoint'. Thus the two declarative
sentences:
5.11a. John is a preacher,
b. John is an idiot.
The one "objective", the other "subjective", are distin¬
guishable in that only the second has an underlying per¬
formative. This may, however, be regarded as a distinction
in modality: asserting a fact vs. asserting an attitude
(cp. the Hopi distinction (Whorf, 1938) between an indic¬
ative and a concessive: 'I see that it is red' (objective
statement) nY"? t'l'wa' - q pa'la; 'I see that it is new'
(inferential statement) n't"5 t'iwa' - q kVr pV 'h'i.
Another version of the 'performative analysis' is to be
found in Boyd/Thorne 1969. This is an attempt to analyze
English modal verbs and certain sentence types in terms of
two abstract performatives: state for statements and imp
for commands and demands (cp. § 4 Stoddart 1849).
Thus for the ambiguous sentence:
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5.12. He should have gone
(- Boyd/Thorne1s Ex. 40)
their analysis would be:
5.12'. I state Some proform imp past He go non-past
where the interpretation is analogous to that of:
5.12". He should have gone yesterday.
Although Boyd/Thorne only propose such a structure as a
tentative semantic representation, it is surely valid to
regard this as an underlying structure of 12, in view of
the claim by Lakoff (1971), inter alia, that semantic re¬
presentation (or the semantico-logical structure) is ident¬
ical to the deep structure of a sentence. If, therefore,
we perform a bracketing operation (implying a tree diagram)
on 12', we arrive at something like:
5.12"'. (I state (Some imp (He go)))
proform past non-past
Two things about this structure are open to question in
view of Ross' version:
i) the possibility of embedding a 'performative' element
in an already performative strucutre; ii) the tense marking
on the embedded 'performative'.
5.1.2 Here I look at some of the difficulties involved in
the 'performative analysis'. I wish to consider first the
nature of 'I say', 'I state', 'I declare' or 'I tell you',
all of which variously figure as the abstract performative
correlates of declaratives in versions of the 'performative
analysis', as overt performative verbs (cp. Austin 1962).
One of the tests for performativity (cp. § 3.1.3) is the
possibility of collocation with hereby. Semantically, this
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means that uttering the performative verb enacts its de¬
notatum - a performative is self-referring. This can,
under certain circumstances, be shown for state, declare
and tell but not for say.
5.13a. In saying this I am saying that he's crazy.
b. I hereby say he's crazy.
c. With these words I say he's crazy.
In uttering:
I say he's crazy,
we do not create the 'saidness' of a proposition in the
sense that we create a 'statement' by uttering the word
state. On the other hand, say may be used in cases where
we might suppose an 'implicit performative'.
5.14a. — Dr Fatfee, what is your learned and con¬
sidered opinion as to the accused's
mental condition?
— I say he's plum crazy. i.e. 'I declare'
b. — Mrs. Wheatgerm thinks her new neighbour's
a dish.
-- Well, I say he's crazy, i.e. ' counterclaim'
c. -- Sir Alf Stubborn, general secretary of the
knifegrinder's union, had this to say:
"I say we will not be dictated to by any
government on this issue and any attempt
to do so will meet a sharp rejoinder
from us ..." i.e. 'I warn'
Such behaviour suggest rather that say is a descriptive
verb. Although Ross himself formalizes his abstract per¬
formative as 'declare', he constantly refers to it as a
verb of saying. It is important to realize that say is not
performative, or alternatively that if the abstract verb
is really performative, then it is not say. There is, how¬
ever, a problem with the other candidates for underlying
performativity, namely that they are too specific for the
nature of declarative sentences.
If we examine Ross' arguments again, it turns out that
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the whole proof for the performativity of the superordi-
nate verb of saying rests on the paraphrase relation be¬
tween :
That is, Ross assumes that tell is performative and a
verb of saying, proves that there is a higher verb of say¬
ing and then infers that it is performative. The relation
between 15a and b is not one of strong equivalence: they
may be different speech acts: 15a states (and in stating
may inform); 15b primarily informs. At best the relation¬
ship between them, I would say, is one of implication.
There is also reason to have reservations about at least
part of the justification of a performative analysis of
questions and imperatives. Questions have been analyzed
either as:
5.15a. Prices slumped.
b. I tell you that prices slumped.
(= Ross 1s 1a)




while imperatives have been analyzed as:
(Lakoff 1971)
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Marginal sentence types like optatives, hortatives, etc.
have not generally been considered. It can readily be
shown that the (IMP I you (STAT you (S))) analysis of
questions is not valid for all questions. First there
are questions which do not solicit an assertion but agree¬
ment on the part of the addressee; a fact which can be
indicated by the paraphrase relations below:
5.16a. Is he there? cp. Tell me whether
he's there (or not).
b. He's there, jrtisn't he? cp. I think/believe he's
there: tell me if he
is.
c. He's there, "Visn't he? cp. I think/believe he's
there: tell me that
it's true.
Secondly, there are questions which are not addressed to
anyone but are simply 'posed' as steps in an argument, cp.
'I wonder' with 'I ask myself'.
5.17. Now, what happens when we add some acetic
acid?
That was a nice big bang, wasn't it?
Here it would be inappropriate to gloss with 'Tell me ...'.
Thirdly, this analysis complicates our account of if/whe¬
ther in indirect questions, if we accept the general ex¬
planation that certain constructions take a Q morpheme
without being themselves questions.
5.18a. Is it true, I asked asked if it was true.
cp. 'Black English' I asked was it true.
b. Is it true, I wonder I wonder if it is true.
c. * Is it true, I don't knowI don't know if it
* I don't know is it truej < is true.
It would be counter-intuitive to introduce (IMP I you (STAT
...)) in 18c .
Fourthly, this analysis does not distinguish the structure
of the gloss 'Tell me if ...' from that of 'Tell me that ...'.
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Taking the other analysis (ASK I (...)), there is some
doubt about the pertormativity of the real verb of que¬
stioning ask;
5.19a. ? I hereby ask (you) if you saw him last night,
b. * In saying this I ask if you saw him last
night.
wonder is, of course, clearly not performative:
5.20a. * I hereby wonder if you saw him last night,
b. * In saying this I wonder if you saw him last
night.
The verb of ordering ask may be performative:
5.21. I hereby ask you to comply
There are similar considerations with IMP or ORDER. First,
not all imperatives command:
5.22a. Go! (command)
b. Please go! (request)
c. Shut the door, will you! (request)
d. Be happy! (injunction/optative)
It would be counter-intuitive to analyse 22d as having an
underlying performative ORDER; yet, on the other hand, it
would be unsatisfying to analyze it in a way that ignored
the similarity of form with 'true imperatives' (cp. § 11.2),
a similarity which occurs in many languages. It is reason¬
able to conclude that something other than an underlying
performative ORDER or IMP must cover such a generalization.
5.1.3 What marks the whole debate about the performative
analysis is perhaps the lack of precision as to what is
meant by 'performative'. In order to clarify this concept
and thus evaluate its relevance for the linguistic analysis
of modality, since, as I claimed earlier, some modal verbs
may have 'performative' interpretations, we need to go
back to the source of the term, namely linguistic phil-
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osophy, and establish the relationship between the behav¬
iourist theory of speech acts and semantico-syntactic phe¬
nomena. I will discuss the following aspects of speech
act theory: the constative/performative distinction;
locution - illocution - perlocution; overt performative vs.
'primary' performative. Although Austin 1962, appears to
have partially given up the distinction between 'constat-
ive' and 'performative' towards the end of his account of
speech acts, it is, in my opinion, still tenable, and I
shall attempt to justify this claim below.
Austin's distinction rests upon the fact that constatives
can be given a truth value, whereas performatives can only
be judged felicitous or infelicitous. Thus:
5.23. I owe you $6.
may be true or false, but 25a and b below may only be
judged to be appropriate to or successful in the context
in which they are uttered.
5.24a. I promise to pay you $6.
b. I'll pay you $6.
where 24a is an explicitly performative utterance and 24b
is a 'primary' performative (to use Austin's term). The
distinction can be made clear by means of response poss¬
ibilities :
5.25a. I owe you $6. - Yes you do.
- No you don't.
- Do you?
- ?*You say that but
you don't mean it.
b. I promise to pay you $6. - ?*Yes you do.
- No you don't.
- Do you?
- You say that but
you don't mean it.
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In 25a we can agree with the statement (accept its truth)
or deny it or question it, but we cannot question its fel¬
icity. With 25b, however, we can question its felicity
and we can deny its felicity, but we cannot agree with
the sentence (accept its truth), though we can agree to
it with a response like: OK, Agreed, etc. Notice that the
response: No you don't, is challenging the felicity of the
promise, not denying the truth of 'I pay you $6', and the
question response is questioning the felicity of the prom¬
ise not questioning the truth of 'I pay you $6'.
We may further note that the question of intention is im¬
portant in determining performativity. This leads on to
the question of locution - illocution - perlocution.
This three-way distinction has been made by a number of
linguistic philosophers (Austin 1962, Searle 1969, Sesonke
1965) to represent various aspects of the speech act. In
fact it is not sufficient, as we shall see below. The dis¬
tinction may be characterized, following Austin 1962, Se¬
sonke 1 965:
locutionary act: saying something
illocutionary act: what is done in saying something
perlocutionary act: what speaker tries to do by saying
something
It is the word 'do' that is the key to performatives: a
performative utterance performs a (social) act. Thus:
5.26. I pronounce you man and wife.
is interpretable as:
5.26'. With these words I create you man and wife.
And, as noted before, an overt performative verb is self-
(26)
referring, it performs the act it denotes . In:
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5.27. I name this ship the SS Mae West.
the locution, illocution and perlocution co-incide: what
is said, done and intended is 'I name this ship the SS
Mae West'.
The situation is somewhat different with implicit or
'primary' performatives. If we interpret:
5.28. You are now man and wife.
performatively, i.e. the enactment of marriage, the loc¬
ution 'You are man and wife' differs from the illocution
'I pronounce you man and wife'. The intention (perlocution)
is to create a married couple. In such a case the illoc¬
ution is discoverable only by determining the intention
and-or the effect of the utterance.
The notion of implicit performative leads us to the cen¬
tral question regarding the performative analysis. Whilst
it is undeniable that an utterance like 28 has an illoc¬
ution (cp. below), what justification is there for view¬
ing this as an underlying performative (for that is what
Q
implicit performative means in structural terms).
Consider an utterance containing a constative verb:
5.29. I think she's crazy.
Clearly this cannot perform the act of thinking or estab¬
lish the existence of a thought. It cannot be argued that
it performs the mental act of opining (or judging) and
thus involves an implicit performative. Even if we inter¬
pret this utterance in the same way as:
5.30a. I hereby judge him to be crazy.
b. I hereby give my opinion that he's crazy.
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- which I find tenuous - the performativity involved
here seems to be trivial in comparison to the perform-
ativity of utterances like:
5.31a. I shall pay you §6.
b. I pronounce you man and wife.
What 29 does, pragmatically, is state an opinion or be¬
lief - at most we could argue for the performativity of
the act of stating. But I don't think this gets us near¬
er to a proper analysis. This can only be achieved, I
think, by distinguishing clearly between illocution (the
function of an utterance in discourse) and 'performativ¬
ity ' (the linguistic enactment of a social event). Hence¬
forth, I shall speak only of 'performative use' and 'per¬
formative interpretation' not of 'performatives' per se.
This does not exclude the possibility of implicit perform-
ativity - indeed this possibility is exactly what is allow¬
ed for by 'performative interpretation'. But I regard
this as distinct from illocution.
5.1.4 Having argued for the above distinction, let me
return to the 'performative analysis'.
In two articles: 'Queclaratives' (1971) and 'Whimperatives'
(1970) Sadock analyzes utterances which look like inter-
rogatives but aren't. He produces evidence that, for ex¬
ample, shows 'whimperatives' to behave as imperatives in
terms of co-occurrence possibilities but not as questions.
We can note in passing, also, that:
5.32. Why don't you get lost.
- which is not a 'whimperative' in Sadock's sense - would
be semantically odd as a question unless the event verb
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get lost were interpreted iteratively, i.e. 'Why don't
you ever get lost?'. Otherwise a true question would have
to have the form:
5.33a. Why aren't you getting lost?
b. Why haven't you got lost?
Were it not for the fact that 32, as well as being respond¬
ed to as it is intended to be responded to, that is in the
same way as an instruction: 'Get lost!', may also be re¬
sponded to 'naively', that is by deliberately ignoring
the intended instruction, taking the utterance at its
'face value' and giving a reason why one doesn't comply
with the speaker's wishes, we should have no reason other
than the surface structure for viewing it as a question.
But to make such a 'naive' response is of course to break
a conversational rule, and, as it were, to refuse to accept
the first speaker's challenge. This is impossible with a
'true' imperative.
Sadock's solution to utterances that aren't exactly what
they look is to propose deep structures containing a con¬
junction of two illocutions, in the case of 'whimperatives',
a conjunction of a question illocution and a command illoc-
ution. But there is another way of viewing this kind of
utterance and that is in terms of illocutionary potential
and illocutionary force - a distinction that is argued
for, in particular, in Boyd/Thorne 1969. 32 would be ana¬
lyzed as having the illocutionary potential of a question
i.e. the speech act is formulated interrogatively, but
the illocutionary force of a command, i.e. 'Get lost!'.
Or, to take another example:
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5.34. You will speak the truth.
(which Austin would presumably treat as a case of implicit
performativity), the illocutionary potential of a declar¬
ative is associated with the illocutionary force of a
command - at least on one interpretation.
In § 11 I will offer a modification of such an analysis
within the framework of my own approach.
5.1.5 What I have argued in the foregoing sections is
that many of the claims made about the 'performative ana¬
lysis' are questionable or false. This does not mean, how¬
ever, that the whole analysis can be disregarded. A num¬
ber of linguistic phenomena that it attempts to handle
still have to be handled in some way. These are:
a) illocutionary potential, which may be regarded as
the mode of the utterance
b) illocutionary force, which partially includes the
sphere of implicit performativity.
c) performativity
With regard to certain aspects of the speech situation we
should note in particular Ross's arguments for the presence
of I (= speaker) in the abstract strucutre of the sentence
and also the reference of sentence adverbials like:
regretfully, hopefully, preferably to the speaker not the
hearer or any other participant. None of the arguments
leveled against Ross have disposed of the need for this
information. On the other hand, his conclusion that the
structure should be something like.
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is not a necessary one, if one does not accept the exi¬
gencies of his formalism. Ross himself allows that there
may be a 'pragmatic' alternative where I is "in the air",
i.e. it does not appear in the structural specification
but may be utilized in the operation of formation con¬
straints. Within the framework outlined in § 1 it might,
for instance, be introduced via translational rule or
appear as a condition on a translational rule. I see,
therefore, no reason for treating the performative ana¬
lysis as anything other than a notational variant in this
respect of the analysis offered in § 1;i.e.
(Ill (Mod (Prop)))
where 111 is taken to be the illocution of statements,
claims, etc. I shall take up some of the other points
in § 5.2 and in later chapters (especially § 11).
§ 5.2 The analyses of R. Lakoff and Householder
5.2.0 Here I examine accounts by Lakoff and Householder,
which attempt to analyze illocutionary and modal structure.
5.2.1 Robin Lakoff's 1968 analysis of Latin complemen¬
tation and associated mood phenomena in terms of abstract
verbs is interesting as an attempt to treat variations in
mood as a reflex of a variety of deep structural relations
and configurations. The surface phenomena include:
i) complementation types: complementizer + infinitiv-
ization
subjunctive (various tenses)
ii) participant relations: identity/non-identity of
subjects of higher and em¬
bedded sentences.
inclusion/non-inclusion of
subjects of higher and em¬
bedded sentences.
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iii) sentence types: questions
imperatives
subjunctive statements




The abstract structures involve:
i) two types of embedding: subject
object















Since the model of complementation embedding used by La-
koff is in itself controversial (cp. § 12.2), I shall leave
that out of discussion. Below I note some of claims made
by Lakoff which are relevant to the analysis proposed in
this study:
i) The abstract performatives JlMPERo} [hORtJ and the
non-performative [vel] correspond approximately
to the English imperative, let's construction,
and I wish/if only constructions respectively.
They are distinguished as follows:
llMPERO requires non-identical/non-included
subject in embedded S.
i.e. ( [iMPERoj X (V X' ))
where X' ^ X
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[hORTj allows inclusion of subject in
embedded S.
i.e. ( [hORt] X (V X' ))
where: x' £ x
or: x' / X
[velI allows identity of subject
i.e. ( [vEl[ I (V X' ))
where: x' = I
or: x' / I
ii) The two non-performative abstract verbs: [opORtJ ,
JaEQUUm] correspond to English obligative should/
ought and advisory/deliberative should/ought. Thus:
( [0p0rtJ x(v x ) = x is obliged/ought to ...
( [aeQUUm] (v x ....)) E It is right that x ...
A difficulty with this, disregarding the surface structur¬
al facts of Latin that Lakoff is trying to elucidate, is
that the senses of the two seem to overlap.
Should he go? 1) a deliberative =
_ (Ought he to go
\ls he to go
b advisory
*2) obligative cp. Must he go?
He should go. ?*1) a deliberative £ He is to go.
b advisory = He ought to go.
2) obligative = He ought to go.
He shouldn't go a deliberative
b advisory E He'd do better
not to go.
He should not go obligative
Furthermore, the sense of it is right that ... as a state¬
ment is more or less restricted to expressions like:
And so he should.
The meaning-relationships touched upon here would seem to
bear further examination: the sense of [aeQUUm] could be
considered as being included in that of
iii) The non-performatives [vel] and [vol] correspond
to the distinction in English between wish and
want.
[oport]
only allows I as subject
allows any subject.
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Lakoff uses [VOLJ to account for purpose clauses
so that/in order ... to, in combination with an
abstract verb of reason [because] which allows
only S embeddings as its arguments. Her analysis
of:




in order not to see
so as not to see
so that he would not see
Clodius
is accordingly:
[because] [vol] Marcus (neg (see Marcus Clodius))) (
leave Marcus Rome)
i.e. Marcus left Rome because he doesn't want to
see Clodius.
iv) Similar to [because] is [result], which is the ab¬
stract verb underlying consecutive clauses with
so (that) ...
patriae tanta est vis ut Ithacam vir sapient-
issimus immortalitati anteponeret
(= Lakoff1s 50b)
so great is the power of one's country that the
wisest man set Ithaca above immortality
( [RESULT*] (Ithacam vir sapientissimus immort¬
alitati anteponit) (patriae tanta est vis))
v) Similar in some ways to [Vol] is [designate], which
underlies relative - purpose clauses cp. English ..,
the one to ... It requires a human subject and a
non-negative embedded S.
scribebat Aelius orationes quas alii dicerent
(Lakoff's 45c)
Aelius used to write speeches for others to de¬
liver
(scribere (Aelius) (orationes ( [DESIGNATE]
S S
(Aelius) (dicere (alii) (orationes))))
S SSS
i.e. 'Aelius wrote speeches which other men were
designated by him to read.'
vi) The concessive abstract verb [lIc] is said to under¬
lie clauses with: '(al)though'/granted that', which
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allow in English a choice between the indicative
and the modal verb may.
ne sit summum malum dolor, malum certe est.
(= Lakoff1s 15c)
though pain may not be! the greatest evil, it is
(isn't /
certainly an evil.
vii) The potential abstract verbs [poss]] and {VerISIMILe]
correspond to English may/can/possible and likely
respectively, but the latter has its only realiz¬




'Could I have been angry with you?'
egone ut te interpellem?
(= Lakoff's 22b)
'Is it likely that I'd interrupt you?
Would I interrupt you?'
The kind of sentence being considered here strikes me as
more complex than Lakoff allows. In terms of speech acts
they seem to question the hearer's beliefs rather than
his view of what is probable.
jj?OSS^], too, is not so straightforward as it might seem.
It is used to account for sentences like:
5.35. certum affirmare non ausim (= Lakoff's 17a)
'I wouldn't dare say for certain.'
although Lakoff relates such phenomena to constructions
like:
potest ut + subjunctive 'it is possible that'
which I find implausible. In English possible allows both
will and would in its complement sentence:
5.36a. It's possible I'll be in a position to say that,
b. It's possible I'd be in a position to say that.
though 36b often presupposes an if-clause or conditional
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adverb. It doesn't appear to explain anything if we
attribute would in:
5.37. I wouldn't say for certain,
JpossJto the present in deep structure of a deleted
when we still have to explain commutation with:
5.38. I won't say for certain,
and even:
5.39. It's possible I won't say for certain.
5.2.2 Lakoff's analysis is based on the principle of
paraphrase relations, as are many other accounts includ¬
ing the present one, although I have attempted to refine
4- /
the notion of paraphrase (§ 1.3.3).
Her starting point is the ambiguity of a sentence like:
5.40. venias!
= 5.4 0'. come I 'impero ut venias'
40". may you come! 'volo ut venias'
40"': you may come 'licet venias'
In senses 40' and 40" the negation particle is ne, in 40'"
it is non. Since the choice between ne and non can be de¬
monstrated to be related to the choice of complement types,
namely those with volitional main verbs and those with
non-volitional main verbs, and since these complement
types are connected with verbs which are semantically
very close to the senses of the independent mood form:
venias, it is a reasonable hypothesis that the two pheno¬
mena are related. Thus both:
5.41a. ne venias — don't come
b. impero ut ne venias = I order you not to come
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are said to have the same deep structural representation,
roughly:
5.41'. _ ( TiMPERo] i ii _ ( NEG veni + re (ii)))S u "* S ss
Lakoff's claim is formulated thus:
"What is present in deep structure is a verb with
semantic and syntactic properties similar to those
found in real verbs but with no phonological form;
such verbs govern the application of complementizer
placement, complementizer-change, and sometimes
other rules ..."
(R. Lakoff 1968, p. 161)
This differs somewhat from the claim fundamental to gen¬
erative semantics, whereby certain surface structure
verbs may be the realization of a number of embedded
predicates in underlying structure (lexical decomposi¬
tion) as discussed in § 1.2.2. It is similar to the per¬
formative analysis in that some of the abstract verbs
suggested by Lakoff are said to be performative; namely
j^IMPERoj and JhORt] .
5.2.3 One of the objections to the 'Abstract Verb Hypo¬
thesis' is that the behaviour of abstract verbs is just
as much subject to irregularity as that of surface struc¬
ture verbs. Lakoff claims:
"An abstract verb behaves like a real one in one way
that may be unexpected: it can be irregular with re¬
spect to the redundancy rules of its meaning class.
Thus in Latin, verbs of ordering regularly take the
complementizer ut - subjunctive: impero ut venias.
But a verb of ordering may be marked in the lexicon
as undergoing for-to complementizer change instead,
as iubeo: iubeo te venire. It is conceivable that
a verb of ordering in Latin might be able to under¬
go either of these rules; this was true for some
speakers of Latin in the case of impero, for others
with iubeo. It is equally conceivable that the ab¬
stract verb of ordering, which underlies the super¬
lative, might function this way and that we might
find alternative forms of the imperative, venias
and te venire. That only the first of these appears
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in Latin is not altogether accidental but rather the
result of the fact that a language will choose the un¬
marked complementizer for a class in an abstract verb,
though it will not invariably do so. It may choose a
marked possibility, but it will never choose one that
is impossible for the meaning class; thus it is pre¬
dicted that *quod venit and *venit are impossible as
imperative forms in Latin, as of course they are."
(R. Lakoff 1968, p. 166)
Despite Lakoff's attempts to explain this away, such a
prospect is not a very happy one for any grammar: in order
to explain the generality of certain phenomena, we intro¬
duce into the deep structure the possibility of irregular
behaviour with regard to certain rules. We would need, I
suspect, some fairly ad hoc rules to explain why an ab¬
stract verb behaves in a way which is not identical to
its surface realization, even if we allow for markedness
or some kind of valency.
In her review of Lakoff's work, Green (1970) raises the
question of meaning classes and asks whether it is in
principle possible to discover meaning classes which elim¬
inate the need for a number of governed rules (redundancy
rules): "suppose all putative synonyms differing in syn¬
tactic properties such as want/desire can be shown to
differ in meaning too."
This, I think, is the crux of the matter: although 'pairs'
like want/desire can be shown to have a very close meaning,
despite their differing syntax, we cannot claim that they
are equivalents, i.e. stand in a strong paraphrase re¬
lation, since there are, if not implications, at least
suppositions that they do not share. If we imagine the
following said in the context where the speaker is asking
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the addressee to do something in accordance with his
wishes, then I think there is more than a difference of
style involved: one of them is situationally appropriate,
the other is not.
5.42a. Mary, I want you to leave.
b. Mary, I desire that you leave.
Although 42a is a statement about a volition, it can
serve also as a request; the speaker uses it when he
may reasonably expect his addressee to conform to his
wishes; the addressee feels, if not ordered, at least
challenged to conform to these wishes. With 42b I don't
think the speaker has the same expectation. Without setting
up a 'meaning class' we might view the meaning of desire
and want as varying along the following lines.
wish for/long for/desire
require/need/want
The term 'meaning class' is inaccurate. It is a notation
for a set of items which have one or more elements in
common, and thus may be grouped parametrically, but they
can individually and variously pass into other parameters.
A parameter, it should be recalled (cp. § 3.2.2), is es¬
sentially a heuristic device. I take the view that the
theory of abstract verbs, as formulated by R. Lakoff,
concerns a notation for feature composites; they are not
themselves primitives and could be further analyzed. If
we accept a generative semantic position, then we cannot
justify abstract verbs in R. Lakoff's sense. The general¬
izations we wish to capture about complementization and
mood, whether in English or in Latin, can, I think, be
equally captured by a grammar which operates in terms of
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semantic primitives. This means that a certain part of the
meaning of a 'real item' like order may be contained in
the deep structure representation of an imperative, or
else be 'translatable' from it, but there is no need to
posit a discrete abstract verb to explain this common mean¬
ing element and to provide a common source (identical deep
structure) for the two.
5.2.4. Katz/Postal (1964), Bierwisch (1967) and others have
proposed sentence operators such as IMP and Q to handle in
a transformational framework such surface phenomena as im¬
peratives and interrogatives. Householder's (1971) account
may be viewed as a development out of this approach incorpor¬
ating certain insights thrown up by the performative debate.
The following rules summarize Householder's treatment:
1. U —> S + 111 (+ Q) i.e. an utterance may be quest¬
ioned or not, but must be
given an illocutionary mark.
Possibly Excl(amation) be¬
longs here as an la^ternative
to 111 (+ Q)
2. S —> S' (+ Mod)
3 . S ' —^ Snu (+ Neg) i.e. the sentence nucleus may
be negative.
4. Ill —> Assn, Will
5. Mod —> Poss, Nec
(Householder 1971, p. 94)
The element Q here is taken as a process, like negation
and modalizing, which can combine with Assn and Will to
produce other sentence types.
Ass (he go) : he goes [[[fre gi]] [Ass
Assn + Q (he go) : does he go? H[[[he gcj 2 D [Assn] q]
Will (you go) : go! [ [[&ou <?°]UU [Will] 3
Will + Q (you go) : are you to go? ECCEou gsm (Will] cD
In addition he suggests (informally) a feature of "you-
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neutrality" which when combined with Q accounts for ex¬
pressions like: 'I wonder as opposed to the non-you-
neutral: 'I ask you . ..' and when combined with Will ac¬
counts for 'I hope ...' or 'I wish ...1.
What Householder is attempting to do with his system is
to explain modality not only in main clauses but also in
subordinate clauses without recourse to embedding trans¬
formations or recursive phrase structure rules. Thus the
structure:
5-43- [CUE tD] E11] 3
would be said to underlie:
5.43'. Am I to go?
and:
5.43". I ask whether I am to go?
and (adding tense):
5.43'". I asked whether I was to go?
Householder claims that recursion is only possible with
complete utterances (U); this is not the same as the
S S1 expansion. Presumably Housholder's claim is design¬
ed to cover the combination of utterances with different
illocutions, f. ex.:
5.44. Let's go out, shall we?
since the S S' expansion, at least as his rules are
formulated, would allow only the following phrase structure
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but not expansions like:
111
and
5.2.5 My main reservations concerning this analysis in¬
volve the status of Q, and the status of Will. Household¬
er's structure for a question like:
5.45. Is John going?
would be:
5.45'. L L L (John goj J ~\ jAssnj Qj
US S' Snu Snu S' S 111 111 U
Householder says that "an assertion may be questioned"
(op. cit. , p. 94). This statement strikes me as rather odd.
In an open-question (one that simply asks for information)
there is no questioned assertion but rather a request for
(27)
a statement of the truth or falsity of a proposition.
Only in case of non-open questions would it be conceivable
that an assertion is questioned. Negative questions are
typically non-open - these would have the specification:
5-46 [[[Eohn Nejj J jAssn] 5]
under Householder's analysis. It would, of course, be poss¬
ible to say that the distinction between an open (positive)
question and a non-open (negative) question is conditioned
by the pragmatics of negation. Unfortunately, a positive
question may also have a non-open interpretation, admitted¬
ly with a different intonation contour (cp. § 11.3). Thus
Householder not only does not distinguish open and non-
open positive questions structurally but also gives a spe¬
cification for positive questions which I believe to be
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wrong for open-questions.
We might also ask ourselves how Householder would handle
tag questions. I foresee two possibilities: a double-illoc-
ution analysis i.e. U + U or transformational derivation
from non-tag questions. The former possibility is includ¬
ed in Householder's rules, but as I shall argue in § 11.3.3,
I think it is wrong to assume two illocutions as in:
5.47££ £ £[john 0R[TLC!iohn Ne3Zl ^.ss3 0$
Moreover, the tag question:
5.48. John's going, isn't he?
has two possible intonations depending on whether it is
used to solicit agreement or reaffirmation.
5.48a. John's >going,J*isn't he? ('I thought he was
going or is my belief wrong?')
b. John' s "Vgoing , ">isn ' t he? ('John's going -
don't you agree?')
The analysis is of the tag in 48b in terms of Q may cover
its illocutionary potential, but doesn't cover its illoc-
utionary force.
On the other hand, if tag-questions are treated as a single
illocution, i.e. one utterance, then we would have to con-
(29)
ceive of extensions to Householder's analysis , even
ignoring the two intonation types mentioned above. For
example:
=> [[[Eohn jAssnJJ :£££^ohn goj Nea]]] [AssTj q]
I would claim, therefore, that Householder's account is
both formally and conceptually inadequate.
Let me now examine Householder's treatment of volitional
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utterances. Presumably the following have an identical
analysis if the principles of Householder's account
5.2.4^ are followed:
5.50a. Go!
b. You will go!
Namely:
5*50' • [CrEouc?3]] 1
Householder claims that questioned Will accounts for de¬
liberative questions like:
5.51. Am I to go ?
i.e.
5.51'. [HUE*31] 3
where, because of the question, the volition is no longer
the speaker's but the hearer's (or a third person's). How
then can we arrive at an analysis of:
5.52a. Are you to go?
b. Will you go?
c. You are to go.
Note that 52a and b are by no means synonymous: 52a might
be a kind of deliberative question (Are you to go, I wonder?)
or an addressed question enquiring about external Will,
while 52b may be a question about the addressee's will,
52c differs from 52b in that it may report an external
will rather then express the speaker's will. The only
structure available (30) to us, it seems to me, for both
52a and 52b, however is:
5.52a' ,b' .[X CEou 311 J [will] 3]
and for 52c:
5.52c'. LCCE°u 3&i]33
which is identical to that for 52a and 50 b above.
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Householder's "you-neutrality" could only help us to dis¬
tinguish a deliberative question (you-neutral) from an
addressed question - the two interpretations of 52a. It
cannot distinguish the latter interpretation of 52a from
52b.
I will not speculate further on the problems involved
with other kinds of volitional utterance - hortatives,
optatives etc. It may seem somewhat unfair to criticize
an analysis on the basis of projections of that analysis
not envisaged by the author. The point of my arguments
is, however, to show that Householder's approach is at
best not developed enough, at worst apriori not powerful
enough^ to handle the facts of language. Projections are
thus a means of measuring generative capacity.
§ 5.3 Standard and Extended TG accounts
5.3.0 Transformational Accounts of mood and modality.
Here I shall survey some of the proposals made within the
standard and extended models of transformational grammar.
5.3.1 Little attention has been paid to the treatment of
subjunctive forms like that in:
5.53. I demand that he go.
Stockwell et al. (1972) treat this as an underlying im¬
perative. Kiparsky/Kiparsky (1970), however, treat certain
cases as dependent on a feature: + EMOT(ive); they allow
for the generation of sentences with should, which is then
deletable.
5.54. I insist that he should be there =}I insist
that he be there.
This appears, for instance, in Lakoff 1971.
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Those who incline to interpetive semantic approaches,
Jenkins 1972 for example, oppose this explanation.
The past subjunctive in counter-factual conditional
clauses is generally taken to be a conditioned variant
of conditional (which is provided for in phrase structure
rules) in if-clauses. There is, however, no integrated
account in a transformational framework of mood construc¬
tions in English.
Bierwisch's (1967) account of German present subjunct¬
ive, which differs from that of English, is rather better
(31 )
worked out . He proposes that it is syntactically de¬
termined by the 'verb of saying' in the complement of
which it appears. His treatment of past subjunctive/con¬
ditional in conditional sentences is to transform two
kernel sentences in a double-based transformation, one
of which already contains a past subjunctive or condi¬
tional form. This sentence functions as an adverbial in
Bierwisch's formulation. To Bierwisch, there are three
subcategories in the phrase structure. These
correspond to present subjunctive, past subjunctive and
imperative respectively. Rather more attention is paid
by Bierwisch to the analysis of modal verbs in German.
Here Bierwisch follows most accounts in treating modals
as a subcategory of Aux (= auxiliary).
Compare here the rules given by Burt (1971) and those
given by Bierwisch. (I have taken Burt since she, like
Bierwisch, generates passives in the phrase-structure
rules (cp. Chomsky 1965, Lees 1960).
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M -> will, shall
Perf -> have + en
Prog be + ing
Pass be + en
Aux ->(M3 + P
< Aux + Fin
I d
I (Aux^) + Fin





fPass (f Md + Md'\ )
-j(Pf) Md'^(Md) Pf
In^ + sei (Pf) (Md1)
{In^ + hab]Md J ) (Pf) (Md')







X f In^ + werd, mocht
•Y ^ mocht
darf, kann, mag, muB, soil, will
Bierwisch's account is clearly more detailed. It takes
into account the question of combinality as in:
5.55. Peter soli einen Ball suchen gewollt haben
miissen.
(= Bierwisch's 2.6 k)
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In English suppletive modals like be able would have to
be incorporated (cp. below). It also handles the forms
haben + zu + infinitive and sein + zu + infinitive, which
in German are parallel to active and passive sentences
respectively:
5.56a. Das Ziel wird fur ihn nicht zu erreichen ge-
sein sein.
b. Man soil keine Vorschlage zu machen gehabt
haben.
And it also treats the verb form mochte 'would like' as a
separate lexical item from the past subjunctive of mogen,
which is also mochte. Burt's account would, for example,
treat English should as a past tense of shall, which,
(32)
notionally, it is not in utterances like:
5.57. He should go there tomorrow,
cp. *He should go there yesterday.
5.3.2 Here I shall list some of the weaknesses of such
accounts.
i) The status of the category M (Md in Bierwisch) is open
to question. It may represent a natural syntactic class
but then it excludes, in English, items like ought to,
have to, Vbe to. If it includes them, as I feel I should,
not simply on semantic grounds, then the simple phrase
structure component that Burt, at least, is aiming at is
not feasible. On semantic grounds, too, there is a certain
inadequacy about the inclusion of German wollen and the
exclusion of English want, its translation equivalent in
the majority of cases. The negative modals daren't, needn't,
nicht brauchen and the interrogative dare I, etc., need I,
etc. are not accounted for.
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ii) M + Past would generate could, which is however high¬
ly restricted in past time environments, namely to negative
utterances, interrogative utterances, and a restricted
class of activity verbs in positive utterances: dance,
sing. Compare:
5.58a. Yesterday you could find the answer.
b. * Last year I could go to England, (cp. Ex. 6.24)
The suppletive form was able to would be generated diff¬
erently, thus the native speaker's intuition that was able
to stands in a 'past tense-form' relationship to can, in
certain environments, is not capturable (without having
two sources of be able to). Similarly with infinitive
suppletion:
5.59a. I can go.
b. I must be able to go.
iii) Should, could, might are treated as M + Past even
(33)
though they are used in non-past environments.
5.60. I might go tomorrow.
iv) In German, where a number of items under M (Md) may be
selected|there is a problem of determining which combin¬
ations are permissible. Bierwisch has, for instance, no
explanation for the impossibility of:
5.61. ?* Peter wird einen Ball suchen gewollt haben
miissen sollen.
(= Bierwisch's Ex. 2.6.1)
other than the number of sequenced modals.
It should be noted that in such combinations the sequence
is dependent on semantic factors, namely the type of mod¬
al meaning. The basic order seems to be:
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epistemic - deontic - dispositional
(cp. § 8.2).
v) If Passive is regarded as a transformational process,
then the following pairs of related and unrelated utter¬
ances are problematic:
5.62a. The doctor will examine John.
b. John will be examined by the doctor.
5.63a. The doctor may now examine John.
b. John may now be examined by the doctor.
In generating the passive by T-rule we may capture the
relatedness of 62a and b but also specify 63b as the
direct passive of 63a with its implication of semantic
equivalence. The scope of the modal, however, generally
(34)
differs. If passive, on the other hand is generated
in the base, as with Burt and Bierwisch, it is not poss¬
ible to relate directly 62a and b. A distinction between
epistemic and deontic modality is relevant to the opera¬
tion of the passive.
In general we may say that there are considerable areas
of inadequacy entailed by these transformational accounts
irrespective of the perhaps prejudicial conception of
grammar set out in § 1.
5.3.3 Hakutani (1972) and Hakutani/Hargis (1972), in an
attempt to come to terms with certain aspects of points
(i) - (iv) above/modify the analysis to distinguish be¬
tween quasi-modals (Q) and strict modals (M) and to in¬
clude 19 lexical items: may, might, can, could, will,
would, shall, should, must, need, dare, have to, ought to,
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used to, had better, had best, be going to, be about to,
"^be to.
All other modal-like items are treatable, according to
Hakutani and Hargis, in terms of extraposition and sub¬
ject raising rules. Thus: He is certain to go is generat¬
ed from: (It (He go) is certain) cp. That he will go is
certain. Occasionally this leads to questionable solutions:
He tends to be sick would be derived from (It (He be sick)
tend) just as He seems to be sick would be derived from
(It (He be sick) seem) despite the fact that tend and
seem behave differently with regard to extraposition:
5.64a. * It tends that he is sick,
b. It seems that he is sick.
Hakutani and Hargis, moreover, propose a revision to the
phrase-structure rule for Aux:
Aux Tense (M) (Q)n (have + en) (Q)n (be + ing) (Q)n
This is intended to account for combinations like:
5.65. He may be going to be about to leave,
provided ^ in any (Q)n i.e. there is no repetition
of the same item under the same Q mode. Syntactic justi¬
fication for the distinction between Q and M is given by
their different behaviour under negation, interrogation,
etc. Thus:
5.66a. Need you go?
b. * Are going to you go/Are going you to go?
5.67a. Won't you go?
b. * Are going not you to go?
A distinction, however, between those items which can under¬
go passivization (Hakutani and Hargis regard it as a trans¬
formational rule) without change of scope cuts across the
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categories Q and M i.e. some items from Q and some from
M pattern identically with respect to passivization. Thus
Hakutani and Hargis fail to come to terms with inad¬
equacy (v) of the standard transformational account.
There is an important problem with this analysis with re¬
gard to time reference. Hakutani and Hargis1s rule per¬
mits only one tense marking, whether we take tense to
mean t^ or t^. In fact this is inadequate; we need at
least two to account for utterances like:
5.68. When I return tomorrow he'll be going to have
to leave 24 hours later.
In the terms set out in § 2, of course, will indicates
t. - but we still need two t.'s.
i 1
t ti = fut
*- 1 1
t.' (I return) t^" (he have to leave)
The problem of the passive is a concern of Bierwisch
1967, who in addition to his standard analysis, indicates
another analysis that would obviate many of the problems
involved in the scope of modal verbs in active and passive
pairs. Passive is still introduced as a phrase-structure
element, but modals are treated as main verbs taking a
sentential complement which is subject to a special in-
finitivization transformation.
Similar analyses are to be found in Hoffmann (1966), Kraak
(1968), Ross (1969), Newmeyer (1970), Perlmutter (1970,
1971) and Rivero (1972).
Most versions of this analysis distinguish syntactically
(36)
between epistemic and deontic modality . Epistemic mod-
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ality is analyzed as an intransitive construction, 69'
or 69" for 69, for example:
5.69. John must be there.
5.69'. ((John be there) must)
5.69". (It (John be there)must be)
deontic modality is analyzed as a transitive (or, in New-
meyer, a causative) construction, thus:
5.69"'. ^roj must John (John hit Mary))
The presence of John as subject (or indirect object) of
must is intended to account for the difference between:
5.70a. John must hit Mary.
b. Mary must be hit by John.
In those accounts where passive is regarded as a transform¬
ation, 70b would have to have Mary as object of must.
There is, however, a problem with this apparently plaus¬
ible analysis, as R. Lakoff (1972b) has pointed out. In
the following three sentences the scope of the modal
(and hence the structure required under the above analysis)
differs.
5.71a. The witch must be kissed by every man in the
room or they will all be turned into star-
nosed moles.
(= Lakoff's 21a)
b. The witch must be kissed by every man in the
room or the leader of the coven will demote
her to a leprechaun.
(= Lakoff's 21b)
c. The witch must be kissed by every man in the
room - that's the law.
(= Lakoff's 21c)
Thus, while we could prevent passivization operating on
(Pro must kiss the witch) to derive 71b, we could not gen¬
erate 71a and probably not 71c either. Moreover, there
are deontic uses of modal verb where no indirect object
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may be supposed.
5.72. There must be peace and quiet.
(= Lakoff's 22)
This, R. Lakoff claims, must be given an intransitive
structure just like an epistemic modal. Such a conclusion
is problematic for a grammar that requires a syntactic
explanation of semantic distinction; it is not necessar¬
ily a problem if there is a clear separation between sem¬
antic and syntactic structure, as proposed in § 1, since
two distinct semantic specifications may be mapped into
one and the same structure. Thus if, say, the semantic
specification of:
5.73a. He must be on his way. (epistemic)
b. There must be peace and quiet, (deontic)
were formulated (approximately):
5.73a'. (I say (necessarily the case (he be on his
way)))
b': (I say (necesary (there be peace and quiet)))
it is possible that mapping could produce for both a syn¬
tactic structure conforming to:
(NP ((M) (Cop PP)))
An alternative solution to the problem of the scope of
modal verbs and passivization is examined in § 5.4.
§ 5.4 The approaches of Jenkins and Jackendoff
5.4.0 Although these two approaches are not identical
they have a number of arguments in common. These include:
the categorial status of M; the semantic similarity be¬
tween epistemic modals and certain adverbs; and the
'Control Problem' with regard to passivization. In addi¬
tion, Jackendoff attempts to establish a number of mod-
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alities which form part of an interpretive theory of mod¬
al structure, as opposed to functional structure. It
should be noted that both Jenkins and Jackendoff use
their arguments to strengthen the 'interpretive seman¬
tics' position. But their data can equally be used to
argue for the position ('generative semantics') they
argue against.
5.4.1 Jenkins (1972) and Jackendoff (1972) argue on pure¬
ly syntactic grounds for a category M. i.e. modal. (They
are not averse, it should be noted, to using semantic
arguments for other parts of their analysis - the trans¬
formational relationship between active and passive sen¬
tences, for example.)
Both Jenkins and Jackendoff allow that M may not be a
category of German phrase structure (accepting Ross' 1969
arguments), but insist that it is one of English:
"This approach [^treating modals as main verbs^ ignores
the totally different syntactic behavior of modals and
verbs. Consider the differences. Modals do not undergo
number agreement, though all verbs do. Modals do not
occur together, and they do not appear in gerunds and
infinitives."
(Jackendoff 1972, p. 100)
"These arguments do not hold for modals in German, which
behave much more like normal verbs. Instead of arguing,
as Ross does, that this proves on universal grounds
that English modals are verbs too, we will take this
difference as an indication that English modals have
become a separate part of speech through a process of
historical change including a syntactic reanalysis.
Old English modals were much more like German modals."
(Jackendoff 1972, p. 100, note 5)
The further piece of evidence pointed out by Jenkins, that
modals do not allow do-support, covers the items need,
dare (sometimes) used to (generally), ought to (always),
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which they do not include unter M.
There is as much evidence for a syntactic category M in
German as there is in English, even if it is partially
of a different nature. And as much reason in German as in
English for saying that this syntactic category does not
correspond exactly to a natural semantic class. It should
be noted that the selectivity of both Jenkins and Jacken-
doff gives the impression of homogenity in M. More ex¬
haustive accounts, Palmer (1965), Quirk et al. (1972) for
example, indicate that a number of sub-categories of Aux
are needed on syntactic grounds, of which M may be one,
and that many items not in M but in other subcategories
of Aux are semantically modal.
5.4.2 Jackendoff notes the similarity in syntactic be¬
haviour between a class of "speaker-oriented adverbs"
(which are distinct from "subject-oriented" and "manner"
adverbs) and epistemic modals.
5.74a. Probably John has read the book.
b. John probably has read the book. (speaker oriented)
c. John has probably read the book.
5.75a. The police carelessly have arrested Fred. (sub'ect
b. Carelessly, the police have arrested Fred. . -1
c. The police have carelessly arrested Fred.
5.76. The police arrested Fred carelessly. (manner)
Speaker-oriented adverbs, like epistemic modals, retain
their interpretation under passivization: subject orient¬
ed adverbs, like certain deontic modals, typically change.
5.77a. John has probably read the book.
b. The book has probably been read by John.
5.78a. John may have read the book.
b. The book may have been read by John.
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5.79a. The police have carelessly arrested Fred,
b. Fred has carelessly been arrested by the
police.
5.80a. The police must arrest Fred.
b. Fred must be arrested by the police.
Other similarities between speaker-oriented adverbs and
epistemics include behaviour under interrogation (Jacken-
doff treats this as a transformational rule):
5.81a. Max probably left.
b. ?* Did Max probably leave?
5.82a. Max must have left,
b. ?* Must Max have left?
Neither of these interrogative utterances is interpretable
as a straightforward question (cp. Is it probable/likely
that Max left?), though they may be interpretable as echo-
questions .
Jackendoff also points out that speaker-oriented adverbs
may exchange positions with epistemic modals without any
change in interpretation other than emphasis.
5.83. John-fW^""!"^ ey^en^*^\ open the door.1 evidently will J c
(= Jackendoff's 3.272)
This doesn't however demonstrate anything beyond a syntag-
matic permutation. Deontic modals may also exchange posi¬
tions with speaker oriented adverbs.
r o ji (can evidently")5.84. Max, you ■{ ,, ■* rao.1 ^evidently can! -
while subject-oriented adverbs are permutable with epis¬
temic modals but incompatible with deontic modals.
5.85a. Max "f wisely "I open the door.I wisely may ) c
.... / wisely can")b. * Max, vou -S i . > go.lean wisely/ ^
(Comma punctuation would be usual in: Max, wisely, may
open the door.)
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In fact the co-occurrence of epistemic modals with speaker-
oriented adverbs may well indicate that they belong to
semantically (not just syntactically) distinct classes
cp. adverbs with an intensifying function like really:
5.86. Max really will open the door,
which modify the modality of will etc.
Jackendoff claims that the projection rules needed in
his interpretive semantic component for speaker»-oriented
adverbs and for epistemics will be similar. Further support
for this claim is given by his discussion of scope (cp.
§ 5.4.4).
5.4.3 The 'control problem' is the problem of identity
or non-identity of reference among participants in com¬
plement constructions. Thus want, when it appears without
a participant in its complement:
5.87. Mary wants to go.
logically has its subject as the subject of the comple¬
ment, cp.
5.88. Mary wants Peter to go.
In cases where only the subject of the complementizing
verb may be the logical subject of the complement, as in:
5.89a. Mary tried to leave.
b. * Mary tried (for) Peter to leave.
the subject of the complementizing verb is said ,to control
the subject of the complement. A case where the object of
the complementizing verb controls the subject of the com¬
plement may be seen in:
5.90a. John permitted Mary to go.
b. * John permitted to go.
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Superficial form does not necessarily indicate which kind
of control network pertains. Compare:
5.91a. Mary forced me to go.
b. Mary promised me to go.
In 91a we have object control i.e. Mary forced me: I go -
and in 91b subject control, i.e. Mary promised me: Mary
go. Clearly, questions of control must take into account
whether the complement is active or passive.
5.92a. Mary tried to get examined by the doctor,
b. * Mary tried the doctor to examine her.
5.93a. John permitted Mary to get examined by the
doctor.
b. * John permitted to examine Mary.
If there is a rule of passivization it must operate be¬
fore interpretation of the control network.
Control networks are relevant to the interpretation of
deontic modals.
5.94a. The doctor may examine Mary.
b. Mary may be examined by the doctor.
The control networks are:
5.94a'. The doctor may: the doctor examine Mary,
b'. Mary may: the doctor examine Mary.
Mary be examined by the doctor.
If we accept that 94b is ambiguous (cp. § 5.3.3) , we should
add:
5.94b". the doctor may: Mary be examined by the doctor.
If we compare these cases with:
5.95a. I permit the doctor to examine Mary.
b. I permit Mary to be examined by the doctor.
it can be seen that may represents a notional passive of
(38)
permit . (This, of course, is not the way Jenkins and
Jackendoff analyze may in terms of syntax.)
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A further aspect of the control problem noted by Jenkins





5.96a. Peter is asking Bill^ if he^ •< wougd > please
b. * Mary^ is asking Bill if she^ iia } please
open the door.
c. Peter^ is asking Bill if he^ '^ightl' Please
open the door.
d. * Peter is asking Mary^ if she^-T please
(cp. Jenkins 1972, p. 107)
can/could please could replace either will/would please
or may/might please, though with different meanings: 'abil¬
ity' versus 'permission'. Jenkins notes, without exploring
any possibility of explanation other than that of control
networks in a projection rule, the parallel restrictions
on direct questions involving will and may:
5.97a. Will-^^°j ^ please open the door?
C ^ *VOU j
b. May -S " i > please open the door?
c. Can ^ j. ^ please open the door?
(cp. Jenkins 1972, p. 107)
will, it seems, is notionally active: can ambiguous. We
may compare the use of diirfen and wollen in German.
5.98a. Peter bat seinen Chef, Platz nehmen zu wollen.
b. Peter bat seinen Chef, Platz nehmen zu diirfen.
where in 98a it is the Chef who is the logical subject of
wollen (object control) and in 98b Peter who is the logic¬
al subject of diirfen (subject control) . Such examples show
that it is not just the nature of the complementizing verb
that is involved in the control problem, but also the nature
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of the complement verb, and more precisely the semantic
nature: notional as against syntactic activity and passiv¬
ity .
Jenkins and Jackendoff set up interpretive rules to handle
the control problem and implicitly corroborate their in¬
terpretive theory; they do not, however, use control net¬
works to prove their theory correct. Their claim may be
summarized:
(i) a complementizing verb has included in its lex¬
ical entry well-formedness conditions specifying
certain co-reference restrictions on participants.
(ii) position and acceptability as controller is de¬
pendent on 'thematic' not structural factors,
('thematic' refers to the logical function of a
noun as goal, source, etc.)
(iii) the semantic component establishes the co-reference
networks and control positions and interprets or
throws out the structure containing them.
On points (i) and (ii) it might be claimed that a generat¬
ive solution with 'lexical decomposition' and logical
functions in semantic specifications is notationally
equivalent, (iii), however, poses the question:
Should the grammar freely generate structures which then
have to be rejected as semantically deviant or should it
control generative capacity from the outset so that sem¬
antically deviant structures are not generated? § 1 has
made it clear that I incline to the latter view.
One criterion we may summon in support of this view is the
generality of a phenomenon. For instance, the restriction
on:
5.99 ?* Will I please open door?
excluding alter ego interpretations and echo questions is
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related not only to the pattern in the reported form:
5.99'. He asked her if she would please open the
door.
but also to a number of other constructions which may
express requests:
5.100a. Please open the door.
b. Will you open the door?
(beg |
c. I <request Vyou to open the door.
^ask J
Moreover, the same restriction applies to commands.
5.101a. (You) Open the door!
b. You will open the door!
c. Will you open that door!
and reported commands:
f*him ~\
5.102. He^ commanded him'' J to °Pen t'le door.
Clearly, if the restriction is so general, the grammar
has a high degree of redundancy if it is constructed in
the way Jackendoff envisages. And a grammar which gener¬
ates a specification for requests and commands with asso¬
ciated restrictions on participants at an abstract level
avoids redundancy; avoiding redundancy means greater ex¬
planatory adequacy.
5.4.4 Jackendoff (1972) claims that predicate logic is
incapable of accounting for the parallel ambiguity in the
following pair:
5.103a. John wants to catch a fish.
b. Bill is trying to find a pretty girl.
He gives the following logical expressions, of which one
is implausible, to show how predicate logic would have to
disambiguate both 103a and b.
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5.103a'. 3x (x is a fish & J wants to catch x)
a". John wants (3x (x is a fish & John catches x)
b'. 3x (x is a pretty girl & Bill is trying to
find x)
b". *Bill is trying (j-Jx (x is a pretty girl &
Bill finds x)
Jackendoff suggests an alternative notation, which I do
not find any more plausible, in an attempt to bring out
what he claims is the parallel in interpretation between
103a" and b". In this notation non-specific readings are
interpreted in terms of the dependence of one item on
another. Dependence is represented by bracketing. Thus:
5.103aa'. John, a fish, want ( )
aa". John, want (a fish)
bb1. Bill, a pretty girl, try ( )
bb". Bill, try ( a pretty girl)
Jackendoff's claim is that what 103aa" and bb' have in
common is a specific reading of a fish/a pretty girl and
what 103aa" and bb" have in common is a non-specific read¬
ing of these items.
The projection rule by which the syntactic structures of
103a and b receive the semantic representations above is
as follows:
a. If an NP is within the scope of a verb V of the
class ... in the syntactic structure, it is option¬
ally, but preferably, dependent on V in the semantic
interpretation.
b. If an NP is not within the scope of V, it is not
dependent on V.
the class of V referred to including: want, look for, hope
for, wish for, hunt for, ask for, try for, plan (for), ex¬
pect , attempt, intend.
This class is thought to contain the modal operator: 'un¬
realized' as semantic marker in their lexical entry.
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There are several objections to this analysis, and I shall
discuss three in particular: i) the explanatoriness of
the representation; ii) the relevance and nature of scope;
iii) the naturalness of the class of V.
Jackendoff assumes that the ambiguity of 103a and b is
parallel and that therefore the semantic representation
for the two must be parallel. There is undoubtedly a
similarity in the case of a 'specific' reading of 103a
and b, a fact which predicate logic reflects. Notice that
we can gloss both sentences with the 'specific' reading in
similar ways.
5.103A. 'There is a/some fish John wants to catch.'
3. 'There is a/some pretty girl Bill is trying
to find.'
What, however, are the glosses of the 'non-specific' read¬
ing? Before answering this question we must clear up a
point of terminology. In grammatical treatments of the
question of reference (cp. Stockwell et al. 1972, Quirk
et al. 1972) it is usual to make a double distinction:
definite (identified) vs. indefinite (unidentified);
specific (particular) vs. generic (general). Jackendoff's
use of specific vs. non-specific is intended to be a sub¬
division of the reference of indefinite into 'particular
member' and 'arbitrary member' of the class of fish/pretty
girls etc., thus adding a further term to the distinctions
above. Glosses of the non-specific reading should there¬
fore read:
5.103 ex. 'John wants to catch any fish.'
[3. 'Bill is trying to find any pretty girl.'
which, though not distinguishable in predicate calculus,
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may certainly be distinguished by the introduction of set
calculus into the expression.
Thus far Jackendoff's examples may be parallel. But there
is an important respect in which these examples are not
parallel and it is perhaps an indication of the superior¬
ity of predicate calculus that it cannot assign analogous
expressions for Jackendoff's putative 'non-specific' read¬
ing (cp. 103a" and b"). I say 'putative' because 103a" is
not an expression of the non-specific reading but of 'John
wants there to be a fish which he catches', which is
again different. Notice that 'John is trying for there to
be a pretty girl who he finds' is meaningless, which
(quasi-) predicate calculus reflects.
The difference between 103a and b, whether specific or non¬
specific, lies in the differing natures of 'want to catch'
and 'try to find' (cp. below), which is ignored by Jacken-
doff.
It is, of course, arguable that some convention of semantic
interpretation could associate Jackendoff's: John, want
(a fish) to arbitrary members of the class of fish, and
his: John, a fish, want ( )_ to a particular member
of the class of fish. But it seems to me that he has at
best produced a notation (and a fairly untransparent one
at that) for distinguishing the two interpretations. He
does not express the semantics of the distinction. It is
also obvious that his notation is prejudiced by his notion
of scope (cp. below). Whilst I accept that scope is uni¬
versal phenomenon in language, it is impossible for me to
conceive of scope as underlying the semantic distinction
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between 'specific' and 'non-specific', which is what
Jackendoff's claim amounts to.
Jackendoff's representation consists of an unordered list,
only the dependent (bracketed) items being fixed in pos¬
ition, i.e. immediately after what they depend on. This
is treated as being subordinate to scope.
"Modal Projection Rule
Given a lexical item A whose semantic representation
contains a modal operator M. If an NP is within the
scope of A, it is optionally (with degree of preference
dM) dependent on M in the modal structure, that is,
subject to modal condition. If an NP is outside the
scope of M, it is not dependent on M."
(Jackendoff 1972, p. 293)
Three types of scope are distinguished.
I if a lexical item containing a modal operator be¬
longs to a category that strictly subcategorizes
NPs (f. ex. verbs and adjectives in predicate posit¬
ion) the scope consists of one of these NPs
II everything commanded by a lexical item containing
a modal operator, f. ex. modals
III everything to right of, and commanded by, a lexical












The motivation for distinguishing these types of scope seem
to be entirely dependent on the form of syntactical re¬
presentation used. In a grammar that distinguishes the
deep structure of it is possible that he went and he may
have gone in structural terms, two types of scope are re¬
quired: type I for possible, type II for may. In a grammar
that derives them from a common source (a higher predicate),
both will presumably be subject to type I scope.
The third type of scope: Type III operates in the case of
negation, quantification, generics wh- in questions and
there-existentials. It is claimed that this type is sur¬
face structurally conditioned (unlike type I), since the
application of rules can change the position and hence the
scope of the item containing the modal element.
5.104a. Tom didn't go to town very often. „ , ,
a' . Not very often did Tom go to town. | ^ , .Vef
=^a". Very often Tom didn't go to town. ron in<?'
b. The cops didn't arrest many of the innocent
bystanders.
=^b'. Not many of the innocent bystanders were
arrested by the cops.
=^b". Many of the innocent bystanders were not
arrested by the cops.
(by Passivization)
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In the case of II it is said to be indeterminable whether
the scope is deep or surface structural, since no trans¬
formations exist that move NPs in or out of clauses con¬
taining modals.
It needs to be pointed out that the claim for surface in¬
terpretation depends on acceptance of certain meaning
changing transformations. If, however, passivization is
allowed only if it does not change meaning, then we would
have to refer to surface relations in order to permit or
block passivization which is, of course, impossible. Or
else, adopt the solution, as Lakoff (1971) does, of de¬
termining scope relations in deep structure. The kind of
grammar I have outlined in § 1, would, of course, determine
scope relations in semantic structure, without the need
for Lakoff's higher-predicate proposal for quantifiers
like many. Scope is undoubtedly a universal phenomenon in
language, but Jackendoff's claim for it is theory-specific.
Finally, we may note that the class of verbs Jackendoff
assumes to contain the modality 'unrealized' is not a
natural class. Many of the items are semantically complex;
for example: hunt for and look for are readily analyzable
as: 'try to find'. The class includes volitional statives:
want, wish etc. and verbs of attempting: try, attempt. What
these have in common is inchoativity: Compare:
5.105a. John is trying to find a unicorn,
b. John wants to find a unicorn.
5.105a'. 'John is doing something in order that his
finding a unicorn might come about.'
b'. 'John wants his finding a unicorn to come
about.'
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There are, of course, other senses of want, thus:
5.106. Bill wants his wife to dominate him.
can also mean that Bill's wife does dominate him and he
likes it that way. Notice that if a non-inchoative sense
is taken an indefinite pronoun is "non specific' but gen¬
eric :
5.107. Bill wants a woman to dominate him.
Here, another lexical item want would have to be supposed
without the modality 'unrealized', if we accept the status
of 'unrealized'. Given, however, the conception of grammar
in § 1, it would seem to me more advisable to seek an ex¬
planation for the ambiguity of utterances like 107 with
regard to 'specificity' in the nature of inchoative quasi-
predicates and their suppositions.
5.4.5 As I have thrown some doubt on the status of Jacken-
doff's modality 'unrealized', let me complete the picture
by looking at his other modalities. These are: future
(contained in will); possible (contained in possible, may);
certain (contained in certain); negative (contained in not,
no, un-, non-, dis- etc.); multiple (contained in some,
any); generic; wh- (contained in question words); and per¬
haps also for - to (contained in purpose clauses).
Whilst most of these would be covered by my definition of
modality (cp. § 4.2.5), I find 'multiple', at least, if not
'generic', implausible. 'Multiple' can, I believe, only
be an operator on a nominal and as such does not meet the
definition of modality. It is perhaps arguable that 'gen¬
eric' is a modality if it is understood as a speaker's
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view of a state of affairs as being typically the case
instead of being actually the case. I do not discuss thxs
in this dissertation. As to 'wh-' and 'for - to' , my own
analysis (§§ 12, 14 respectively) treats them as con¬
figurations of modality and other abstract elements.
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§ 6 Semantic Approaches to Modality
6.0 Since the deficiency of transformational accounts lies
mainly in their inability to explain semantic relation¬
ships, I look here at some of the semantic accounts of
modal verbs. This includes naturally a discussion of some
of the logical properties of modal verbs. The chapter is
concluded by an examination of the proposals of Seuren,
Halliday, Leech and Anderson, which have provided us with
the most suggestive approaches to date, and by a brief
note of a proposal by R. Lakoff.
(There are in addition many articles with promising but
not worked out suggestions that I might have included here,
in particular Karttunen (1971, 1972) and Givon (1972), but
I think it more profitable to mention these as and when re¬
levant in the course of later chapters.)
§ 6.1 Formal Semantic Approaches
6.1.0 In this section I shall examine attempts to analyze
modal verbs from a formal semantic point of view by Joos
(1964) Ehrmann (1966) Bech (1949). These studies examine
the syntactically and morphologically identified modal
verbs as a closed system and attempt to establish notional
reflexes of real-world situations. What these accounts
have in common are, first, an attempt to isolate all the
nuances of meaning involved in the modal verbs, second an
attempt to reduce these 'meanings' to hypernymical terms,
and third an attempt to establish a 'modal logic' express¬
ing the relations within the system.
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6.1.1 Bech (1949), examining the German modals wollen,
sollen, durfen, mogen, miissen, konnen, establishes lists
of up to 11 or 12 meanings, making fine distinctions like:
physische Notwendigkeit etc. (for mussen) and then collaps¬
ing this exposition into a system based on 3 'systems':
volitive, emotive, causal and 2 'axes': active (likely to
be realized); passive (not likely to be not realized) with
sub-divisions for subjective where the grammatical sub¬
ject is the logical subject of the modality (wollen, for
example) and objective where the grammatical subject is


















(Bech 1949, p. 38)
A relatively minor criticism of this is that the terms
'active' and 'passive' are perhaps ill-chosen for contrasts
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like:
6.1a. Ich soli ihn besuchen. 'I'm (supposed) to
visit him.'
b. Ich darf ihn besuchen. 'I'm allowed to/may
visit him.'
in that both can be viewed as passive since the obligation
to do something or lack of obligation not to do something
are equally experienced by the speaker. More significant
is perhaps the objection that the rarely used mogen oc¬
cupies such a prominent position with so many systematic
distinctions.
Ia ... ich mag kein Unrecht sehen, und auch keines
leiden ...
'I don't wish to see any injustice or to suffer
any either.'
... ich mochte wohl wissen, was aus ihr geworden ist.
'I'd very much like to know what's become of her.'
Ib(i): der bloBe Hinweis auf diese Abart der sekundaren
Spannung moge hier genugen.
'mere indication of this variety of secondary
tension shall suffice here.'
(ii): so bat ich ihn, er mochte machen, daB das GroBe
wegginge.
'so I requested that he should get the big one
to go away' i.e. reported request
Ila: soviel aber weiB ich und mochte Leben und Ehre
darauf wetten.
'that much I do know and I would stake my life
and honour on it.'
b: mogen die Leute reden, was sie wollen.
'let people say what they will' i.e. I don't
care what they say.
... und urn das, was sonst in dem Menschen stecken
mag, kiimmert er sich kaum.
'and whatever else a person may be capable of
is of hardly any concern to him.'
It can be seen that some of the putative systematic dis¬
tinctions are directly related to syntactic classifications
lie: concessive, reported speech, etc. (cp. §§ 12, 13, 14) .
It is hard to see, however, how a concessive and a let-
construction, the one non-volitional, the other volitional,
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can be classified together under lib; the difference is
surely as great as that between la 'wish/would like'
and lib 'will/be willing'.
To an extent appealing is Bech's classification of sollen,
durfen, miissen and konnen as symmetrically opposed
sollen : durfen :: mussen : konnen
But this leaves out of account the overlap between durfen
and konnen - in deontic senses at least.
Bech's "logistische Darstellung" contains some interest¬
ing meaning relations and some that I think are spurious
(which I have marked '?'). The basis is a combination of
external and internal negation.
A: definitions.
a = any subject
b = any participant distinct from subject b f a
c = speaker
B:
x = any infinitival complement or its




= mogen la, Ila, lb, lib.
overlining indicates negation
theory.
1 . a muB x = a kann x
2. a kann x = a muB x
3. a soil X = a darf x
4. a darf x = a soil X
5. a will.j x = a WHI2 x
6. a will^ x = a will.j x
7. a soli X - b will^ (a soli x)
8. a darf x = b willj (a darf x)
? 9. a mag^ x
= a mag2 x
?10. a mag2 x
= a mag^ x
- 157 -
?11. a mag^ x = a mag4 x
?12. a mag^ x = a mag^ x
?13. a mag^ x = c mag1 (a mag x)
?14. a mag^ x = c mag2 (a mag x)
(cp. Bech 1949, pp. 43 - 44)
In establishing systems and logical theories there is a
danger of being led astray by the appeal of symmetry,
which is not, it should be noted, one of the theoretic¬
al principles, cp. 'simplicity', 'economy', of Chomskyan
or post-Chomskyan linguistics. It seems to me that this
is the case with postulates 9 - 14.
My objections to 9 - 12 are that we cannot find very plaus¬
ible natural language translations of the formulae. Thus
for 11 - 12:
1 1 ' das moge genugen ? = moge das nicht nicht geniigen
3= das mag (wohl) nicht nicht
genugen
cp. that shall/should suffice ? E 'be it not that that
not suffice'
that may well not not
suffice
12' das mag stimmen ? = das moge nicht nicht stimmen
that may well be true that should not not be true
Furthermore, the following formulae would seem more appro¬
priate for 13 & 14:
13' a mag^ x = c mag^ (a x)
will
.j
a 'shall' x = c 'wishes' (a x)
'wants'
14' a mag^ x = c mag2 (a x)
will2
'let' a x = c 'is willing' (a x)
the difference between mogen and wollen not being clear in
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such situations. Although universality is not a claim made
by Bech, it may be considered that universality is implied
by a logical system. Attempting to analyze English modals
using Bech's system and postulates and translations of
his examples leads to some interesting discrepancies, even

























Although a distinction not made in German (between subject¬
ive & objective causal modals) is provided for by Bech's
system, hence must/need to vs. have to, other distinctions
in English (between must and need to; betweenVbe to, be
supposed to and should, etc.) cannot be handled without
further subdivision. More important, an item like may
straddles different 'systems' (in Bech's use of the word).
- 159 -
We may conclude, I think, that Bech1s system may have
some validity as far as wollen, sollen, diirfen, kdnnen
and miissen are concerned, though it is by no means ex¬
haustive of their properties, but that it is implausible
on the analysis of mogen. Here a 'system' is created that
includes subjunctive forms, volitional modals and con¬
cessive use of modals. It is questionable whether these
can all be lumped together as 'emotive'; the divisions
of the obviously complex area of modality do not seem
to have been clearly established by Bech.
6.1.2 Bech's conceptual framework is one that includes a
considerable number of metaphysical notions: Lustgefuhl,
Wille, kausale Moglichkeit/Notwendigkeit, Realisation,
Realitat, Existenz, etc. He defines, for instance, mogen:
"bezeichnet die Realisation (Realitat, Existenz) des In-
halts der Subjekt-Infinitiv-Pradikation als ein Lustge-
fiihl bei einem Individuum ... hervorrufend, das entweder
a) mit dem grammatischen Subjekt oder b) mit dem Sprecher
identisch ist." (Bech 1949, p. 21)
Joos (1964), in contrast, takes more of a social view of
constraints on predicates. His analysis may be considered
in terms of three distinct claims. The first of these is
that the underlying notions of eModEng modals (Shakespear)
are different from those of contemporary English; the sec¬
ond, that contemporary English modals (8 in number accord¬
ing to Joos: dare, will, need, shall, must, ought, can,
may) can be handled in terms of a perfectly symmetrical
system based on three binary oppositions representing
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underlying notions: adequate/contingent; casual/stable;
assurance/potentiality; the third, that a set of logic¬
al formulae in terms of events, actors, circumstances,
reality and a consistency relationship can express these
underlying notions.
Joos claims that the archaic system of the modals: will,
shall, can, may differs from the modern system in its
underlying semantics.
WILL authoritative probity vs. adequate assurance
SHALL subservient probity vs. contingent assurance
CAN authoritative freedom vs. adequate potentiality
MAY subservient freedom vs. contingent potentiality
This claim is, however, not supported by any proof of a
change in semantics, let alone adequate definitions of
the complex notions: "probity", "authoritative" and "sub¬
servient". At best, Joos demonstrates that there is a
difference in the use or application of modals in eModEng.
Consider Joos1 explication of can and may:
"CAN: either Authoritative Freedom or adequate potent¬
iality: the event is entirely possible in that no cogent
factor stands against its occurrence: the event is con¬
sistent with all the circumstances.
MAY: (2) archaic sense: Subservient Freedom: the event is
authoritatively allowed, and the assertion is worded with
this modal to signify that the actor is hardly free to desist.
(2) modern sense: contingent potentiality: the event is
allowed by some but not all circumstances, and the assert¬
ion is worded with this modal to allow for contrary cir¬
cumstances to perhaps prevail."
(Joos 1964, p. 180)
Apart from objecting to fuzzy terminology, it can be ob¬
jected that the analysis fails to distinguish epistemic
from deontic modality. MAY (1) appears to be a definition
of deontic modality; MAY (2) of epistemic modality. Now,
it would be barely plausible that the deontic sense of
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may is exclusively 'archaic' i.e. eModEng and therefore
not productive in lModEng. It would be untrue that eModEng
did not possess an epistemic sense; according to Traugott
(1972) may has had this sense since at least 1100. Even
if we can see how Freedom relates to the more usual gloss
'permission', it is difficult to understand what 'author¬
itative' and 'subservient' mean. In the context of will
and shall (the relevance of Joos' 'probity' totally eludes
me), it may be that will (authoritative) is the speaker's
exercising of authority over another/the world, whereas
shall (subservient)is his submission to others' or the
world's authority. This works in:
6.2a. You will go to bed.
b. I will be your guide.
c. I shall not complain.
but not in:
6.3a. Thou shalt honour thy father and thy mother.
b. He shall die.
c. You will do these things!
It is difficult, however, to see how can involves the
speaker's authority, while may involves his submission.
Turning to the terms Joos employs for his modern system,
which are defined, I cannot say I am any more sure of
what he is claiming.
1. "casual modals (WILL, SHALL, CAN, MAY) take" the
relation between an event and the factual world
"from the minimal social matrix of events, where the
determining factors are the resultant of chance and
whim operating upon the items that populate the fact¬
ual world of accepted reality."
"stable modals (MUST, OUGHT, DARE, NEED) find that
relation in the maximal social matrix of events, where
the determining factors are eternal and omnipresent:
they are community mores. Accordingly, stable modals
exclude remote [= past and/or conditional,]] tense."
(Joos 1964, p. 149-150)
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We may observe that there is again no distinction made
between epistemic and deontic - it is difficult to see
how a definition including "community mores" explicates
in any way the epistemic use-of must:
6.4. He must have been there.
Moreover, it is not true that must, ought, dare, need
have no "remote" tense form, even though some of them
may not have a morphological past form and thus require
suppletion. Compare
6.5a. He must learn French,
b. He had to learn French.
6.6a. He ought to learn French.
b. He was advised/expected/supposed to learn
French.
These, of course, are deontic interpretations of must and
ought to. Joos' claim can be accepted, perhaps, for epis¬
temic senses of must and ought to, if we exclude reported
speech and inner-monologue forms:
6.7a. He must be joking.
b. * Yesterday he must be joking.
c. ?* Yesterday he had to be joking.
6.7a'. He had to be joking, thought John.
b'. I said then that hefmust tolbe joking.
(had to J
c'. He had to be joking yesterday, thought John.
Joos1 second division is between "adequate" and "contingent"
modals. These are defined:
"adequate modals (WILL, CAN, MUST, DARE) derive their
force from completeness in the set of determining
factors."
"contingent modals (SHALL, MAY, OUGHT TO, NEED) get
their weakness form some deficiency in the determining
factors."
(Joos 1964, p. 150)
I interpret this to mean that "adequate" modals anticipate
the realization or truth of a predicate, whereas "contingent"
- 163 -
modals permit a degree of doubt or uncertainty. Compare:
6.8a. He must be there by now ?*(but I'm not sure
he is) .
b. He ought to be there by now (but I'm not sure
he is).
c. He (certainly) can have committed the crime ?(but
I don't think he did).
d. He may have committed the crime (but I don't
think he did).
It is, however, somewhat difficult to see this with will
and shall.
6.9a. I'll be there tomorrow *(but I'm not sure).
b. I shall be there tomorrow *(but I'm not sure).
c. He'11 do as he's told *(but he may not).
d. He shall do as he's told *(but he may not).
The third division in Joos' analysis is between "assurance"
and "potentiality":
"assurance (WILL, SHALL, MUST, OUGHT TO) comes from
penalties for failure of the specified event to occur."
"potentiality (CAN, MAY, DARE, NJ^ED) comes from the
immunity in case the actor brings the event to comple-
tion."
(Joos 1964, p. 150)
Again, although we can see how these terms may apply with
some of the modals, it is hard to fit them to the other
cases.
6.10a. John will come.
b. He shall be saved.
6.11a. John may come.
b. He can be saved.
With will and shall, there is a sense of assuring; with
may and can, a sense of potentiality. But with:
, . „ _r , , ( be coming.6.12a. John must ■< ^
^come.
b. John ought to { come.be coming,
irrespective or whether must and ought to are epistemic or
deontic - the sense of assurance is less clear. When they
are deontic, an obligation is asserted, which may be con-
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sidered binding (must) or non-binding (ought to). When
they are epistemic, must denotes as necessary conclusion,
ought to denotes probability or expectation. It is diffi¬
cult to see what "penalties" are involved here. If assur¬
ance has any validity, we ought to be able to combine
these modals with phrases like: "Don't worry, ..." or:
"Wait and see, ...". And if potentiality has any validity,
then we should find combinations of those modals with
phrases like: "I think ..." But this doesn't work in the
case of must and ought to on the one hand. With dare and
need there is the additional problem that Joos is defining
the positive forms although only the negative forms appear
as modals (cp. below).
6.13a. Don't worry, he'll be here.
b. Don't worry, he shall be saved.
c. ? Don't worry, he must be coming.
d. ? Don't worry, he ought to be coming.
6.14a. I think he may come.
b. I think he can come.
c. ? I think he daren't come. cp. I don't think he
come.
d. ? I think he needn't come. cp. I don't think he
need come.
Turning from the inconclusiveness of Joos' semantic gloss¬
es to the formulaic system he postulates, we find more in-
constency and inclarity.
This system has the base terms:
E = event
A = actor as proper member of community
C = all circumstances, none neglected
c = some of circumstances but not all
R = £e i.e. sum of events already known
o = is consistent with and vice versa
Some of these terms may be negated. Whether the negation
is polar or not is not clear.
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E = non-occurrent event
A = actor in jeopardy as not proper member of community,
o = is inconsistent with and vice versa.
R (used by Joos but not defined by him)
The expressions are as follows:
a) E o E no modal (factual assertion)
b) E o R belief: the assertion must be true.
E o R II . " " ought to be true.
E o R II . I dare say the assertion is true
E o R II # the assertion needn't be false.
c) E o C WILL
E o c SHALL
E o C CAN
E o c MAY
d) E o A MUST
E o A OUGHT
E 5 A NEED
E o A DARE
(I have subdivided these according to whether E, R, C/c, or
A functions as the third term - Joos does not so list them.)
These expressions may be negated by adding further bars to
the individual terms: even numbers on the same term cancel
out, thus E = E and E = E. But C/c cannot be negated.
If we put this into effect, then even in those cases where
we have C/c and the negation possibilities are fewer (in
fact there are two), we get some strange results.
negating EoC —> EoC or: EoC
i.e. EOC or: EoC
negating EoC —^ EoC or: EOC
(39)
Thus, according to Joos, the two negations of will are
identical to the two negations of can. Likewise the two
negations of shall EoC and EoC are identical to the two
negations of may E o c and E o C. A few examples will
suffice to show that this is not true of the natural lan¬
guage realizations of these (putative) formulae.
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.r , , /can't comeJohn won't come ± John fi~ (can not come
i.e. i) (/" WILL) come ('"CAN) come
ii) WILL (vcome) CAN ("come)
cp. John's not going to come ^ It's impossible John's
coming.
John's going to not come =£ It's possible John's
J
not coming.
John's not willing to come John's unable to come.
John's willing not to come ^ John's able not to come.
I shan't get the prize £. I may not get the prize
i.e. i) ( a/ SHALL) get the prize ('"MAY) get the prize
ii) SHALL (~get the prize) MAY (« get the prize)
I predict I shan't get the prize ^ It's impossible I
will
I predict I shall not get the prize ^ It's possible
I won't
It's determined I shall not I'm allowed not to.
It's not determined I shall ^ I'm not allowed to.
Similar results, and more complicated ones (in view of the
additional negation possibilities), are to be found with







must go. E o A
mustn't go. E 5 A 10w11
ought to go. E o A
oughtn't to go. E o A c0wii
need to go. E 0 A
needn't go. E 0 A = E o A
dare to go. E o A
daren't go. E o A
From this it would appear that You mustn't go and You
daren't go are equivalent, and that You oughtn't go go
and You needn't go are also equivalent. The latter is
clearly not the case; in the former I think there is a
difference in speakers involvement: you daren't do that
relates to an external authority against which the ad¬
dressee is reminded he may not transgress. In current
usage mustn't or shouldn't would probably be preferred.
Joos' expressions involve transitive relations of consist-
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ency or inconsistency. There seems to be no reason, and
Joos gives no reason, why these relations should not be
expressible in terms of predicate calculus, thus:
3 V (fXy)-Jy x V
where y = an event
x = set of all circumstances
£ = is consistent with.
But if they are expressed in a predicate calculus and the
normal operations are allowed to apply we find further
difficulties with Joos1 analysis. In the following I give
somewhat abbreviated predicate calculus translations of










E o C will ~3 ¥
y x
E o c shall 3
~*y x
E o A must 3
_ _ y z
E o A ought ~3 ~3
-iY z
E 5 A need 3 <v"-l
y -*z
E o C can 3 v
y x
E o c may 3 3
E o A dare 3^ 3Z
Of these only the last three seem to be in their base forms.
And reducing the remaining five to base forms by means of
tautologies such as:
¥ p =~3 ~p
X X
3 p = ~v ~p
x x
~¥ p e 3 ~p
x x
~3 p e v ~p
"Tx x
we would arrive at the following expressions:
will VV (jfxy)
y x
shall 3 V (£xy)
must /3z(£zy)
ought ¥ ¥^ (£zy )
need 3 V (£zy)
y z w
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This would mean, for instance, that ought is defined in
relation to must as the exact opposite of our intuitions:
'All occurrences of an event are consistent with being a
proper member of society.' (Joos' E o A).
cp. 'All occurrences of an event are consistent with there
being some proper member of society.' (? also E o A)
The basic expressions I have cited above follow logically
from Joos' expressions, but cannot adequately be re-trans-
lated into Joos' terms.
Joos does not, of course, allow for quantification over
events or proper members of society (or better: proper
membership of society) in his formalism, yet his glosses
involve both quantification ('some of the circumstances',
'all of the circumstances', etc.) and negation ('the non-
event', inconsistent', etc.). Under the normal logical
(and also language) use of negation, saying 'the non-event
is inconsistent with being a proper member of society' is
equivalent (cognitively equivalent) to saying 'the event is
consistent with being a proper member of society', thus
must would be equivalent to dare. Similarly, 'the non-
event is inconsistent with the set of all circumstances',
i.e. will, is surely equivalent to 'the event is consistent
with the set of all circumstances', i.e. can. Will and can
are, however, not equivalent, even if will may presuppose
can.
Joos' use of negation is, it seems to me, a confusion of
logical negation ('not proper member of society') and
mathematical null ('non-event'), hence the difficulty
when we attempt to translate his expressions into formal
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two-valued logic.
A further objection is that the possibility of adding
negation on three terms runs counter to the logical ne¬
gation possibilities of modals, which are two in number
i.e. modal negation (Joos' "relative negation") and predi¬
cate negation (Joos' "eventual negation"). Thus with must:
E o A —> E 5 A = E o A event inconsistent with
proper membership of society
E o A = E o A non-event consistent with
proper membership
—> E o A non-event inconsistent with
not being proper member of
society.
But again, although the system allows triple negation the
sense of the glosses cancels out to double negation, i.e.
E o A must E o A mustn't
E o A ") -j | ,
E 5 A J needn't
6.1.3 The implausibility of a symmetrical system such as
Joos' became the starting point of Ehrman's (1966) study.
"... while there are important insights and many places
of agreement between my discussion and that of Joos ...
in many cases the very neat and apparently inclusive
logical systems proposed are in a way too good to be
true. Much of this perfectly fitting three dimensional
system covers the data adequately, but for where it
seems to break down there appears to be some subtle
distortion so that system seems to take precedence over
fact. The difference between the British English of
Joos' perhaps too limited corpus and the American of
mine does not account for all of my disagreements with
his treatment."
(Ehrman 1966, p. 105)
Despite Ehrman's skepticism about systems and symmetry
she seems to fall into a similar trap, because she tries
to fit her results (which it must be stressed conform
much more readily with the native speaker's intuitions
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about his language than Joos' results) into a two dimen¬
sional pattern based on i) degree of contingency: required
predication/non-occurrence not guaranteed/predication not
prevented/predication conforms; and ii) nature of condi¬
tioner: environment/relevant aspect of environment/speak-
er's view of environment (and in the Appendix on Shakes-
pear's use of modals: Volition).
Her meanings for the modals of English can be reformulated
as follows - I do not use Ehrman's glosses, partly because
they are long and partly because characterizing glosses
like those of Palmer (1965) seem more illuminating to any¬
one not working from Ehrman's quasi-philosophical stand¬
point. A distinction is made by Ehrman between basic mean¬






overtones: not certain not
will certain (future or generic)
overtones: subject's volition
consequence
shall = will (educated use)
also overtone: speaker's guarantee






May seems to occupy a key position in Ehrman's analysis in
that its meaning is said to stretch between that of can
and that of will, may and will differing "by the breadth
of a double negative" i.e. may ~ not certain not ...
will = certain.
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Ehrman's classification is summarized in the table:
c continge n c y
0 required non-occurr. predicat. predication
n


























(cp. Ehrman 1966, p. 76)
This representation involves:
1) moving left to right on contingency, an irreversible
implication relation
2) moving down, greater markedness
3) a) will-least modal b) should/ought to-most modal.
4) The empty spaces i.e. meanings, 1 and 3, and 2 and 4
are implied by must and shall respectively
5) may-] is "circumstantial"; may2 ist "occurrential"
6) 5 and 6 are empty because conformity of predication
is not modal.
We may make the following criticisms about these claims.
1) Is it plausible that points 3b and 6 are reconcilable?
2) dare does not seem to have much to do with the speak¬
er's view of the environment (cp. my comments on daren't
in § 6.1.2) except perhaps in the fixed phrase: I dare say
3) Although we may find a distinction between environment
and speaker's view of environment clear-cut (perhaps it
corresponds to the distinction drawn in the introduction
between the illocutionary and the modality part of the
utterance), it is less clear what is to be understood by
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the distinction: environment/aspect of environment.
4) If we suppose there to be a discoverable process be¬
hind meaning extension and meaning shift, then the fact
that shall appears in two unadjacent boxes is unsatisfact¬
ory; likewise in Ehrman1s account of the Shakespearian
modal system, there are two will's separated thus:
environment will^
aspect of environment must
speaker's view of environment shall
(need not)
volition will.|
5) Ehrman, like Joos, is concerned with basic meanings.
Her development is the inclusion of a set of overtones,
but I don't think even this gives a powerful enough ana¬
lysis. A basic meaning may still be semantically complex,
if not imprecise. As I pointed out in § 1.3.1, I believe
structural approaches to meaning to be more powerful and
hence more appropriate to the analysis of modal items.
6.1.4 There are two fundamental questions raised by the
accounts described and commented on in §§ 6.1.1 - 3. The
first is the justification for treating modal verbs as a
closed (and, except in the case of Ehrman, symmetrical)
set. The second is the difficulty of applying the terms
of these accounts to modals in other languages.
Whilst it may be valid in a syntactical study to separate
off an identifiable class of modal auxiliary and then to
analyze its syntactic properties, I think it is invalid to
presuppose a syntactic class as representing a closed sys¬
tem and then to set up an equally closed system in a sem¬
antic analysis. Both Joos and Ehrman, it is true, include
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ought to, which is syntactically only semi-auxiliary in
some views (cp. Quirk et al. 1972), but this appears to
be motivated more by its partial synonymy with should,
than by a notion of what constitues modality in semantic
terms. This aside, the further assumption that this sys¬
tem must be an optimal one token - one type system and that
the correct analysis is the most economic one is a great¬
er misconception. Joos, for example, determines a set of
8 items and then proceeds more or less to juggle with
referentially opaque terms to arrive at a perfect 23 system
i.e. 3 binary features. Bouma (1973), which I have not
been able to examine in detail, follows much the same
principle as Joos, though with rather more plausible terms
perhaps. His system could be reduced to 2 ternary features
giving six values, six being the number in his set of Ger¬
man modals.
The question of cross-language transference is not unre¬
lated: if the features set up are determined by the number
of items in the set of modals, then clearly these features
will have no validity for another language with a different
number of items in its set of modals, regardless of the
question of the universality of semantic features. Joos,
of course, might argue, since he takes a social view of
modals, that the difference in features reflects differenc¬
es in the mentality of different societies: this is impli¬
cit in his comparison of eModEng and lModEng. Such a view
is, of course, diametrically opposed to the view I have
adopted in this dissertation.
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I have already demonstrated that Bech's system is not
readily adaptable to English; let me conclude by demon¬
strating by means of translation equivalents that Joos'





adequate v s. contingent
werden, wollen werden, sollen assurance











mussen sollen durfen (marked)
wollen mogen konnen (unmarked)
It is less easy to make such a demonstration with Ehrman's
account, since it is uncertain to what extent German mod¬
als might fill some of the empty spaces in her system. A
direct comparison could only be made by taking Ehrman1s
definitions and working through German data.
§ 6.2 Structural Semantic Accounts
6.2.0 The four accounts of modality I wish to examine
here are chronologically & geographically related rather
than ideologically related. I have termed them 'structur¬
al semantic' because what characterizes them most obviously
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(and thereby distinguishes them in particular from sem¬
antic accounts like those discussed in § 6.1) is their
concern to formalize semantic relations in terms of cer¬
tain linguistic primitives and-or universals. All three
are close to 'generative semantics' but only one: Seuren
(1969) - can be said to fall within the transformational-
generative approach. Anderson's (1971b) approach is gen¬
erative but not strictly transformational; Halliday's
(1970b) discussion takes more a discourse analytical
approach; and Leech's (1969) approach is logico-semantic:
it attempts to formalize meanings and meaning relations
without any formal generative algorithm.
6.2.1 Seuren's concept of grammar differs from standard
transformational grammar in a number of respects, includ¬
ing the following that are relevant to the present dis¬
cussion .
1) A set of sentence qualifiers (SQL), for assertions,
questions, imperatives, and hortatives. Every sen¬
tence has only one SQL.
2) An element QL (i.e. qualifier) rather like Aux in
standard TG expandable as Tense, Modal, Negation
element.
3) A set of clause qualifiers: Qu, Ass, Sugg, Hyp. etc.
which generate various types of embedded sentence.
4) A set of Modals (M): Poss(ibility), Nec(essity),
Perm(ission).
5) Formation rules of the following kind.
1) Sent —> SQL + Prop
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3) Prop —^ QL + Nucleus [v][CVjl
4) QL —> (NEG) Tense
(T env. IMP (NEG) -
(Modal)5) Tense —^











8) NEG —> Neg (Neg) (Neg)
9) M —^ fPoss)
\ Nec V
I Perm I
These rules should be compared with those quoted in
§§ 5.3.1 and 5.3.3. Of particular importance is the re-
cursivity of Tense and hence Modal (rules 5 and 6).
A few examples will illustrate how this system analyses
certain mood and modal phenomena.
6.15. You published some poetry back in 1916,
didn't you?
*
6.15'. SUGG E(poetry): you Past publish the poetry
back in 1916.
i.e. I suggest there is some poetry that you
published back in 1916.
6.16a. It seemed l , , , , ,
, _. , ., rthat John had been away,b. Dxd it seemJ 1
6.16a . ASS 1
past: it seem that (Proposition)Qu ) j
Past: John be away.
6.17. John may have known something.
6.17'. ASS U Poss Past E(thing): John know the thing
6.18a. John may be at home
b. ) tomorrow.{now.t o.
6.18a'. ASS U Poss Pres (now):John be at home
b'. ASS U Poss Fut (tomorrow): John be at home
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6.19a. John can be at home (now.
b. Vtomorrow.
6.19a'. Ass Poss Pres (now): John be at home
b'. Ass Pres Poss Fut (tomorrow):John be at home
6.20. Big men aren't necessarily strong men.
6.20'. Ass Neg U Nec U A (big men): The big men are
strong men
From this we can see that various configurations of Tense,
Modal and Neg are used to account for the semantic differ¬
ences between closely related modals like: can ar may ^ poss¬
ibly ; must Z have to # necessarily.
Seuren makes the claim that there are only six possible ex¬
pansions of QL; which can be collapsed into the formula:
(Neg) Tense (((Modal) (Neg)) (Tense))
This does not allow for sequences of modals as in:
6.21. He may have to go home.
But the recursivity or Rules 5 and 6 would permit a sequenc¬
ing of modals. Even though Seuren entertains the possibil¬
ity of another Modal: Prob(able), it seems unlikely that
the three he proposes: Poss, Nec and Perm are adequate for
the complexities of the English modality system. In particu¬
lar I find his representation of the tense-paradigm of
Modals counter - intuitive.
Poss Nec Perm
U may must may*
Pres can have to be allowed to
Past could* had to was able to*
Fut will be able to will have to will be allowed to
Perf have been able to have had to have been allowed to
The items marked * seem questionable to me. We normally
only find could with the past possibility sense when follow¬
ed by have, or with certain verbs, or in questions or ne¬
gation :
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6.22a. I could have killed him.
b. I could see you a minute ago.
c. I could dance the polka yesterday.
d. ?* I could go to France for a holiday last year,
e ?* I could kill him yesterday.
Compare with this:
6.23a. I was able to go to France for a holiday last
year.
b. I couldn't go to France for a holiday last
year.
c. ? Could you go to France for a holiday last
year?
Could is apparently only idiomatic where the event is general¬
ly possible as in:
6.24. I could get from here to Machynleth by train
before they closed the line.
Likewise, I doubt that was able to is the past of may/be
allowed to, and moreover that may is necessarily universal
tense. Compare:
6.25a. You may go now!
b. You may now kiss me goodnight.
c. He may have gone.
It is difficult to see how the permission is universal (U)
tense in 25a and b, cp. the presumed universality of the
possibility in 25c. Moreover, Seuren seems to disregard
the difference between epistemic and deontic modality,
presumably treating the epistemic senses of Poss and Nec
as cases of universal tense. While this may be an appeal¬
ing proposal in the case of Poss and Nec. i.e.
epistemic possibility is universal cp. possible/may
deontic possibility is tense marked cp. be able
epistemic necessity is universal cp. necessary/must
deontic necessity is tense marked cp. have to
there is presumably no epistemic permission. We can also
justifiably comment that granting permission (cp. You may
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go!) is in a sense enabling and that it is not of the
same order as Poss and Nec (cp. the assertion of the
existence: 'it is permitted').
A final point worth noting about Seuren's proposal is
that must can appear as a realization for IMP. Most
linguists who have attempted to relate imperative to
modals (Boyd/Thorne 1969, Lakoff 1971, etc.) have found
will a better candidate than must. And it does seem as
if will is more categorical than must in the following
paradigm.
6.26a. Get your hair cut!
though must may of course potentially receive a very em¬
phatic intonation. Must or should is more likely to be
used in reporting a command.
Although there are numerous questionable points of detail
about Seuren's analyses in practice, it is more important
to note those parts of the analysis which seem to offer
fruitful lines of research and which accord with the kind
of approach made in this dissertation. These are:
1) the possibility of complex tense configurations
interplaying with modals.
2) the principle of deriving modal adverbs and modal
verbs from the same source.
3) the principle of sentence qualification and clause
qualification to account for certain sentence types
and mood phenomena.
b. You will get your hair cut.
c. You must get your hair cut.
should get your hair cut.
must
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6.2.2 Anderson's approach is twofold - first there is
an empirical minimal pairs approach to arrive at the
system of distinctive features involved in the English
modals; second a discussion of the paraphrase relations
between modal verbs and synonymous complementizing "lexic¬
al" verbs concluding with the claim that modal verbs
should, like 'lexical' verbs plus complements, be derived







+ COMPLEX distinguishes predictive ( 'epistemic') meanings
from 'deontic' (+ COMPLEX) meanings.
+ FUTURE distinguishes present inclusive from future re¬
ferring senses.
6.27a. I can swim.
+ CONDITIONAL distinguishes tentative or imaginative mean¬
ings from 'real' meanings.
+ EXTERNAL indicates the presence or absence of an external
agency with 'deontic' meanings.
+ POTENTIAL distinguishes can and may and their related
forms from the rest.
In view of the ambiguity of would/could between conditional
b.
6.28a. It might arrive tomorrow,
b. It may arrive tomorrow.
6.29a. He ought to leave tomorrow,
b. He would leave tomorrow.
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and past interpretations, he incorporates + Past into his
system. But although + FUTURE seems to be determinable in
the semantics of modal verbs, he suggests that it is ir¬
relevant to the system. His subcategorization rule for
the feature modal is then:
"+ external /




the system for the category VP being:









Extrapolating from this and Anderson's examples we would



























+ COMPLEX + POT + EXT + COND (+ FUT)
- + - -
+ + - -
+ + + -
- + + -
+ + + - +
- - + -
+ - + - +
+ - + - +
- - - -
- - - -
+ - - -
- + - +
+ + - +
+ + + +
- + + +
+ + + +
- - + +
+ - + +
- - - +
+ - + +
- - + +
- - - +
+ - - +
+ - + -
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The four binary feature system allows only 16 possible
(cp. Joos) combinations. Accordingly:
can,, = may ^
must,, = shall^ = have to
shall^, - will^
could.3 = mighty
ought ^ = should^
ought2 ~ should^
should^ = would^
Where this synonymy is questionable, additional features
like + FUT in the case of can f may, have to f must and
+ EGOCENTRIC or similar in the case of must f shall may
be called upon. "SHALL differs from must in making it
explicit that the initiation is dependent on the speaker
(or addressee); with must, it may or may not be." In my
dialect this only seems to work with the archaic sense
of shall as in:
6.30a. Thou shalt honour thy father and thy mother,
b. Thou shalt not kill.
6.31a. You must honour your father and your mother,
b. You must not kill.
There is a considerable difference in meaning between the
following:
6.32a. He shall have a new bicycle.
b. You shall go to the ball, Cinderella.
6.33a. He must have a new bicycle.
b. You must go to the ball, Cinderella.
The closest in meaning is + COMPLEX wil^, not will^, which
Anderson does align with shal^. What is interesting about
Anderson's approach is that the synonymy of certain modal
verbs in certain senses is allowed for in principle. More¬
over, Anderson assumes that the modal verbs may be poly-
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semous. In both respects, then, his approach is an improve¬
ment over Joos'. What is less satisfying is the underly¬
ing symmetry, and the apparent arbitrariness of some of
his features, 'potentiality' and 'conditionality' in par¬
ticular. 'Potentiality', because it becomes clear through
Anderson's exegesis that this feature is used to cover
what is missing in the symmetrical representation, namely
a means of distinguishing:
can^ 2; will^ ^ shall,,
can^ i. will 2
may2 can^ ^ shall^ must^
may £ must1
which would otherwise have identical feature specifications.
'Conditionality', because some of the modals involved in
this feature should f. ex. seem to be permissible in both
conditional and non-conditional environments, although
they may be more 'tentative' than others. Anderson seems
to be covering 2 phenomena with one feature here (cp. §§
13.3.0-2).
The second respect in which Anderson's analysis is inter¬
esting is his discussion of paraphrase relations between
two-clause structures and modal verbs. It is not necessary
to examine all the details of these relationships, except
in the few cases where they seem implausible.
Broadly speaking, Anderson establishes four kinds of para¬
digm
1) where a modal verb is paraphrased by a periphrastic
modal
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can E be able (to)
can/may = be allowed /permitted (to)
will = be willing (to)
must/have to = be obliged/required/compelled (to)
can = it is possible (for)
may = it is possible (that)
must/need = ... is bound/sure/certain (to)
I'm sure/certain/convinced (that)
2) where various configurations of a modal and one or
more negatives are paraphrases of each other.
needn1t = may not
needn1t not = may
must = can't not
must not E can't (epistemic)
not i"sur® . = needn't
(certain —
sure 1 _ . ,
. V not — can t
mjcertain^
it's possible (for)T= . sn't certain not.
can J —
3) where the more analytic paraphrases show semantic
contrasts in tense and-or time reference in the sub¬
ordinate clause.
he may have gone = 1) it is possible that he has
gone.
2) it is possible that he went.
, Cleave tomorrow _ . , . ,,
he may •< , , . . . , , , ,, - it is possible thatJ I be telling the truth — c
The will leave tomorrow.
\he is telling the truth.
4) where the more analytic paraphrases of conditional
modals involve differences in tense configurations.
might _ jit is possible that\ ,
should/ought to) — ll'm sure that J wou
could E would be possible ...
be able (to)
Souid > = would^J willing (to)
could/might J |^be allowed/permitted (to)
The difficulties with this approach are firstly the some¬
what loose concept of paraphrase and secondly the confusion
of paraphrase with logical equivalence.
In the introductory chapter I drew a distinction between
strong and weak paraphrases. Many of Anderson's paraphrase
relations would at best only qualify as weak paraphrases
since the sentences in the paraphrase pairs differ in sem-
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antic complexity (and also pragmatically). By semantic
complexity I mean the quantity or restrictedness of in¬
formation contained in a sentence; thus
6.34. He's willing to help you.
is semantically more restricted than its (putative) para¬
phrase :
6.34'. He'll help you.
because it refers to a state of mind, a disposition, on
the part of the grammatical subject of the sentence, where¬
as the form with will makes a prediction of future behav¬
iour without referring to a present disposition; it may,
however, imply (in the sense of § 1.3.3) that the partici¬
pant in question is willing. The form with will would not,
however, be inconsistent with an extension that would deny
this. Compare:
6.35a. He'll help you, if you wish.
b. He'll help you, even though he doesn't see
why he should.
c. He'll help you if he must, but he doesn't
want to.
- be willing would be inappropriate as a gloss for will in
35b and c. A closer approximation might be: 'he's in no
position not to help you (because of some obligation com¬
pulsion , etc.)'.
By pragmatic difference I mean a difference in the applic¬
ation of an utterance to a situation.
6.36. I'm sure he's home by now.
differs, I believe, from:
6.36'. He must be home by now.
and also from:
6.36". He's sure to be home by now.
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The difference lies in the nature of the speaker's beliefs:
36' differs from 36 and 36" in that the speaker's belief
is not presupposed by it: must indicates that the state
of affairs leads the speaker to the logical conclusion
'he is home (by) now'; it establishes his belief, whereas
36 and 36" may presuppose it. With 36 and 36" the speaker
is committed to belief in 'he is home (by) now.' In other
contexts I'm sure that and X is sure to ... may also be
distinct. Compare:
6.37a. I'm sure he'll be there tomorrow,
b. He's sure to be there tomorrow.
6.38a. I'm sure he'll be there tomorrow, but I may
be wrong.
b. * He's sure to be there tomorrow, but I may be
wrong.
37a seems to be appropriate to a situation where the speak¬
er's belief is dependent on appropriate to a situation
where the speaker's belief is dependent on subjective
certainty cp. 'I am convinced', while 37b seems to be
appropriate to a situation where the speaker's belief is
dependent on objective certainty cp. 'It is certain ...'.
Anderson also attempts to relate surely to must. In
my dialect of English surely differs quite markedly from
must, if not in terms of probability then in terms of illoc-
ution. Compare:
6.39a. He's surely on his way.
b. He must be on his way.
surely (rather like tag-questions with rising intonation
cp. § 11.3) poses a question as to the validity of a be¬
lief; must, as I said above, does not necessarily indicate
a belief, and it does not seem to invite verification.
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Note also that surely can co-occur with must:
6.40a. He must surely be on his way.
b. He surely must be on his way.
c. Surely, he must be on his way.
Such considerations lead me to doubt that the following
paraphrase relations established by Anderson necessarily
indicate a common source in deep structure (or semantic
specification):
will CH be willing to (41)
sure/certain/bound OZ must
can ftz be able to
can/may be allowed/permitted to
In setting up the following equivalences, Anderson is not¬
ing logical equivalences and not strong paraphrases.
I'm not sure that ... not = needn't not EE may = It's
possible that
I'm sure that\ fit's not possible for ... not
must J - \can't not.
I'm sure that ... notl _ fit's not possible for ...
(mustn't) J — \can't
I'm not sure that/ _ fit's possible that/for ... not
needn't j ~ |may/can ... not
I'm not sure that ... notl _ fit's possible that/for
needn't ... not j ~ ^may/can
These equivalences can be reduced to the following logic¬
al expressions.
~nec~ = poss
nec = poss ~
nec-v = ~poss
/v nec = poss ~
But this does not mean that this captures the whole mean¬
ing of the expressions involved. Particularly in the case
of I'm sure, they seem to fall short of the meaning, thus
we find something like:
I believe ( ~ nec )
to be more adequate for: I'm not sure that ... not.
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We cannot take such equivalence relationships as motivation
for deriving, say: I'm sure from the same structure as:
not possible ... not or can't not. Such relationships be¬
long to translational rules not to the rules of syntax.
Anderson's claim about the nature of modals is, neverthe¬
less, with certain reservations, one we can endorse.
"I have ... tried to suggest that the range of phenomena
relevant to the grammar of the modal is wider than is
usually proposed, and that greater illumination is
thrown on these phenomena if we consider the modal forms
not as directly realising a simple subcategorization
(with respect to a category M(odal)) but rather as variants
of an underlying two-clause structure. I have tried also
to suggest relationships between the structures under¬
lying different modals, with a view to reducing the
number of 'primes'."
(Anderson 1971b, p. 109)
The reservations are broadly that the notion of variant is
too imprecise and that underlying structures (semantic
specifications) may involve greater complexity than is im¬
plied by "underlying two-clause structure".
6.2.3 Leech's (1969) analysis of modality in English is
part of an attempt to establish a formal semantic account
of English using a lexicon of semantic primes, classified
into systems, formators and features. The systems relevant
to modality are all reciprocal; they are:
causation x CAU y
authority x AUT y
volition x <Z?VOL y
ability x £1*ABLE y
Within each system there is the possibility of a weak or a
strong constraint (1TT or 2TT) and certain formators 'actual¬
ity' ( + distinguishing hypothetical from non-hypothetical
forms, and 'theoretical/practical' + 7- (see below).
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The weak and strong constraints permit the following
three-way differentiation.
—^ CAU 1 "IT 'let' (weak causation)
—^ CAU 2tC 'make' (strong causation)
—^ CAU 'cause' (intermediate causation)
The actuality formator distinguishes, f. ex.:
have to: AUT +y/ 2T
would have to: AUT -ifS 2tt
ought to: AUT 2tt
The 'theoretical/practical' formator distinguishes for
example:
the pound may be devalued 1TT +1JJ : (a.r -T-b)
the pound can be devalued 1"Tf +yj : (a.r +T*b)
where: 11T + \jJ = 'possible'
The feature + PROB introduces the greater degree of certain¬
ty suggested by 'probable' as against 'possible'.
1TT +\jJ + PROB = it's probable
1TT +\fj - PROB = it's improbable/unlikely
The feature + EGO is used to specify the speaker's involve¬
ment in the case of shall, and in certain uses of may and
must. Thus:
My chauffeur shall help you . . . <— VOL 1Tf + EGO . . .
No-one shall stop me . . . VOL 2TC +\j/ + EGO . . .
(in the above I have not used Leech's complete formulas
but have extracted the essential symbolism for the purposes
of demonstration.)
In essence, modality here seems to be based on logical poss¬
ibility and necessity (the weak constraints 1tT and 2TT") .
Extrapolating from Leech's discussion we would arrive at
the following meaning specifications.
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possible 17T + V
necessary 2TT +y/
probable 171 + ^ + PROB
improbable 171 + if/ - PROB
can +r <©• 177 +^>
may -T <©' 171 + y>
have to +T <©' 271 + V>
must -r <©' 271 +
ought to 2 7T




























= speaker willing —> VOL
= speaker insists —^ VOL
may = permission —^ AUT + If/ 171' •' <— CAU









In a later work Leech (1971) summarizes his analysis of





















This excludes the use of modal adverbs and many other ex¬
pressions. It also excludes the use of should, ought (to)
in non-conditional cases. As with Anderson, it seems necess¬
ary to voice the suspicion that the volitional analysis of
will and shall may be a little wide of the mark (cp. § 7.3),
One of the more interesing meaning relations established
by Gruber (1965) is that between certain verbs of causation
and verbs of preventing.
let = ^ stop, stop = let
In Leech we have an extension of this phenomenon in the
causality and other modality systems.
~let = make ^
i.e. ~ > CAU 1 tc (x) =-3>.CAU 271 (~x)
The rule here is that the constraint term is changed (1tT
for 2tt & vice versa) and the negation inverted, the result
being logical equivalence. Similarly he establishes:
-vpermit = oblige ~ cp. may not must not
~AUT 11t (x) = > AUT 2-K (~x)
^possible — necessary~ cp. may not « needn't
~1tt (x) = 2 tt ( ~ x)
possible ~ ~ necessary
1-rt ( ~ x) a ^ 2 tt (x)
~ willing a insist ~ cp. unwilling « won't
—^ VOL 1 tt (x) a-»VOL 2tt ( ~ x)
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(These, it should be stressed, are as with Anderson logic¬
al equivalences and not paraphrases - there is clearly a
difference of emphasis in the terms involving 2~tX.)
Interestingly, there seems to be no English equivalent
for ABLE 2 TT :
~ able E ? ~
can not ??
i.e. />- —> ABLE 1 -n (x) = —> ABLE 2TT ( ^ x)
unless we take ABLE 2Tfto be 'does not/is not' - I am in
some doubt as to what the ability system means. Leech
moreover, equates 'capability' and 'ability' as one and
the same system, though it seems to me that there are im¬
portant differences not dissimilar to the differences be¬
tween may and can when interpreted as possibility that
Leech attributes to + f . Compare:
6.41a. She's \ 1ulte 1 capable of murdering her
^ husband.
b. She's t able to murder her husband,
perfectly )
41a is interpretable as if the state (frame of mind, etc.)
she is in makes it possible that she will murder her husband.
41b, however, refers to an inherent ability (her strength,
size, etc.). 41a and 41b may be glossed:
6.41a'. It's quite possible/likely that she'll murder
her husband in the state she's in.
b'. It's quite possible for her to murder her
husband because of ...
Notice the oddness of the following expansion of:
6.41b". ? She's quite able to murder her husband in the
state she's in.
The most positive aspect of Leech's analysis is his in¬
sistence on formal symbolism and the use of implication
and presupposition to establish differences in meaning. I
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have already pointed out the importance of such meaning
relations in § 1.
What I find questionable about Leech's analysis is:
i) the nature and status of 'ability' system in
particular
ii) the validity of the weak and strong constraint
with particular reference to the 'volition' system,
i.e.
—^ VOL 11T 'willing' i.e. weak volition
—> VOL 2"TT ' insistence' strong volition
VOL 'wish' intermediate volition
(A discussion of volition is taken up in § 7.3.3.)
6.2.4 Halliday's (1970b) analysis is reminiscent of Ander¬
son's in its inclusion of various grammatical indicators
of modality: modal verbs, adverbs, intonation, etc. It goes
beyond Anderson's treatment in presuming a grammar of dis¬
course rather than a sentence grammar. It distinguishes,
therefore, two linguistic functions: the 'interpersonal
function' i.e. speaker's assessment^roughly equivalent to
epistemic modality - the modal elements falling under this
category being termed 'modalities'; and the 'ideational
function', i.e. relation of participants to process,rough¬
ly equivalent to deontic modality - the modal elements in
this category being termed 'modulations'.
Halliday makes a number of claims about the difference be¬
tween modality and modulation, the most important being:
i) modalities may not accumulate, except perhaps in
sentences like: perhaps he might have built it,
where they reinforce each other.
modulation may accumulate: you shall be allowed to
do it.
ii) modalities are mainly expressed by: modal verbs,
adverbs, and it is (adj.) constructions;
modulations by: modal verbs and x be (adj.) to
constructions.
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iii) modalities are not subject to voice distinctions,
modulations may be of the active or passive type.
cp. he is willing vs. he is allowed.
iv) modalities are not susceptible to tense; the 'pro¬
cess' takes the tense, ('process' = proposition
operated on by modality or modulation,
modulations are susceptible to tense; the 'process'
is tenseless (and even where we have a perfect
infinitive after a modulation: he should have been
there, for example, this is treated as a 'past un¬
fulfilled' form of should).
v) since, according to Halliday, the total number of
modality + negative constructions is no greater
than the number of modalities, modality negation is
held to be impossible, the negative being really
associated with the 'process'; with modulations we
have the possibility of negation of the modulation
and negation of the 'process'.
Of these claims I find (i), (iv) and (v) inadequate, for
reasons I list below:
ad (i): In sentences like: Perhaps he might have built it;
Certainly he might have built it, the two putative modalities
(43)
do not reinforce each other (cp. § 8.2.1) ; rather the
sentence adverb (in traditional terms) expresses the 'speak¬
er's assessment' of what I suggest is an assessment conceiv¬
ed in another world, i.e. jPer^aPs s. j_s case that^certainlyJ
he might (cp. would) have built it if things had been
otherwise. The might have, which is semantically distinct
from would in the same environment, expresses a possibil¬
ity dependent on a condition whether expressed or not.
ad (iv): Modalities may be tensed if we take narrative or
reported speech or predictive situations into consider¬
ation, although these may not be expressed by modal verbs.
I fail to see how else we can analyze sentences like:
6.42a. 200 years ago it was possible to walk for
miles without seeing a soul.
b. Yesterday it was possible that she would have
failed her exam.
c. Tomorrow it will be possible to see her.
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What might, however, be a valid claim is that the tense
of a modality cannot differ from the tense of the world
conceived by the speaker (cp. §§2,7 and 9) .
ad (v): Halliday's evidence is dependent largely upon his
subdivisions of modality (see below). He notes, as others
have (Huddleston (1969) for example), that it is not poss¬
ible to determine whether the 'process' is negated or the
modality with will and would under the 'probable' type of
modality. Consider:
6.43a. He will come.
b. He won't come.
c. He would come.
d. He wouldn't come.
If we translate will into it is likely/probable (which
Halliday equates it with), we do find alternative negation
possibilities.
6.43a'. It is probable that he's coming.
b'. It is not probable that he's, coming,
c'. It is/improbable"! that he's coming.
/unlikely J
d'. It is probable that he's not coming.
It is clear from Halliday's tables that negation possibil¬
ities pattern in just the same way as Leech's rule of nega¬
tive inversion, i.e.
possible not = not certain (may not) (might not)
not possible = certain not (can't) (couldn't)
shouldn't and oughtn't seem to be indeterminable like
won't/wouldn't and Halliday's glosses ('virtually certain'/
'assuredly') do not help much toward determining the accept¬
ability and meaning of negation possibilities.
it is fairly certain that he's there ? E should be there
it is /? not fairly certain "I that he's there E he's probably
I fairly uncertain ) not there
it is fairly certain that he's not there ? = he shouldn't
be there
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In fact, it seems questionable whether should and ought
belong where Halliday has put them - and saying this leads
us onto the question of Halliday's tables, which I repro¬





























































can can shall is to
could could should was to
(cp. Halliday 1970b, p. 340)
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Noting a similarity in the pattern, Halliday suggests

















POS will can, may must
NEG won' t may not (modul.)
needn't (modul.)/ can't (modul.)mustn't (" )
POS would could, might should,
ought to
must








(cp. Halliday 1970b, p. 348)
f (uncommitted






* neutral relative impossible
(cp. Halliday 1970b, p. 346)
One is left in considerable doubt not only about Halliday's
system(s), but also about his methodology. Unlike Anderson,
Halliday gives little evidence for his categorization and
even less to establish which items appear where or to
establish that there is no difference in meaning between
can, may under neutral permission (be allowed) or to es-
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tablish that there are differences in meaning between:
can = 'able', can = 'entitled' and can = 'allowed'. Fur¬
thermore, have to is excluded, though it plays an import¬
ant role in the modality system (both as a 'modality' and
a 'modulation', in Halliday's terms); and must is included
as oblique, although it is well known that must cannot
appear either as a past tense or as a conditional or as
a subjunctive
6.44a. * He must be there yesterday, (cp. had to)
b. * If you were to see him, you must run after him.
(cp. 'd have to)
c. * You wouldn't like it either, if you must go
there. (cp. had to)
On the other hand, so-called 'oblique' could, might, should,
and ought to, but not would can appear in commutation with
'neutral' 'modalities/modulations'.





- as well as sometimes performing some of the functions
listed above:
6.46. If you were to see him, you[ might / laugh.) could S
|*ought to([j* should /
(i.e. conditional paradigm)





The 'oblique' category seems to gloss over a number of
complex patterns of behaviour.
In his analysis of modulation, Halliday has two subsystems
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distinguishing will and must from can, shall and Y*be to.
The division of will (= 'willingness') and can (= 'ability'),
seems clear enough, both refer to dispositions on the part
of the subject. It is difficult to see a parallel distinct¬
ion, i.e. one based on some common structural or semantic
opposition between must on the one hand and shall and
Vbe, to on the other, though they are undoubtedly distinct.
And if the items are distinct, why ignore the distinction
for the sake of establishing a combined system for 'modal¬
ity' and 'modulation', a system which is not empirically
based but a restructuring of two other systems whose empiric¬
al basis is itself questionable?
My final criticisms of Halliday's analysis concern two of
his systemic oppositions: 1) the distinction between 'prob¬
able' and 'possible « certain'. 2) the subdivision of
'possible^ certain' into ' possible si virtually certains^
certain'. The first question is: how motivated are the
divisions? the second: do the divisions 'inclination^
ability' and 'permission necessity' in Halliday's analysis
of 'modulation' really parallel them?
Butler (1973), who is interested in establishing the patterns
of 'modality' in other W. European languages, argues against







and I think this is a fairly common na'ive view, namely that
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we are assessing merely the degree of likelihood of an
action or event. But such a scale, which ignores 'certain'
(and 'certain' is still an assessment of likelihood, not
equivalent to a statement of fact), allows even greater
differentiation, to the point almost where one would
suspect the human mind of working in percentages if such
as scale really represented the linguistic facts.













Moreover it becomes arguable as to whether extremly probable
is the same as almost certain, etc.
I believe that Halliday is right in separating 'probable'
from 'possible « certain', but I also think, like Leech,
that 'probable' is dependent on, and a modification of,
'possible' (cp. § 7.1.2). Two facts support this: i) the
difference in the kind of modification probable itself
allows, cp. possible and certain (cp. above). It does
not allow, notably, modification with almost. ii) the
difference in negation possibilites.
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it is possible that he's coming,
it is not possible"! that he's coming.
impossible)
it is possible that he's not coming.
it is certain that he's coming.
it is Jnot certainT that he's coming.
in /\= uncertain
it is certain that he's not coming.
(likely










i.e. 'possible - certain' obey Leech's rule of negative
inversion; 'probable' does not, as is evident from Leech's
analysis.
Having said that 'probable' needs to be distinguished from
'possible certain', I have to point out that will is not
the correct modal to insert under 'probable'. German diirf-
te (wohl) is perhaps the nearest modal realization I can
think of: English may well, might well are also possible
realizations. Notice that will can itself appear with
probably, and the result is less certain than with will
above.
6.48a. That'll be the postman.
b. That'll probably be the postman.
I think the will here functions not as a marker of probabil¬
ity but as the marker of future in t.. Thus:
6.49a. That'll probably be the postman,
b. That's probably the postman.
both involve a judgment of likelihood, but differ in being
predictive and non-predictive respectively.
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Now what of 'virtually certain', to which Halliday ascribes
should/ought to, at least in 'non-neutral' cases? If we
examine the paradigms set up by these modals in commutation
with the 'possible' and 'certain' modals, we find that
there are very different syntactic restrictions and prag¬
matic associations involved.
6.50a. He might be the killer.
b. He could be the killer.
c. * He should be the killer.
d. p He ought to be the killer.
e. He must be the killer.
6.51a. He might have been the killer.
b. He could have been the killer.
c. * He should have been the killer.
d. * He ought to have been the killer.
e. He must have been the killer.
6.52a. He might be there by now.
b. He could be there by now.
c. He should be there by now.
d. He ought to be there by now.
e. He must be there by now.
The use of should and ought to as epistemics is restricted
to situations where the speaker expresses an expectation
or makes a prediction on the basis of a process or program
of events that is already underway - lack of evidence
prevents a categorical statement. The cases where should/
ought to are ruled out involve deductions from some previous-
(44)
ly considered information . This seems to suggest that
there is no paradigm: possible & virtually certain ^ certain.
Interestingly, the 'probable' modals: may/might well would
fit in the paradigm in place of 'virtually certain'.
Such considerations suggest that the system suggested by
Anderson (1972) for quantifiers is configurationally
appropriate for modality, ignoring the equating of will
and probable.
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Let me now look at the structure of Halliday's modulation
system. Parallel to 'possibility' Halliday has 'permission';
this much has been suggested by a number of writers on
modality and is uncontroversial. Parallel to 'virtually
certain', which I have expressed doubt about, we have
'obligation' and parallel to 'certain' - 'compulsion'. The
implication is that 'obligation' is less categorical than
'compulsion' and this is true in the case of should/ought (to)
vs. must (have to is again excluded); but should/ought (to)
are termed oblique, so they are less categorical from that
point of view, too. What throws doubt on this distinction
is Halliday's assignment of shall to 'obligation' and
Vbe_ to to 'compulsion'. Disregarding for the moment the
fact that shall and Vbe_ to are often pragmatically and
illocutionarily distinct, I should say that the reverse
categorization would be more appropriate, at least in:
6.53a. No civilian shall pass beyond this point
without a special permit,
b. No civilian is to pass beyond this point
without a special permit.
In the pair:
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6.54a. You shall have another donkey ride tomorrow,
b. You are to have another donkey ride tomorrow.
the difference is between a promise (not an obligation)
and a requirement. And in the question pairs:
6.55a. Shall I open the window?
b. Am I to open the window?
6.56a. Shall I get you anything?
b. Am I to get you anything?
The shall forms inquire about the hearer's desires, where¬
as the fhe to forms inquire about a stipulation or desig¬
nation which the hearer may know about, but which may not
be of his instigation. Furthermore, Vbe to forms are not
offers, but rather inquiries about what an already acknow¬
ledged duty demands,
i.e. am I to get you anything Z3 3x, yl x is a duty for y
With the 'oblique' pair:
6.57a. I should go there tomorrow,
b. I was to go there tomorrow.
the difference is not one of degree, but of implications,
should indicating an obligation but making no guarantee
about realization - it may allow the expectation that the
event will not occur - was to implies non-realization,
whether as a result of deleted obligation, or refusal to
co-operate.
There is, therefore, as much room for doubt about the
'obligation' ~ 'compulsion' distinction as there was about
the 'virtually certain' » 'certain' distinction.
What Halliday includes under 'entitled' would perhaps in
slightly more archaic English be more properly covered by
dare; the negative daren't is still current enough to
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warrant inclusion.
My final comments on Halliday's treatment of 'modulation'
involve the active - passive distinction. This is motivated
by the paraphrase possibilities, namely with adjectives
and passive participles respectively, f. ex.: will = be
willing, can = be allowed. The distinction between active
and passive, however, hides the true nature of the differ¬
ence between volitional will and abilitative can on the
one hand and permissive can, obligative shall, must, etc.
on the other, because, if the glossing is correct, the
'active modulations' refer to dispositions on the part of
the referent of the subject of the sentence, whereas the
'passive modulations' refer not so much to dispositions
but to authority possessed by the speaker or a third person.
Even if Halliday gets closer than Joos to 'linguistic real¬
ity', he seems to me to be just as guilty of letting sys¬
tem hold sway over evidence. Despite his observation that
'modality' has "no one single place in the clause" but
"runs prosodically throughout it" (Halliday 1970b, p. 331)
he ignores functions of language that play an essential
part in the modality system (in my sense of the word mod¬
ality) , functions such as speaker - hearer relationship and
illocutionary function.
6.2.5 The 'possible worlds' approach
This approach derives mainly from an article by R. Lakoff
(1972b) which shows the interpretation problem associated
with:
- 207 -
6.58a. Football players may be sex maniacs.
(= Lakoff1s 1a)
b. Football players can be sex maniacs.
(= Lakoff's 1b)
Both 58a and b have epistemic interpretations but are
not synonymous. (Leech (1969) has related the semantic
distinction to a difference between "theoretical" and
"practical" possibility and claims a similar distinction
for necessity (cp. § 6.2.3).)
R. Lakoff glosses her examples:
6.58a'. ( 3„) (V > (V. ) SM (x,t,w)W L.
b'. (Vx)(3t) SM (x,t)
b". (3x)(Vt} SM (x,t)
b"'. (3x) (3t) SM (x, t)




(cp. Lakoff 1972b, p. 232)
In other words:
6.58a'. EE there is some world in which all football
players are always sex-maniacs,
b'. = all football players are sometimes sex-maniacs,
b". EE some football players are always sex-maniacs,
b"'. = some football players are sometimes sex-maniacs
I shall ignore here one of the problems with the "practic¬
al" possibility interpretation of can, namely that it is
unstable and may sometimes be confused with what Palmer
(1965) has called the "characteristic" sense of can, i.e.
'X has a tendency to be ...' which is scarcely epistemic.
Lakoff has chosen examples which may be misleading because
they involve quantification over football players (univers¬
al and existential quantification) and also because of the
kind of predicate involved, which because it refers to a
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behavioural property, which is ipso facto non-permanent,
and not to an inalienable property like tall, introduces
quantification over time. Is it not conceivable that 58a
can have a reading:
6.58a". 3t7 V 1, SM (x,t,w)W .X L.
i.e. 'in some world all football players are sometimes
sex-maniacs' (cp. 60a' and a" below).
If we reduce the quantification over the attributee (59)
and also change the type of predicate (60 and 61), we dis¬
cover certain snags with Lakoff's analysis.
6.59a. Mary may be a bitch,
b. Mary can be a bitch.
6.60a. Mary may be sick,
b. Mary can be sick.
6.61a. Mary may be tall,
b. ?* Mary can be tall.
Assuming that can is interpretable in the above as an
epistemic, which is not necessarily the preferred inter¬
pretation, we would have the following quasi-logical ex¬
pressions, exhausting all combinations of quantifiers over
times:
6.59a'. vt BITCH (m, t, w) i.e. a bitchy woman
a" . p 3
W 3t BITCH (m, t, w) i.e. bitchy at times
b' . ?* ¥t BITCH (m, t) i.e. always
b" . 3t BITCH (m, t) i.e. sometimes
6.60a'. ¥t SICK (m, t, w) i.e. a sick woman
a" . 3„ SICK (m, t, w) i.e. sick at the moment
b' . 9 * vt SICK (m, t) i.e. a sick woman
b" . 3t SICK (m, t) i.e. sick at the moment
6.61a'. vt TALL (m, t, w) i.e. a tall woman
a" . * 3„ TALL (m, t, w) i.e. temporarily tall
b" . ★ ¥t TALL (m, t) i.e. a tall woman
b" . *
t
TALL (m, t) i.e. temporarily tall
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59a" is highly questionable as an interpretation of 59a.
Why, when 60a" seems to be possible for 60a? I suggest
the reason lies in the nature of the predicate. 59b' is
an impossible interpretation of 59b, except in the con¬
text of a play or film, where Mary plays the role of a
bitch; similar considerations apply to 60b'. Such a con¬
text, arguably, involves a possible or alternative world,
and it may be difficult to distinguish this from the not¬
ion of 'possible world' used by Lakoff to explicate may.
The fact that 61b", as well as 61b', is an impossible in¬
terpretation of 61b, in direct contrast to the case with
59b", is, I think, clear evidence that the interpretations
to be associated with can are dependent on the nature of
the predicate. Note also that the possibility of universal
or existential quantification over time with may is also
dependent on the type of predicate, cp. 59a", 60a", and
61a". And yet, if Lakoff's claim for the nature of may
were correct, we would surely be able to predict the
quantification pattern for other cases.
Whilst I do not totally reject the application of alter¬
native worlds to handle may cp. below, the treatment of
both may and can in terms of quantification over times
and-or worlds seems to be incorrect. It is true that can
(apart from its other functions) may reflect quantification
over states of affairs (cp. "situationsquantifizierendes"
kann, Grabski 1971), as in:
6.62a. Lions are dangerous. i.e. always
b. Lions can be dangerous. i.e. sometimes
But it is questionable that we need to analyze 62b as being
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three-ways ambiguous. It is surely the validity of 'Lions
are dangerous' that is quantified, not lions, nor times
with respect to specific lions. In other words, a more
appropriate gloss would be: 'it is sometimes true that
lions are dangerous'. The interpretations: 'some lions
... always', 'all lions ... sometimes' and 'some lions
... sometimes' are implied, but not asserted, by the
quantification of validity.
Apart from these practical difficulties, there are two,
more theoretical questions raised by Lakoff's analysis:
i) what is the status of the possible/alternative world?
If an expression like: 3 V, SM (m, t, w) to expressW u
Mary may be a sex-maniac is integrated into a general
linguistic analysis including an account of illocutions,
is it plausible to say that uttering an epistemic state¬
ment with may is equivalent to stating that a world with
certain properties exists? That is, is a statement: 'it
is possible that p' also a statement: 'there is a world
where p'? Would we not, in order to capture the true illoc
utionary status of an utterance with epistemic may, have
to formulate: 'it is possible that there is a world where
p', thereby introducing modal logic? This, of course, doe
not say that Lakoff is wrong in seeing the difference be¬
tween may and can in terms of alternative worlds; Leech's
'theoretical' and 'practical' possibility is tantamount
to this.
ii) how do we distinguish will from may in Lakoff's ana¬
lysis? It strikes me that the formula 58a' would be more
appropriate as an expression for Football players will be
sex-maniacs (on Mars, etc.), since will also makes pre¬
dictions about alternative worlds.
The conclusion one is forced to come to is that R. Lakoff's
proposal has problems not only of a practical nature but
also of an ontological nature. It does not appear to offer
an adequate and viable alternative to modal logic.
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§ 7 The Syntax and Semantics of Modality Expressions in
English and German
7.0 In this examination I shall take a large number of ex¬
pressions that may be considered 'modal' following the de¬
finition in § 1.0. In English such expressions include what
have traditionally been called modal auxiliaries:
will, shall, can, may, must and negative and-or interrog¬
ative need and dare plus the oblique forms: would, should,
could, might
To these we may add what are sometimes called 'semi aux-
• -I . . , (45)lliaries :
have (to), ought (to) ,Ybe_ (to), have got (to)
An important group is the set of 'periphrastic' or 'supple-
tive' modals:
be able (to), be capable (of), be allowed (to),
be permitted (to), be obliged (to), be supposed (to),
be willing (to), be inclined (to), be liable (to),
be apt (to), be about (to), be going (to), be sure (to),
be bound (to), be said (to), be thought (to),
be believed (to)
had better/had best
appear (to), seem (to)
tend (to)
mean (to), intend (to)
know how (to)
it's possible/necessary/certain/likely/impossible etc.
We can further distinguish a set of modal adverbs:
perhaps, possibly, maybe, necessarily,certainly,
probably, really, surely
Finally I would include a number of expressions like: I_
think, I suppose. These, as I shall attempt to show in
§ 7.1.1, have an analyzable modal content, even if this is
not the whole of their meaning.
Forms like: used (to), be in the habit (of), which have
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temporal and-or aspectual meaning, should be regarded as
non-modal. In view of the meaning relationship between
these and some uses of would, there is clearly also a non-
modal sense of would.
In German, the expressions we should consider are:
traditional modals: wollen, sollen, mussen, mogen,
durfen, konnen
the auxiliary: werden
semi-auxiliaries: haben (zu), sein (zu)
complementizing verbs: brauchen, drohen, scheinen, ver-
mogen, neigen
modality adverbs: doch, schon, ja, sicher, gewifi,
wohl, bestimmt, vielleicht, even-
tuell, moglicherweise, eigentlich,
etc.
We shall also have to include subjunctive forms of some of
these verbal items.
Accounts of the semantics of modality expressions like those
to be found in Leech (1971), Quirk et al. (1972). Palmer
(1965) for English, and in Griesbach (1966), Duden (1973)
and Buscha et al. (1971) for German, come to rather contra¬
dictory results. Thus English will has (according to Quirk
et al. (1972) and Leech (1971) four distinguishable mean¬
ings :
1) weak volition: willingness, f. ex. He'11 help you if
you ask him.
2) intermediate volition: intention, f. ex. We won't stay
long.
3) strong volition: insistence, f. ex. He will do it.
4) prediction, f. ex. The game'11 be finished by now.
Palmer, however, separates up to six meanings:
1) futurity, f. ex. It'11 rain tomorrow.
2) volition, f. ex. if he'11 come.
3) induction, f. ex. Oil will float on water.
4) characteristic, f. ex. She'll sit there for hours
doing nothing.
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5) probability, f. ex. He'll be at home by now.
6) insistence, f. ex. You will do these things.
Quirk et al' s "prediction" would probably encompass Palmer's
"futurity" and "probability". It might also be argued that
Palmer's "induction" and "characteristic" also belong under
the rubric "prediction".
We can find similar divergences in accounts of German mod-
als. Thus for miissen Duden has:
1) Notwendigkeit, f. ex. Er mufi jeden Morgen um 6 Uhr
aufstehen.
2) fremder Wille, f. ex. Er sagte, wir miiBten das tun.
3) subjektiv, f. ex. So muB es gewesen sein.
as against Griesbach's:
1) Zwang, f. ex. Ich mufi heute piinktlich zu Hause sein.
2) natiirliche Veranlagung, f. ex. Alle Kreatur muB ster-
ben.
3) sachgerechte Erfordernis, f. ex. Die Apfel mussen eine
halbe Stunde sieden.
4) notwendige Folge, f. ex. Man muBte sich in sie verlieben.
5) unvermeidliche Erfahrung, f. ex. Ich muB Ihnen leider
eine groBe Nachlas-
sigkeit vorwerfen.
6) unerlaBliche Empfehlung, f. ex. Sie mussen unbedingt
dieses Buch lesen.
7) notwendige Ermahnung, f. ex. Du mufit mich nicht immer
storen.
Here we can see that Griesbach's "Zwang" is included in Du¬
den' s "fremder Wille"; his "natiirliche Veranlagung", "not¬
wendige Folge", "unvermeidliche Erfahrung" under Duden's
"Notwendigkeit"; "sachgerechte Erfordernis" and "notwendi¬
ge Ermahnung" possibly also belong under the same rubric.
On the other hand Duden's "subjektiv", which to an extent
covers the concept of 'epistemic modal', doesn't appear un¬
der any guise in Griesbach.
In order to arrive at a more systematic account of the sem¬
antics of modality expressions I shall set up paradigms
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based on a particular type of modal meaning to discover the
potentiality of that type. I shall then attempt to classify
the items in such a way that essential contrasts become
clear. I shall not, however, be able to examine each of the
items on the above lists exhaustively, that is, set up a
complete semantic specification.
§ 7.1 The syntax and semantics of epistemic expressions
7.1.0 An epistemic expression is one which relates to the
speaker's knowledge with regard to the truth or probability
of a proposition. Thus: I know he's there and I think he's
there are epistemic expressions.
Commonly, however, 1epistemic' is restricted to mean what
is objectively known about the probability of a proposition
being true, as with: it's possible that he's there, it's
unlikely that he's there.
Perhaps a definition of this order is more useful:
a statement as to the probability of a proposition in
relation to what is known, whether objectively or subject¬
ively
I will, at any rate, attempt to demonstrate that epistemic
modality is involved in expressions of the I know-type as
wellas in what are more generally termed epistemic, i.e. the
it's possible-type. This I discuss in § 7.1.1. In addition,
I shall examine the use of modal verbs like may (§ 7.1.2).
Modal adverbs like maybe, perhaps, etc., and so-called
'logical modality' are discussed in § 8.
7.1.1 I observe first that the syntax of the I know and









































( he'll be there.






Furthermore there seems to be no restriction on aspect
forms or on action-type (cp. § 2.1.1) or voice (cp. § 7.2
on deontics).














fthe licence expires tomorrow,
he's reading a book,
he's fetching a hat.
his clothes are drying out.
the house belongs to him.
he's singing,





J the stone was moved,
j he received a phone call.I he was phoned up.
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Two points may, however, be noted with regard to negation.
1) know and certain, when negated, and doubt, when not
negated, can appear with if/whether complements:
When know is negated, it has (apart from a denial interpret¬
ation) the meaning of doubt. (This should be compared with
the use of if/whether in reporting yes/no questions (§ 12.1.3)
2) suspect, guess are not susceptible to negation (except
when the negation is a denial: 'It's not the case that I
suspect/guess' as in:
7.4. I don't (just) suspect it, I know it.
This suggests that these items may have a different status
from the rest. And certain restrictions on tense-form in
the complement may be discovered when the tense form of the
complementizing clause is not present.













I ' 11 believe( that
know/ ]
*he will be there.
*he is going to be there.
*he's there.(46)
*he has been there,
he was there,
he had been there.
he would be there,
he was going to be there.
?*he'll be there.
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When the tense-form of the epistemic expression is past,
we find tense forms in the complement that are typical of
reported statements. Compare:
7.6a. I said: "He'll be there."




b. I said he would be there.
he was going to be there,
he was there,
he'd been there.
When the tense-form of the epistemic expression is future
(will or be going to-forms), we have a strong feeling that
this tense-form is dependent upon other factors, an if-clause
or unexpressed condition, for example. Compare:
7.7a. I'm going to think that he's there if I see
his hat in the hall, aren't I?
b. So, he'll come home at 10 o'clock, and I'll
know that he's there from the signal you
give me ...
A combination of future tense-form in both complementizing
expression and complement is impossible or at best extremely
marginal. This I think is consistent with the claim I am
about to make.
What is characteristic of reported speech (cp. § 12.1) is
that a statement is being made or a question is being posed
about a question, a command or a statement. This is essen¬
tially different from actually making a statement about the
world. Similarly, saying: I believed he was there is making
a statement about a state of belief, while: I believe he's
(47)
there may itself be the expression of a belief.
There seem to be syntactic and semantic parallels between
'performative utterances' like I claim ..., etc. and ex¬
pressions like: I believe, think : both normally only
(49)
have a present simple tense-form ; and both have a time-
reference which is co-extensive with the moment of speaking.
But time-reference seems to be almost incidental. This is
not the case, for example, when a perfect tense-form is used:
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_ [ he'll be there.(known ) \ he' s going to be there.
7.8a. ?* I' ve •< believed y that/ he's there.
thought J | he was there.1 he'd been there.
b. I
/'he'll be there.
(known ^ , l he's going to be there,believed , f?r at,l0"g^ there.
/ thought ) time that he was there.
\ he'd be there.
Here time-reference is essential, so essential that a time
adverbial is obligatory (cp. 8b). In this case, again, we
have statements about states of knowledge, belief, etc.
even though they may entail the validity of the expression
of knowledge, belief, etc.
7.8'. I've known for a long time that he's there.
-> I know he's there.
I claim, therefore, that epistemic expressions of the I know-
type are 'tense-less' (in the sense of 'tense' discussed in
§ 2.2) and as such allow all manner of time reference in
their complements. When, however, verbs like: think, know,
etc. are used in statements about states of knowledge, they
themselves are tensed and thus restrict the tense-form poss¬
ibilities (i.e. tense (t^) and time reference (t^)) of their
complements: sequence of tense rules apply.
Let me now suggest how we may analyze the epistemic express¬
ions discussed above. Since it is claimed that the I think-
type is 'tenseless', I rule out an analysis assigning it to
Prop and its associated t^. This leaves 111 and Mod with
associated tQ and t^ respectively. I believe that the I think-
type should be assigned to Mod (or rather factors involved
in this type should be assigned to Mod) and that the it is
possible-type should be assigned to Mod and Prop.
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Let me argue the second part of this claim first. It is
possible-type epistemics may also be regarded as 'tenseless',
as I argue in more detail in § 9.3.1. But there are condit¬
ions under which tensing can occur; it would be better, per¬
haps, to say 'unmarked for tense' rather than 'tenseless'.
If something is unmarked for tense, we can say that t^ is
not specified with respect to tQ. I suggest therefore that
the 'tense' of the it is possible-type is to be associated
with t^. On the other hand, as pointed out in §§ 8.2 and
8.3, the it is possible-type of epistemic makes a statement
about the objective likelihood, or what the speaker presents
as objective likelihood, of its complement being true — the
I think-type is, in contrast, subjective.
Mod, as defined in § 1.1.1 ("the speaker's conceptualization
of, or orientation towards, the proposition contained in
the utterance") was said to include both a tense system t.
and a potentiality system TC^. I suggest that the "T"C^ system
relates to subjective modality, where the speaker's accept¬
ance of something as being likely, his conceptualization of
it as a 'possible world', is foremost, and that objective
modality is to be viewed as part of Prop. Notice that with
it is possible the speaker is not committed to accepting the
proposition as part of his 'view of the world': It's possible
that he's there, but I don't believe it. The case of the
I think-type of epistemic expression is more complex. I
shall pose four questions which will go some of the way to¬
ward revealing their nature.
1) Does the speaker commit himself to the truth of the
proposition p?
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2) Has the speaker come to a conclusion about p?
3) What modality can be assigned to the expression?
4) Is this modality subjective or objective?
The first question enables us to distinguish I know and
I believe from the rest of the I think-paradigm — the same
criterion would separate it is obvious and it is clear from
other items in the it is possible-paradigm.
The second question enables us to distinguish those items
that are 'evidential'. It seems to me that I suppose he's
there is deductive in much the same way as He must have
been there (cp. § 7.1.2). The same applies to I guess (in
its, at least originally, American use) and to I suppose.
I am not certain whether it applies, however, to suspect
and don't suppose. Perhaps suspect is used both deductively
and non-deductively, meaning, in the latter case, something
like: 'I think it just possible.'
Don't suppose, it seems, has two uses, one which may be logic¬
ally equivalent to: suppose not (cp. § 10.1) but which is
more accurately paraphrased 'I think/it seems unlikely',
and one which is apparently illocutionarily distinct, since
it implies a question, as in:
7.9. I don't suppose he's there, is he?
Questions three and four may be taken together. Here we
may group together I am certain, I am sure and I know as
expressions of subjective certainty, which I shall represent
by d , the symbol otherwise used for (logical) necessity in
logical notation (cp. below). I__doubt , I'm not sure and
I'm not certain are subjective uncertainty ^p. And I don' t
doubt is doubly negated certainty /V/V which is equivalent
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to 0. The remaining items^I think, I believe, I don't
think, I don't believe, I suppose, I don't suppose, I_
guess, I suspect^I assign, since they don't involve either
certainty or uncertainty but non-certainty, to subjective
possibility, which I symbolize V (cp. below). The case of
I believe requires some comment, since it is commonly felt
to be 'stronger' than I think. This might be a reason for
saying that I believe represents subjective probability,
since it cannot represent subjective certainty. Compare:
7.10a. /'I'm not certain
I believe there's a God, but^ fS *I I don't know
there is.
b. ?* I know there's a God, but I'm not certain there
is.
I think, however, the fact that I believe is felt to be
(51)
'stronger' than I think is attributable to the speaker's
(subjective) commitment to the truth of p, which is not to
be confused with any greater certainty. (It may be noted that
I am sure, while representing subjective certainty, does not
commit the speaker to the truth of p.)
Objective modality is relevant in the case of I suppose, I
don't suppose, I guess and I suspect, which, as I understand
them, involve varying estimations of the likelihood of p
being true. Notice that I suspect can be fairly closely
paraphrased by: 'I think it (very) possible'. In all the
other cases, it is the truth or non-truth of p that the
speaker expresses an attitude to. These are represented •
and 'v/-respectively, following Lyons notation (Lyons 1 977).
Returning to the it is possible-type, most of the items in
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the paradigm can be assigned values in terms of p , y and
/v/ under objective modality. In the case of it is conceivable
and it is inconceivable I am inclined to think that they
represent subjective modality, and are thus distinguished
from it is possible and it is impossible respectively.
My analysis of the data discussed in this section is present¬
ed in Table I. It should be borne in mind that I am referring
only to cases where the items are used to reveal a prepos¬
itional attitude towards p, not where they are used to assert
that the speaker has a particular propositional attitude.
My choice in the table of V f°r possibility rather than the
generally accepted Peano-Russell ^ (actually introduced by
Lewis) is motivated by the desirability of having mirror-
image symbols for terms in a symmetric relationship: since
it will be necessary to introduce 'necessity' as a term in
§ 7.1.2, it is convenient to express the relationship be¬
tween possibility and necessity asr-^V^ = Ar where ^ stands
for necessity.
Where it is necessary to represent probability I have done
this with 'likely' rather than introduce a further symbol.
As I have already pointed out (§ 6.2.4) and will discuss
further in § 7.1.2, I regard probability to be a modification
4T T -4. (52)of possibility.
It can be seen from the table that a number of items turn
out to be synonymous. This is, I think, arguably correct,
even for I don't think and I don't believe, where the dis¬
tinction between think and believe appears not to hold.
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7.1.2 I turn now to 'synthetic' epistemic expressions,
those involving modal verbs and other constructions where
there is no overt two-clause structure (cp. those of § 7.1.1)
I will take the same kind of test-frame. Where I find a
form totally uninterpretable I have used *, but where only
an epistemic interpretation is excluded I have used brackets,
thus: [was supposed to]. Where I have written ?*, I mean
that an epistemic interpretation is conceivable given more
context, an if-clause or adverbial, for example. Marginal-
ness is shown by: ?
Table I
subjective objective commitment evidential
modality modality to T of p
think V .
believe V . ( + )
know □ . +
doubt -□ • / i
don't think 7 rv
don't believe 7 V
don't know ~a • /i
don't doubt o
suppose V likely +
don't suppose V /^likely +
guess V likely +
suspect V V
am sure n .
am certain a •
am not sure ~a .
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jetzt da zu sein.
jetzt da.
It should be noted that German has a stronger tendency to¬
wards impersonalized constructions than English, especially
when the modality could be described as 'logical'. Thus the
following items which are unacceptable or else not epistemic-
ally interpretable in 11b would be acceptable in the follow¬
ing paradigm:
(kannmag Vsein L,daB erPmuB J T jetztmuB (durchaus) nicht sein \ da ist.Pbraucht nicht (unbedingt) zu sein
- 2 2 6a
The use of braucht nicht even in this construction would be
unidiomatic (cp. the comment on needn't below). More idio¬
matic even than muB nicht is: es ist nicht gesagt, dafi er
jetzt da ist.
Acceptability may also be improved by the addition in some
cases of a modal adverb, for example:
7.11b". ( muB
Er -s wird V jetzt wohl da sein.
( + mag J
Er sollte jetzt eigentlich da sein.
Er muB nicht unbedingt jetzt da sein.
Other modal adverbs frequently found in combination with
modal verbs in German are: wirklich, schon.
In 11a I have excluded interpretations of now as 'by now'
instead of 'at this moment': 'by now' would introduce an
aspectual factor. When we incorporate aspectual forms in
the paradigm, we find that acceptability largely involves































































have lost the money.
das Geld verloren haben.
das Geld verloren zu haben,
das Geld verloren.
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From these paradigms it seems we have a hard core of mod¬
al expressions which may be interpreted epistemically.
These are:
may, might, can, could, must, ought to, should, seem to,
appear to, be bound to, be said to, needn't and durfte,
kann, konnte, mag, mochte, mufi, miiBte, wird, sollte,
scheinen.
Some of these items seem to be subject to individual re¬
strictions, so they may not occur in all test frames. Other
items may also have epistemic interpretations under apparent¬
ly restricted conditions.
A word needs to be said about the epistemicity of seem,
appear and scheinen, and also of be said to, soil, sollte.
These items are not generally included under the term 'epis¬
temic' but they are generally included under its partial
equivalent in certain German works on modality (Duden 1973,
for example) 'subjektiv', which is not to be confused with
'subjective modality' as used here. Since they indicate a
restriction on the validity of p, just as epistemic may and
must do, and since they have nothing to do with authority
or, I think, disposition, it seems correct to include them
under the somewhat broader definition of 'epistemic' that
I have given in § 7.1.0. Unlike some of the other modal
verbs generally associated with 'epistemicity', they are
'evidential' in the sense of § 7.1.1, and moreover, they
specify more precisely than other items the basis of the
evidence, the appearance of things in the case of seem, etc.,
hearsay in the case of be said to. The item be supposed to,
can, I believe, be used in the same sense as be said to,
though its preferred reading is probably deontic.
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Some of the other restrictions in the paradigms may be comm¬
ented on.
i) shall is not epistemic, except, arguably, when the sub¬
ject of the sentence is first person in those dialects with
shall will variants.
ii) had to and to an extent was supposed to are possible as
reports of epistemic modality.
(53)
iii) is to , was to, darf and braucht nicht can general¬
ly only be deontic, mochte may be deontic or dispositional.
Notice that English needn't may be epistemic; this would be
equivalent to mufi nicht in German (cp. § 10.3.1).
iv) German past subjunctive forms, wiirde and English would
appear to require an if-clause or tacit condition to be in-
terpretable. An exception to this are forms like:
Cbe there.
7.13. He would seem to< be coming.
^_have lost the money.
These are somewhat stylized and often associated with irony.
I would classify them as 'tentatives1 cp. § 13.3.1.
v) should, ought to, sollte and muBte are only epistemical-
ly interpretable when their complements express a proposit¬
ion descriptive of:
a) a resulting state f. ex. have arrived
b) an action or event in progress f. ex. be coming
c) a future event or action f. ex. go soon
d) a state f. ex. be there, know
Often, adverbs like by now, already, German schon are pre¬
sent. We do not, most importantly, find a past time-refer¬
ence in the complement. Compare:
7.14a. He must have been there yesterday.
b. ?* He should have been there yesterday, (not epis¬
temic but deontic)
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I also find habitual or iterative complements very marginal.
7.15. ?* He should go there often, (deontic 'advice'
more likely than 'obligation')
vi) can and have to seem to be more easily interpretable
as epistemics when they are contrastively stressed:
7.16a. He can have been there,
b. He has to have done it.
Otherwise there seem to be restrictions of a not very ob¬
vious nature on can and have to as epistemics.
The following are to me examples of idiomatic uses of them:
7.17a. He can have lost all his money.
b. He can be on his way right now for all I know.
c. Things like that can happen.
d. Drunken driving can be dangerous.
e. That has to be the biggest fiasco in the history
of commercial aviation.(54)
f. X has to be true if Y is true. (cp. § 8.3.1)
If we accept that the following semantic equivalences hold
between infinitive complements and complement clauses:
infinitive E present tense, will future
continuous infinitive — present continuous
perfect infinitive = present perfect, simple past
perfect continuous infinitive = present perfect continuous
then the range of complementation with modal verbs like may
is not in essence different from that with expressions like
it is possible. Ross (1969), amongst others, uses this as
evidence for an underlying two clause structure for sentences
with modal verbs. A more pertinent conclusion, given my
theoretical orientation, is that both types of expression
should be analyzed in terms of the same configuration in
semantic specification. It is with this premiss that I now
attempt to classify the items exemplified in this section
in terms related to the analysis of § 7.1.1.
There are three points we need to clarify. First, there is,
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in my view, a distinction between certainty and necessity.
It will be recalled that I distinguished certainty, symbol¬
ized □ , in § 7.1.1. Certainty is expressed by forms like
be bound to, whereas necessity is usually associated with
must and have to. In fact, in the case of must, 'necessity'
is perhaps not the most transparent classification; 'necess¬
ary deduction' or 'necessary conclusion' would be better.
I suggest that necessity is within the same system as poss¬
ibility and that the expression comes closest to specify¬
ing it. (Recall here the expression of necessity in Hopi
and Chinese by means of negative impotential cp. § 3.1.5)
Certainty is, I think, outside the system that includes
possibility. Notice the following relations:
It is certain that he's coming -f-> He is necessarily coming.
He is necessarily coming It is certain that he is coming.
These I maintain exclude equating necessity with certainty.
The second point is the status of 'probability' or 'likeli¬
hood'. Here, I suggest, we have a modification of possibil¬
ity (cp. Leech's (1969) analysis). Just as may well indi¬
cates greater probability than may, which I assume to be
on the same level as it is possible, the form it is conceiv¬
able seems to indicate a lesser degree of probability than
it is possible (cp. § 6.2.4). Might also indicates lesser
probability than may. Thus there seems to be, within the
possibility system, the possibility of further modification.
The third point concerns the status of forms like should
and ought to. Although they clearly indicate greater likeli¬
hood than may, I do not think they are to be seen as ex-
pressions of probability; they do not paraphrase may well
or German dtirfte. On the other hand, they do not express
certainty like be bound to or will. And they do not seem
to be evidential in the same way as must, for instance.
Their epistemic use is, I believe, an expression of a ten¬
tative prediction about states of affairs. And we may per¬
haps view them as indicating a lesser degree of certainty
than will; 'certainty' is in fact modifiable, compare:
7.18a. He's absolutely certain to see her.
b. He's fairly sure to see her.
My one reservation about this claim is that the following
are not strong paraphrases:
7.19a. It's fairly certain they've arrived,
b. They should have arrived.
Let me summarize the system of modality, as I see it, in










We should consider finally which of the 'synthetic' epistemic
expressions represent subjective modality and which repre¬
sent objective modality. The obvious cases of objective mod¬
ality are: be said to, be supposed to, be thought to and
sollen. In view of the fact that seem, appear and scheinen
seem to be compatible with a contradictory subjective mod-
ality, there is a case fo regarding them as objective mod¬
ality. Consider:
7.20. He seems to have left, but I'm not sure he has.
This classification, however, is not as clear-cut as that
of be said to, etc.
In Table 11,1 list the specifications of the items discuss¬
ed in this section. I have not distinguished subjective and
objective modality in this table because in some cases it
is very difficultto determine. Perhaps the majority of
the items are susceptible to both interpretations. Those
that I believe to be exclusively used for objective modal¬
ity are: needn't, seem to, appear to, be said to, be supposed
to, be thought to, may well, mogen, sollen, scheinen. I also
believe that can, should, ought to and sollte are typically











ought to A weakened
should A weakened
will a
be bound to a
needn't ~A
seem to V +
appear to V +
be said to V +
be supposed to V +
be thought to ^ +











§ 7.2 The syntax and semantics of deontic
7.2.0 Strictly speaking, deontic expressions are those
relating to moral or ethical constraints dependent on some
authority. And it is in this sense that I use the term
here; I include under 'dispositional' (§ 7.3) expressions
like: be able, be willing and certain senses of can and
will, etc. I do not adopt, therefore, the position of those
like Newmeyer 1970 who classify all non-epistemically in¬
terpreted modals as "root" modals.
7.2.1 I shall take first paradigms based on the construc¬
tions: I require/permit ... and X be required/permitted ...
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The use of the first construction is typically performative;
that of the second typically descriptive.
In the following paradigms I have marked as questionable
all forms that would require additional linguistic context







*you will be there.
*you are going to be there,
(?)you are there,
you be there.
?*you have been there.
*you were there.
*you had been there,
you should be there.
The ? in front of permit and forbid reflects the fact that
that-complementation is idiomatically odd, at the very least,




7.22 I ^ order / you
forbid
requestJ
cp. * I demand you to be there.
*to be going to be there,
to be there.
?*to have been there.
The restriction to be seen on the form of the complement,
which reflects time-reference, is repeated in the paradigm












A few of these permit another construction:






, . \ ?*are going topermitted be there.
7.24. It isi rec5u:Lre s that you\ Pare there.1 requested f Y 1 he there.
expec e J j should be there.
*have been there.
We have, then, complementation patterns that involve either
accusative + infinitive or that + subjunctive (or subjunct¬
ive substitute:should). The time-reference of the comple¬
ment construction (whether infinitive or subjunctive) seems
to be either present or future, but not the predictive
future associated with will, which has been analyzed as
future under Mod. In the case of performative interpretat¬
ions, it is necessarily future, because it is inconceivable
that the act of obligating or permitting should be contem¬
poraneous with what is obligated or permitted. Likewise, it
is inconceivable that obligating or permitting should follow
in time what is obligated or permitted - hence there is no
past time reference in the complement construction. In:
7.25a. I permit you to go now.
b. I think he's going now.
the now of 25a refers not to the moment of speaking (t )
but to a moment directly subsequent to the moment of speak¬
ing, cp. 25b. And in:
7.26a. I require you to have finished your homework
by 7 o'clock,
b. You are requested to have left by midnight.
the perfect infinitive denotes a completed action in the
future. A completed action in the past may not be denoted
by a perfect infinitive when the deontic expression is pre¬
sent :
7.27a. * I require you to have left already.
b. * You are requested to have left yesterday.
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A progressive infinitive, too, is only acceptable when its
temporal reference is future, not present or past. (It
may, however, - marginally - refer to habitual action,
but then, I think, the interpretation of forms like: I re¬
quire cannot be performative.)
7.28a. I require you to be washing the floor when I
get back tomorrow.
b. * I require you to j ^ave been ]washi-n9 t*16 floor
when I saw you last night.
c. I require you to be washing the floor every
morning at 6 a.m. (but you never are).
These restrictions on tense-form and hence time-reference
resemble very much those to be observed with imperative
constructions (cp. § 2.2). Consider:
7.29a. Go there now!
b. Go there tonight!
c. Be washing the floor when I get back!
d. * Have left by midnight!
e. * Have done your homework by 7 o'clock!
f. Have your homework done by 7 o'clock!
One difference may be seen in the fact that deontic con¬
structions allow both: have done x and have x done with
transitive verbs of accomplishment, while the imperative
appears only to allow the latter.
I mentioned above that an iterative interpretation of the
infinitive construction may be possible. It seems, however,
that there is a definite bias towards non-iterative inter¬
pretations. This is not the case with epistemic expressions.
Compare:
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7.30a. It's possible] (goes there]
iH 1I think y (is going the
often.
all the time.





b. I require you f go there
You're requiredj" (^be going there|t^°^
It's possible*]., ,, J ?*sometime.
-r ... i > he goes there AI think J L f°r once.
I require you , , , fsometime.
■ • j r to go there J ^You re required/ (for once.
c.
d.
I said above that expressions like: I require are typically
performative. This, of course, is not the case in most non-
present tense forms of I require ^ ^ . It may perhaps be
the case with the present continuous form: I am requiring
(contrary to the claims of Austin 1962, Searle 1969 and
many others). It is also possible, though, as I suggested
above, not typical for the passive construction: You are
required ..., etc. to be performative.
It is, I believe, important to make a distinction between
performative and non-performative interpretations. A non-
performative interpretation of the deontic expression also
allows an iterative or habitual interpretation:
7.31. You are A > required to go.(^usually^) ^ ^
Notice that this kind of temporal quantification is dis¬
tinct from that of the complement construction:
7.31'. You are^^g^ays^ required to go there.
f You are required to "^ag^ay9° there.
This seems to be a difference between this kind of descript
ive deontic expression and a (presumably) descriptive epis-
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temic expression. Compare:
7.32a. It'si*?*°ften I possible that-ft8'3 goi"g there"^ always I c (Jie goes there.
b. It's possible thatif;3'3/1"^3 goi"g there"c \ he always goes there.
The usual interpretation of always in 32a is not as a tem¬
poral quantifier but as a modal intensifier: 'it's certain¬
ly/in any case possible ...'. Notice, however, that temporal
quantification seems to be perfectly normal in the case of
expressions like:
falways J
7.33. It'sJ often ^possible for him to go.
( seldom \
There is, I would suggest, a parallel to be seen between ex¬
pressions like: you are required to ... and those like: it
is possible for x to .... But expressions like: it is poss¬
ible that ... may also be descriptive, and it seems a reason¬
able hypothesis (cp. § 9.1.2) that descriptive modal ex¬
pressions are to be analyzed as a part of Prop. If this is
so, how are those expressions which are capable of temporal
quantification to be distinguished from those that are not.
It will be recalled that I claimed in § 2.2.4 that multiple
time reference is possible under Prop. I suggest that the
analysis of descriptive: You are required to... and it is
possible for x to ... involves a double 9 under Prop while
that of descriptive: it is possible that ... involves a
single 9 modified by an ipso facto tenseless quasi-predicate.
My discussion of the analysis of non-descriptive modal ex¬
pressions is contained in § 9.1 on tense, where I also fur¬
ther discuss the difference between: it is possible that ...
and it is possible for x to .... It may, however, be mention-
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ed here that an analysis of epistemic expressions as 'tense-
less' and of deontic expressions as being present tense un¬
der Mod is plausible in the light of the pattern of their
descriptive counterparts. I shall leave further discussion
of the analysis of deontic expressions, particularly the
semantic differentiation of the items in the paradigms, to
§§ 7.2.2 and 7.2.3.
7.34a.
b.
You / V learn French.?*be learning French.
?*have learned French.
7.2.2 I turn now to expressions of deontic modality of a
'synthetic' nature. Here there is a certain amount of vari¬
ation in the paradigms according to which grammatical person
the subject of the sentence represents. I shall take para¬
digms with II subjects to preserve the parallel with the






























You be at the meeting.
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Forms with progressive and perfect infinitives are, I
would suggest, uninterpretable without further context,
usually in the form of a temporal adverbial referring to
future time such as: when I come home or: by the time I
(57)








































brauchst nicht (unbedingt) in der Sitzung
(zu) sein.V
I have not included wollen and wollte in these German para¬
digms since their meaning is clearly not deontic in the
strict sense (cp. § 7.3.0).
On the impossible or marginal forms in the English and
German paradigms we may note:
(i) would, wtirde and probably diirfte are restricted to
id-clauses or other counterfactual contexts.
(ii) daren't is probably acceptable, though rare and some-
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what old-fashioned. Its use is perhaps further restricted
by the kind of action or situation involved in the comple¬
ment expression; it is more easily interpretable with:
be at the meeting than with: learn French.
(iii) many of the items are ambiguous between performative
and non-performative interpretations; others favour one
or the other. This I will take up again below.
(iv) in the case of mochte, there is an interpretation
possible when an indirect speech context is involved, as
in: Er sagte, du mochtest in der Sitzung sein.
But I don't think there is an interpretation of mochte
without such ellipsis in non-conditional structures.
(v) there is a possible interpretation of would as:
'you insisted ...'. This I discount here, since it is not
strictly deontic (cp. § 7.3.0).
(vi) konnte is either conditional or else requires the
support of durchaus (Franzosisch lernen) or wenigstens
(in der Sitzung sein) to give a tentative meaning. Similar¬
ly, miifite requires wirklich, eigentlich, wohl, schon for a
tentative meaning (cp. § 13.3.1).



































I be at the meeting.
/Franzosisch lernen.


































[in der Sitzung zu sein.
J learn French,
[be at the meeting.
/Franzosisch lernen.
[in der Sitzung sein.
/Franzosisch zu lernen.
[in der Sitzung zu sein,
The paradigms with Ill-subjects do not vary a great deal
from those with II-subjects. The reason for my informants'
hesitation about konnte is, I think, that some adverbial
support is needed, as in:
7.33d'. Sie konnte wenigstens in der Sitzung sein.
The interpretation of this is, however, not one of 'per¬
mission', but of 'minimal requirement'. Similar consider¬
ations might apply to could. With I-subjects, there is
considerably greater restriction. Although will and shall
may normally co-occur with I to give an epistemic sense or,
when stressed, a volitional/intentional sense, they do not
normally co-occur with I in a deontic sense - they may with
II and III. The reason for this, I suggest, is to be found
in the similarity of deontic will and shall (with II and
III subjects) to imperative utterances, in which first
person commands are also excluded (except, of course, for
hortatives like: let's ... cp. § 11.2.3).
The reason why may is also assigned ? is probably connected
with the fact that may (of all deontically interpretable
modals) tends to be used mainly in a performative way; it
is odd to grant oneself permission to do something.
Intuitions in the case of mag are not clear. Its deontic
use is considerably restricted, very much context-dependent
and often old-fashioned, except in certain fixed express¬
ions: Das mag wohl sein, aber ... i.e. 'That may be so,
but ...'. The commonest use, as in this example, is con¬
cessive :
7.37. Das mag sie dieses eine Mai machen.
cp. She can do it just this once (but ...)
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There is, of course, also a dispositional sense as in 38a:
7.38a. Sie mag gern Kaffee trinken.
b. Sie trinkt gern Kaffee.
where the addition of gern is more or less obligatory, but
even this is unusual, 38b being more idiomatic.
The comments I made concerning performative interpretations
and the relationship to imperative utterances in § 7.2.1
are equally relevant here. Most of the items discussed in
this section may be interpreted performatively and non-
performatively. It is difficult to construct contexts where
only one or the other interpretation is possible. In the
following paradigm I attempt to isolate those items that
can have a non-performative interpretation. The context
I am thinking of is one where the speaker reminds the
addressee of an existing obligation or commitment, not























The pattern of * and ?* etc. here does not really reflect
one's intuitions that certain items, namely: can, be to,
have to, have got to, needn't (and one not included here:
be supposed to) are much more usual in the context than
others. In particular, must and may are for me not obvious
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choices as a means for expressing an existing obligation
or allowance.
A reason why certain modal verbs are excluded in the
above paradigm and yet lend themselves to performative
interpretations lies perhaps in what may be called 'speak¬
er-orientation 1 . It has been pointed out by Larkin 1969
that must and have to differ in respect to such a feature.
Compare:
7.40a. It's ridiculous that my daughter ^"has^toj be
home by ten.
b. I say my daughter^ has^to^ ^ome ^y ten.
It appears that must is preferable in 40b where the speak¬
er is the source of the obligation, (though have to is not
excluded), while in 40a have to is preferable (and must
would sound strange in my dialect) when the source of the
obligation is not the speaker - it would be somewhat contra¬
dictory if the speaker, who comments on the ridiculousness
of the situation, were also the source of the obligation.
This 'speaker-orientation' can be seen in must and may but
it seems to be a necessary feature in the case of will and
shall:
7.40a'. It's ridiculous that my daughter^ is^allowed tc
b'. I say that my daughter ^ is"^aii0wed to^ stay
out to all hours.
a". It's ridiculous that my daughter ^?*will~y
I say that my daughter 1 ^ome t>y ten.b" .
The reason for ?* against will in 40a" is that there are
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other possible interpretations of will apart from the
dubious deontic interpretation (cp. § 11.2.1).
7.2.3 I come now to an analysis of the modal items dis¬
cussed in the foregoing sections. Two terms of the ana¬
lysis, namely 'performativity' and 'speaker-orientation',
have already been mentioned. There are two further aspects
of the analysis to be discussed.
First, we may distinguish between deontic expressions that
involve the authority of society or individuals over the
referent of the sentence subject and those that involve the
rights of the referent of the sentence subject vis-a-vis
society. Under the latter I would include daren't, be allow¬
ed , be entitled; a number of items, should, had better, be
requested, be supposed, appear to be ambivalent - on the
one hand authority is imposed, on the other hand the in¬
dividual's rights as a free being are conceded.
Secondly, we should discuss the nature of deontic modality.
I will propose that we set up a further system under Mod
symbolized % , which is configurationally very similar to TV
but which has certain essential notional differences. In
the first instance, it is possible to establish 'categoric-
alness' parallel to certainty in the TV system. It is also
possible, I believe, to establish 'requirement', 'concession'
and 'prohibition' parallel to 'necessity' 'possibility'
and 'impossibility' in the TV-system. There is, however, an
important difference: in the TV-system it is 'possibility'
that is modifiable into 'probability' and 'bare possibility';
in the ^-system, it appears, 'requirement' is the readily
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modifiable element. Thus we have varying degrees of 're¬
quirement' in:
7.41a. You have to go.
b. You ought to go.
c. You'd better go.
Compare this with 'possibility':
7.42a. He might (just) go.
b. He may go.
c. He's (very) likely to go.
Moreover, it seems impossible to grade 'concession' (with¬
out) introducing conditional structures). Compare:
7.43a. You may go, John.
b. You might (just) go, John.
c. You may certainly go, John.
Permission is either granted or it is not: there are no
half-way stages. This doesn't mean, of course, that the
way it is granted is always the same; it can be granted
willingly or unwillingly, which is probably the case in 43c.
In 43b, the only interpretation I find that does not in¬
volve 'concession' is a "hedged" 'requirement' (to use
the notion of 'hedging' to be found in Fraser 1973 and
Lakoff 1972).
A probable consequence of this claim is that 'requirement'
is in a way more fundamental to the ^-system, while 'poss¬
ibility' is more fundamental to theTf-system. This confirms
Lyons' findings (Lyons 1977, pp. 802, 840). The similarity
I noted between deontic expressions and imperatives would
support this hypothesis, but I have no hard evidence to
offer for it.
In Table III I list the items dealt with in § 7.2 and the
analysis I make of them in terms of the discussion above.
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I have taken □ as the modality of 'categoricalness', A
as that of 'obligation'/'requirement' and V as that of
'concession'/'permission'.
It will be seen from the table that certain features
appear to be linked together, performativity with speak¬
er-orientation , ^ -modality with concession of the indi¬
vidual's rights or free will, for example. That this is
not always the case makes it necessary to keep the fea¬




modality orientation authority of rights performative
require A + +
demand a + +
insist a + + ? _
permit v + +
order a + +
forbid A ~ + + -
request Aweakened + + +
command n + +
be allowed V +
be permitted V +
be obliged A + -
be required A +
be requested A + +
be entitled V - + -
be expected Aweakened + ? + -
be designated □ +
be compelled □ + -
be ordered n +
be supposed A + ?+ -
must A + +
ought to Aweakened + +
shall □ + + + (*) +
should Aweakened + +
will □ + + +
can V
could V + ? +
may V + +
might V + ? +
be to a. +
have to A +
had better Aweakened +
needn't ~A - ( + )
daren1t -
miissen A +
miiBte Aweakened + +
sollen n +





werden a + +
nicht brauchen ~A - (+)
haben + zu □ +
* in the promissive sense of shall cp. § 7.3
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§ 7.3 The syntax and semantics of dispositional expressions
7.3.0 In § 7.2 I distinguished strictly deontic inter¬
pretations from dispositional interpretations. By 'dis¬
positional' I mean referring to the state of being, mind,
etc. of an individual. In semantic terms, we may distin¬
guish a number of types of dispositional expressions:
first, between 'external' and 'internal' disposition, cp.
I want him to go vs. I want to go; second, between speaker's
actual disposition and reported dispositions, cp. I want
you to go vs. I wanted him to go that day; third, between
volitional and non-volitional expressions, cp. be willing
vs. be able; and fourth, between a strictly descriptive
(and non-modality) use and a 'conversational' use such as
I noted in § 3.2.3, cp. He wants to get a hair-cut vs. You
want to get a hair-cut, my boy 1
I doubt that I can do justice to all types of dispositional
expression, and concentrate therefore on those that are
immediately relevant to the categories 111 and Mod. I also
concentrate largely on English.
7.3.1 Although 'analytic' expressions of dispositions be¬
long to two syntactic types in English, I don't think there
is any significance in the difference. The first type is


















Those in 44a contrast with performatives like: I promise,
with action verbs like: try, manage, fail, and, of course,
with 'epistemic' expressions like: I know. Those in 44b
contrast with 'epistemic' expressions like: I am likely
to go and 'deontic' expressions like: I am required to go.
With the exception of tend, which I suspect to be a verb
(58)
of action frequency , and the possible exception of
plan, all the items in the above paradigms are typically
stative, the referent of the subject of the sentence be¬
ing the 1experiencer' or location of the state.
The syntax of the complements of dispositional expressions
is very complex. Without going into too much detail here
(I discuss complementation in § 12.2), we may distinguish
certain important patterns: tend and dare of the verbs and
be able, be apt, be liable, be prone and be capable cannot
express 'external' dispositions - the case of be inclined
is marginal.
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(, k) ( for him to go.^endV ^ him to go.(59)areJ ^ that he will go.
(ableapt I ffor him to go.liable f (^that he will/shall/should go.prone )capable of his/him going,
c. ?* I am inclined for him to go. ^
In the case of the verb forms, there are further restrict¬
ions: want and need do not permit that-complements; need
is dubious with for + NP + to-complements, while hope and
plan cannot occur with NP + to-complements. Thus:
7.46a. * I ^need}" will/shall/should 9° •
b. ? I need for him to go.
c. * I ^ him to go.
We can exclude at this point dispositional expressions that
cannot be 'external' as candidates for assignment to Mod,
since 'internal' dispositional expressions can only refer
to the referent of the sentence subject who may only in¬
cidentally be the speaker: they do not refer directly to
the speaker and his orientation within the speech situation,
When we examine the time-reference possibilities of dispos¬
itional expressions, we find no real restriction except in
the case of adjective forms when the tense-form is continu¬




^He'll have been being willing
He'll have been willing
■ He's going to have been willing
SHe'll be being willing
He's being willing
He was being willing





He'll have been wanting
He'll have wanted
He's going to have wanted
s He'll be wanting
He's wanting
He was wanting
^He had been wanting
This cannot be explained away by anything like Ross*
'double-ing' constraint (Ross 1972), since non-continuous
forms would remain unexplained, as would the dubiousness
of: ?* He'll be being prepared to go. Stativity does not
seem to be a reason either, since there is no apparent
difference with respect to stativity in the case of want,
which patterns differently.
The tense and time reference of the complement seems to be

















Pdetermined C \?have been working.
Presolved J




, c, J ?wan^s / fhave worked,d. She < Pneeds N to S , , , .
I Pexpects ( (have been working.
Pplans I
^ Pwishes )
Adding ... when you come home to continuous forms and by
then to perfect forms considerably improves their inter-
pretability. The essential point, however, is that all the
tense forms in the complement refer to the future and the
aspect forms to aspectual distinctions relating to future
(61)
events, actions and states . This is similar to the
pattern observed with deontics and in contrast to that ob¬
served with epistemics.
There is, however, one exception to this claim, and that
is need, which can also, like be able and be capable, have
a complement which is interpretable in terms of past time-
reference. There is then, here, a similarity with epistemics,
''needs to have left at 10 yesterday in
order to have arrived this morning.
^ 5q she-\ ~'"s ak^e i-° have been leaving just as the
bell rang.
is capable of having left in the middle
of his speech.
We should perhaps also not be liable in this connection, as
it is quite closely paraphrasable as an epistemic express¬
ion .
7.51. She's liable to have laughed at him.
7.51'. 'I think it quite likely that she laughed at
him' .
Here it seems that a dispositional expression includes an
epistemic modality (more precisely, it entails a subjective
epistemic modality). An adequate semantic analysis would
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probably require that the modality (Mod) is supplemented
by a semantic specification under Prop for 'characteristic¬
ally' or something similar. Utterances like: I want you to
leave, however, as I have already pointed out, may on one
interpretation be interpreted as being essentially express¬
ions of deontic modality. I would suggest that this 'deon-
tic' use of dispositional expressions should be analyzed
in terms of a deontic modality and a propositional dispos¬
ition .
Before discussing the analysis of the dispositional express-
(62)
ions discussed here that may still be regarded as mod¬
al, I shall look briefly at the paradigms resulting from
'synthetic' dispositional expressions.
7.3.2 Dispositional interpretations of can and will seem to
be somewhat unstable (cp. my comments on can in § 1.3.1).
Consider:
7.52a. He can swim.
b. He can fetch the book.
c. He can be unpleasant at times.
7.53a. He'll swim.
b. He'll fetch the book.
c. He'll be unpleasant.
Excluding possible deontic and epistemic-temporal interpret¬
ations and following to an extent analyses like those of
Leech (1969) and Palmer (1965), we may gloss the above as
follows:
7.52a'. 'He knows how to swim/is able to swim.'
b". 'He's able to fetch the book.'
c'. 'He tends to be unpleasant at times.
7.53a'. 'He's willing/prepared to swim.'
b'. 'He's willing/prepared to fetch the book.'
c'. ? 'He's willing/prepared to be unpleasant.'
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In the case of 53c the gloss with be willing/prepared is
somewhat unusual and this seems to be because of the nature
of the complement. In fact it seems generally to be the
case that dispositional interpretations rely heavily on the
influence of an amenable context. It is, for example, far
easier to get a dispositional interpretation out of 53c if
for you is added.
There is another use of will which is more obviously dispos-
itionally interpretable. This is emphatically stressed will
as in:
7.54a. He will swim.
b. He will sit there.
c. He will be nasty.
Here the complement normally expresses an habitual action or
behaviour, less often a future action:
7.54d. He will fetch the book, (so don't try stopping
him) .
This use is glossable as 'persists in' or 'insists on'.
As with 'analytic' dispositional expressions, the time ref¬
erence of the complement is restricted to the present or
future (in the case of will, the reference is, of course,
indefinite or future.).
It is claimed that German werden'^' may also have an inter¬
pretation of 'willingness' like English will in utterances
like:
7.55. Er wird's schon tun.
Unlike English will, however, it has no historical relation¬
ship to a verb of volition or desire; it is historically
an inchoative verb (cp. § 3.2.2). If we compare utterances
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containing benefactives in English and German like:
7.56a. He'll sing a song for you if you ask him.
b. Er wird dir ein Lied vorsingen, wenn du ihn
bittest.
7.57a. ?* He wants to sing a song for you if you ask him.
b. ?* Er will dir ein Lied vorsingen, wenn du ihn
bittest.
we can see that will and werden are parallel in their com¬
patibility with a proviso like: 'if you ask him' - and also,
I believe, strong paraphrases in context. The dubiousness
of the proviso with want and wollen, which are also parallel
here, rests on the fact that the volition/desire is a pre¬
sent one: will want or wird ,.. wollen are much more readi¬
ly interpretable:
7.58a. He'll want to sing a song for you if you ask
him.
b. Er wird dir ein Lied singen wollen, wenn du
ihn bittest.
But this throws doubt on the volitional analysis of will
and werden. Even if 56a can be glossed:
7.56a'. 'He's willing to sing a song for you ...'
The equivalent gloss for 58a is not only incorrect but also
non-sensical:
7.58a'. * 'He's willing to want to sing a song for you ...'
I suggest that both will and werden should be analyzed in
terms of futurity, not 'willingness'. That 'willingness' is
(often) a possible interpretation I attribute to a consist¬
ency relationship between future + benefactive and volition
+ benefactive. The meaning of will and werden remains one
of futurity (future modality). Notice how easily a volition¬
al interpretation is lost:
7.56a". He'll sing a song for you, even if he doesn't
want to.
b". Er wird dir ein Lied vorsingen, auch wenn er's
nicht will.
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I exclude will and werden, therefore, from the set of dis¬
positional expressions (but see § 13.2.4). The case for
a
will, as a dispositional expression, however, is not af¬
fected by these considerations.
7.3.3 Having made this important exclusion of will and
werden from the set of volitional expressions, I come now
to a discussion of 'volition', 'intention' and 'require¬
ment' in the analysis of the dispositional expressions I
consider to be primarily modal.
I wish first to distinguish between the expressions: be de¬
termined, be resolved, intend on the one hand and: be will¬
ing , be prepared, want on the other. Apart from intuitions
about the meaning of the items involved (be determined, be
resolved, intend represent a different kind of volition
from be willing, be prepared, want, i.e. 'intention' (where
desire or the individual's wishes are irrelevant) and 'de¬
sire' respectively ^ ^ - both of which seem to be covered
by philosophical notions of volition), we can discover a
semantico-syntactic distinction with regard to negation.
Consider:
7.59a. I'm resolved/determined to go.
b. I'm resolved/determined not to go.
c. I'm not resolved/determined to go.
7.50a. I intend to go.
b. I intend not to go.
c. I don't intend to go.
7.61a. I'm willing/prepared to go.
b. I'm willing/prepared not to go.
c. I'm not willing/prepared to go.
7.62a. I want to go.
, . ( not to go.b. I want < 3
^to not go.
c. I don't want to go.
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The distinction is that 59c and 50c are interpretable as
denials of 59a and 60a respectively, while 61c and 62c
are interpretable as negated modalities (cp. the distinct¬
ion between negation types in § 10.1). In the case of 60c
there is an interpretation equivalent to 60b (what could
be called a case of negative-raising in transformation
terms). And of course, 61c and 62c may also be interpreted
as denials, the essential point being that 59c and 60c can¬
not be interpreted as negated modalities. This situation is
reminiscent of the situation with will.
Despite claims by Leech 1 969 and others that will not
and won' t may both be analyzed as (will'v) and (vwill) cp.
can not and cannot/can' t i.e (can~) and (-v can ) , there is
in fact no way of establishing this distinction with regard
to a dispositional interpretation without recourse to the
rejected paraphrase with 'be willing'. I suggest that the
negation of will represents a negative future tense, just
as don't represents a negative present tense in declarative
utterances. The question of whether this is modal or propos-
itional negation will be discussed in § 10.3.1. There is,
I believe, just one negation - a propositional one - of be
resolved etc., when we exclude denials, which involve propos-
itionalized modalities: 'it is not the case that I am resolv¬
ed (cp. § 10.1).
Let me now examine further the case of be willing, be pre¬
pared and want. I observe first that the negation of be will¬
ing / be prepared in 61c is not equivalent to the negation of
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want in 62c. Consider the following expansions:
7.61c'.?* I'm not willing to go but I will (go).
7.62c'. I don't want to go but I will (go).
What is odd about 61c' is that being not willing, which
amounts to refusing, contradicts the offer or decision to
go. Notice that being not willing is not the same thing
as being unwilling. It seems to me possible to say:
7.61c". I'm unwilling to go but I will (go).
(67)
Be unwilling appears to be a paraphrase of don't want.
The difference between be willing and want with respect
to their complements may be expressed as follows:
want p ~ want ~ p
be willing p -/> " be willing ^p
In other words, be willing p is consistent with be willing
/vp, while want p is inconsistent with want /J p.
The semantic relationship between be resolved, etc. and p
is, I think, a linguistic implication:
be resolved p—p
This is parallel to the semantic relationship between "Y*be to
and p (cp. § 1.3.3).
To pursue these relationships a little further, be willing
is similar in its relationship to p to 'possibility' or may.
Attempting to establish a polar modality system on this
basis gives us:
V be willing.
~V be not willing,
be willing not.
oj be not willing not.
The idiomatic form of 'be not willing not' appears to be
- 262 -
insist. Leech (1969) establishes such a system terming be
willing 'weak volition' (with 47t - the weak constraint)
and insist 'strong volition' (with 2tt - the strong con¬
straint) (cp. § 6.2.3). In addition to this, he terms
want as 'intermediate volition'. Want, however, belongs
to another system in my view. Its negation is significant¬
ly different from that of be willing. Consider the follow¬
ing with suggested glosses:
~want 'unwilling' 'don't want'
want "v 'want not'
/vwant~ 'don't want not'
There seems also to be a weak paraphrase relation between
a, want and want /" . Compare this with the case of 'prob¬
ability ' :
likely f. ex. He's likely to go.
/"likely f. ex. He's not likely to go.
likely~ f. ex. He's likely not to go./He
probably won't go.
/v likely/*' f. ex. He's not likely not to go./
He is likely to go.
It seems, therefore, that we may extend the parallel be¬
tween willingsness and possibility to wanting and prob¬
ability .
I will propose that we set up a system of volitional mod¬
ality ft with the following subsystems.
□ categorical: be resolved/be determined/
intend
<want (= upgraded) (69)be willing/be prepared
~V refusal (= downgraded
A = insistence.
A difference between this and7f-modality seems to be that
the categorical terms be resolved and be determined, unlike
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be certain, cannot be modified, though intend may at least
be down-graded.
7.63a. ? I'm absolutely resolved to go.
b. ? I'm fairly resolved to go.
c. I'm absolutely certain that he's there.
d. I'm fairly certain that he's there.
e. I intend to go.
f. I more or less intend to go.
This may indicate that a further discrimination between
be resolved/determined and intend is necessary. This I shall
not explore.
In the case of "fT-modality and ^-modality I suggested that
the V and A terms respectively (of the polar subsystem) were
more fundamental. In the case of (t?-modality it is difficult
to make such a claim: neither be willing (because of its
'passivity' perhaps) nor insist (because of its emphatic-
ness perhaps) seems to be more fundamental. The most fre¬
quent term is probably want (or one of its variants (cp.
below)).
The remaining items to be discussed are: expect, hope, feel
like, would like, wish and need. These I think we can divide
into three sets: (i) expect, hope; (ii) feel like, would
like, wish; (iii) need. Expect and hope seem to be paired
in more ways than one. Expect is notionally passive, while
hope is, I think, notionally active. Expect does not
necessarily include volition; hope does. Compare:
7.64a. I expect you to go.
b. I expect him to come this afternoon.
c. I expect you'll go.
d. I expect he'll come this afternoon.
The preferred interpretation of 64a is probably:
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7.64a'. 1(In my authoritative capacity,) I consider
your going to be appropriate action.'
while that of 64c and d is:
7.64c'. 'I consider it most likely that you'll go.
d". 'I consider it most likely that he'll come
this afternoon.
64b is interpretable in both ways, i.e.:
7.64b'. 'I consider his coming this afternoon appro¬
priate action.'
b". 'I consider his coming this afternoon very
likely.'(71)
Interpretations of expect like those of 64a' and b' must
be related to deonticity in some way. I would suggest
t' (72
<3~modality A./ but this only covers a part of the meaning.
Interpretations of expect like those of 64b" and c' and d',
however, seem easier to analyze. They involve two essential
factors: i) the speaker's readiness to accept the likeli¬
hood of p; ii) the objective probability of p, (p being:
'he come this afternoon' or 'you go'). There seems to be
a similarity between I expect in this interpretation and
I think and I believe, (cp. § 7.1.1). The difference lies
in the inclination of the speaker to accept/and must, there¬
fore, be equated with the modality of be willing, etc.
rather than that of 'insistence'. In addition to /^-modal¬
ity V, there is the likelihood of p being realized, which
may be classified as: "fT-modality V , with V modified to
'probable'.
Hope in utterances like:
7.65a. I hope to go.
b. I hope you'll be happy.
c. I hope for you to go.
is glossable as something like:
7.65'. 'I want p to be realized but I don't know
that it will.'
Want is stronger that hope in that it makes no reservation
about the realizability of p. I would suggest that its
analysis involves both |3-modality Vupgraded and "TV-mod-
ality /v Q.
It is frequently supposed that would like is a 'hypothetic¬
al' variant of want or wish. But such a view is not tenable
if we take the pattern of 'irrealis' forms strictly.
-j r r -r I j ■ x: ( Went .7.66a. I'd go if you j ?*gQ_
, Tij ,., . ( ?*if you went,b. I'd like to go J . _ 1^ 1 if you go.
A more appropriate classification would be 'tentative'
(cp. § 13.3.1). But even this is rather imprecise. Consider
the function of would like in:
7.67a. I'd like to go.
b. I'd like you to go.
c. I'd like for you to go.
I 67a the speaker expresses his desire to go or be able
to go; in 67b his desire that the addressee agree to go;
and in 67c (in some dialects at least) his desire that
circumstances allow the addressee to go. There is I think
a difference between 67a and its counterpart with want:
7.68. I want to go.
Here, there seems to be a presupposition that 'I go' is
feasible or realistic:
I want to go ZD I'm able to go.
With would like there is no such presupposition; instead
there is an implication relationship between |3p and 'be
able (p)'.
In the case of 67b, the implication appears to be something
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like:
j3P-^V 'you be willing (p)'
Feel like, though very close, if not in some contexts
equivalent, to would like, is perhaps more usual when p
is one of a number of possible, already contemplated cours¬
es of action. Both would like and feel like contrast with
want in that they do not suppose the realization of p.
I find it difficult to determine precisely what the differ¬
ence between wish and want is, even though I am sure it is
more than a question of idiomatic variance. Disregarding
the 'irrealis' use of wish as in:
7.69. I wish you would go.
which has no counterpart with want, we should compare:
7.70a. I wish to go.
b. I want to go.
7.71a. I wish you to go.
b. I want you to go.
It is perhaps possible that wish like would like on the one
hand, does not presuppose 'be able p', or 'be willing p',
but like want, on the other hand, supposes the realization
of p if circumstances allow. Thus, 70a seems to say 'I
want to go if I am permitted' and 71a 'I want you to go
if you'll allow me my wishes'. I will not pursue this rather
tenuous explanation further.
The meaning of need also involves some complexity. In some
cases it seems to involve volition, but this is at best con-
tigengent not necessary, as can be seen from:
7.72. I need to get a haircut but I don't want to.
In fact, want and need are logically in an exclusion re-
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lationship. Compare:
7.73a. I need to but I don't want to.
b. I want to but I don't need to.
Under certain conditions, however, need may imply want, the
conditions being expressible 'if x knows what's good for x'.
i.e. one wants to do what is good for one. This seems to be
the case with 'internal necessity' as in:
7.74. I need to get some sleep,
which is at least weakly paraphrasable as:
7.74'. I want to get some sleep.
'Internal' or 'physical' necessity may be distinguished from
'external' or 'social' necessity as in:
7.75. I need to be punished.
which is weakly paraphrasable with ought to
7.75'. I ought to be punished (society demands it)
But the distinction is contextually determined. We can inter¬
pret 75 as internal necessity allowing for the statement of
a masochist, just as we can interpret 74 as external necess¬
ity if the source of the necessity is, say, a doctor. Need,
it seems, expresses as closely as anything an objective non-
epistemic and non-deontic necessity. In the following^two
different interpretations are possible depending on the con-
fituration of participants:
7.76. I need to be flattered.
The two interpretations may be glossed:
7.76a. I need flattery (i.e. I thrive on it.)
b. People^ neec^ ^"° me (to get what ^ ^gy ^ want)
which are logically:
7.76a'. 'It is necessary for me that I be flattered.'
b". 'It is necessary for you to flatter me.'
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What is striking about the use of need is the entailment of
a reason or purpose. This is particularly evident in utter¬
ances like:
7.77. This machine needs to be oiled,
where the entailment is something like: 'if it is to work
properly', 'so as to work properly'. This does not appear to
be case with: it is possible for ... to . . . , be able to, to
which some uses of need and it is necessary for ... to .,.
may be related in terms of the logical relation:
V : ~
Since these items are not considered as candidates for in¬
clusion under Mod, I shall leave the question of their ana¬
lysis here with one proviso/that the purpose entailment may
perhaps have some relation to Mod (cp. § 13.1.4 on purpose
clauses).
Candidates for modality include two types of expression:
7.78a. I need you to play the lead.
b. You need to get a hair cut, my lad!
The first is included by virtue of its superficial structure
(cp. § 7.3.0) and it can be shown to be a special case of the
kind of necessity discussed above. Although we might say the
sense of need in 78a is glossable as 'requirement', we can
see that it is reducible to 'need to have' or 'it is necess¬
ary to have', i.e.
7.78a'. 'I need to have you to play the lead.'
a". 'It's necessary or me to have you to play the
lead.'
The remaining case 78b is a 'conversational' use (cp. § 7.3.0).
What would otherwise be a case of propositional modality is
used to express authority.
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§ 7.4 Recapitulation
7.4.1 It has been pointed out that apart from what are
conventionally termed modal expressions (modal verbs defined
on a morphological-syntactic basis) there are many other
kinds of construction that must be examined in terms of mod¬
ality. Among these there is a class of expressions (I think,
etc.) - which may be termed 'attitudinizing' expressions to
avoid prejudicing the issue by adopting the philosophical
term 'expression of propositional attitude' - which show
certain parallels to performative expressions in their dis¬
course function and which, like performative expressions, must
be distinguished from 'reporting' or 'descriptive' express¬
ions (§ 7.2.1).
It was then suggested that only certain uses of modality
expressions, those that are subjective and not descriptive,
should be attributed to an abstract modality under Mod. Other
uses, notably 'descriptive' uses, and dispositional modality
that is subject-oriented (not speaker-oriented) should be re¬
garded as cases of propositional modality i.e. under Prop.
On analyzing the modality of modal expressions it was found
that we could establish 3 systems (symbolized "TC, 5 and )
which had remarkably similar configurations of terms, though
in the case of "TT-modality and ^-modality with rather differ-
(73)
ent emphasis (§ 7.2.2) . In particular it was argued that
a distinction should be made between 'certainty' and 'necess¬
ity' (in "Tf-modality glosses). My discussion of dispositional
modality perhaps needs a few clarifying remarks. The notion
dispositional modality was established as a kind of recept-
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acle for expressions of modality that were neither epistemic
or deontic. On the basis of certain kinds of dispositional
modality (speaker's not subject's disposition) I established
(J-modality. In fact, dispositional modality includes items
that are not related to (3-modality, be able, need, etc., but
which may be propositional counterparts to other kinds of
modality (it-modality, etc.). These differ from other kinds
of objectivized (propositional) modality in being associated
directly with a participant. He is able to go, for example,
may have a propositional structure something like:
(he go) he) where -^_oc is a predicate locating V on 'he';
... it is possible he went in I don't think it is possible
he went simply has V operating over the proposition (he go),
i.e. 'I don't think' ( V (he go)). (This ignores, of course,
many other factors - significantly perhaps the presumed real¬
ization or non-realization of (he go).)
(3-modality is, I believe, in English frequently 'covert',
i.e. without direct realization in any one lexical item. It
often accompanies deontic modality. A possible means of dis¬
tinguishing must and have to in deontic use would be by at¬
tributing (3 -modality to must but not have to. This is an
alternative to saying that must is speaker-oriented in com¬
parison to have to. Similar considerations apply, I think,
to shall in utterances like:
7.79. You shall do your homework!
This might also offer a means for associating this sense of
shall with the 'promissive' sense in:
- 280 -
7.80a. You shall have a reward if you win.
b. He shall have a bicycle for Christmas.
c. You shall go to the ball, Cinderella.
In other words, shall, whether 'ultimative' as in 79 or 'pro-
missive' as in 80a - c, represents ^-modality under Mod.
7.4.2 Throughout the discussion I have referred to the
definition of modality in §§ 1.0 and 4.2.5. At certain points
in the discussion I have suggested restrictions on this defi¬
nition without formulating them. Let me now offer a revised
definition of modality, or rather a definition of modality
and a definition of Mod.
- modality is a general linguistic phenomenon. It is the
modification at any point in a linguistic description
by operators over other operators or propositions. It
may be represented as |i in: (j. (p) or |i(|i(p))
(Quantification, on the other hand, is modification
of a term of the form q:(x))
- the modality node in the present linguistic description
(Mod) represents an operator over propositions express¬
ing a) the speaker's view of reality b) the speaker's
view of likelihood c) the speaker's view of social
constraints d) the speaker's view of factuality e) the
speaker's volition with respect to the proposition.
The tense system t. (§ 2.2.3) represents (a); the~TT-system
represents (b); the §-system represents (c); and the P~system
represents (e). (d) the speaker's view of factuality is dis¬
cussed in § 11.3. So far as I can see, these all have reflex¬
es under Prop i.e. have objective counterparts, t. is the coun¬
terpart of t^; subject-volition the counterpart of etc.
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§ 8 Further aspects of modal expressions
8.0 This chapter is something of a mixed bag. I discuss
three aspects of modality left over from § 7 and partly
thrown up by it. These are: the behaviour of modal express¬
ions in special constructions (§ 8.1); the combinability of
modal expressions (§ 8.2); and the nature of logical modal¬
ity (§ 8.3.). The conclusions to be drawn from these sections
appear to be a little incompatible but I let them stand in
their own right as possible pointers for other researchers.
§ 8.1 Modal expressions in special constructions
8.1.1 The there-construction in English ranges semantically
from existential expressions like: There is a Santa Claus
via expressions like: There's something wrong to the purely
locative: There's a fly in my soup. (It has been argued (Ly¬
ons 1967, Anderson 1971a) that existential interpretations
are in fact abstractions from locative expressions). Irre¬
spective of their derivation - transformationalists posit a
rule of there-inserfion relating, say, something is wrong
with There's something wrong -, there-constructions are in¬
teresting with regard to modal expressions. Perhaps as a
result of their existentiality, there-constructions with mod¬
al verbs are most usually interpreted epistemically (judging
the likelihood of something existing) rather than deontical-
ly. Dispositional interpretations, moreover, seem to be
completely excluded.
8.1a. ?* There can be a Santa Claus. (not dispositional)
b. * There is able to be a Santa Claus.
c. * Santa Claus can be.
d. * Santa Claus is able to be.
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8.2a. ?* There can be something wrong. (not dispositional)
b. * There's able to be something wrong.
c. * Something can be wrong.
d. * Something's able to be wrong.
In existential expressions, epistemicity is generally the
preferred reading:
8.3a. There must be a God.
b. There must be a Santa Claus.
but put in the mouth of someone who is considered to have
the power to bring about states of affairs (God, a film di¬
rector, or the President of the United States) a deontic in¬
terpretation becomes possible. With locatives, deontic and
epistemic interpretations seem to be equally plausible. The
following paradigms demonstrate this difference in preferred
interpretations with regard to non-locative and locative ex¬











































(It should be noted that the (presumably) deontically in-
terpretable had better is uttered as a threat rather than
advice.
8.5. - What if there isn't anything wrong after all?
- There1d better be something wrong!
In the case of would we do find the emphatic form would with
a dispositional sense:
8.6. - Damn it, there would be something missing!
In particular, items like should, ought to, be supposed to
reflect the difficulty of interpreting modal expressions










































r be a book on the
table.
V
Here, too, would is interpretable when emphatically stressed
(would).
In 7 a number of deontic interpretations, especially with
obligating senses, are possible. Nonetheless, it seems to
be the case that epistemic interpretations are the preferred
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interpretations. There may be two reasons for this: i) that
*
deontic interpretations are in some way 'parasitic' upon
what is basically epistemic modality; ii) that the modality
is neither epistemic nor deontic, but neutral, just a marking
for a particular degree of modification without prejudice
for either "IT- or §-modality. Since it has not been establish¬
ed that epistemic interpretations are necessarily any more
basic than deontic ones, (i) is perhaps the more dubious
of the two conclusions. On the other hand, since I have
established that the configurations of ~7X- and (^-modality
are, except for emphasis, identical (§§ 7.1.2 and 7.2.2),
(ii) seems to me to be a strong possibility.
Even if we can see no means of determining which of these
conclusions is correct, it has been seen that the epistemic-
deontic distinction, under certain conditions, is not just
(74)
very fine but also fluid.
8.1.2 It has often been noted (Feltkamp 1969, Jenkins 1972,
Leech 1969, etc.) that there is a marked difference between
epistemic and deontic interpretations of modal verbs with
respect to the active-passive relationship. Epistemically
interpretable modal verb allow passivization (if it is a
transformational process) without any change in the inter¬
pretation of the modal.
8.8. The bull may gore the toreador.
The toreador may be gored by the bull.
This is not surprising in view of the paraphrase versions
where the modality appears superordinate to the proposit¬
ion, whether active or passive:
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o OI TJ_ . t_t C the bull will gore the toreador.8.8'. It is possible.} ... . ■,^ 7 the toreador will be gored by
the bull.
With deontically interpretable modals a change in inter¬
pretation is observed.
8.9a. The bull may now gore the toreador.
b. The toreador may now be gored by the bull.
The two sentences are paraphrasable:
8.9a'. The bull is now allowed to gore the toreador,
b'. The toreador is now allowed to get himself
gored by the bull.
i.e. with deontics the subject of the sentence is said to
be in the scope of the modal and thus logically the object
or goal of the obligation or permission involved in the mod¬
ality. I have already noted R. Lakoff's counter-examples in
§ 5.4.3. With Lakoff's further example:
8.10. There must be peace and quiet. (= Lakoff's Ex. 22)
we are forced to conclude that there is no element in the
sentence which lies within the scope of the obligation.
Moreover, although an utterance like:
8.11. The witch must be burnt.
may lead us to suppose that some unmentioned agent lies with¬
in the scope of must, it is clear that this is not necessari¬
ly the case. The utterance is rather an unaddressed demand
that something take place.
The fact that passive sentences with deontically inter¬
preted modals are susceptible to such ambiguities may be
attributed to two factors: 1) the generally greater ambi¬
guity of passive constructions in English as compared to
active constructions. The be-passive may be stative or non-
stative (to an extent this is reflected in tense-forms);
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the get-passive appears to be ambiguous between an 'acci¬
dental' sense, as in: The cat got run over and a 'delib¬
erative' sense, as in: He got taken on by the BBC. 2) the
nature of the subject nominal - an animate nominal may ipso
facto have agency adduced to it; an inanimate, nominal norm¬
ally can't. Thus we can interpret 9b in such a way that
the toreador is given permission to get himself gored by
the bull. But with the parallel sentence:
8.12. Flowers may be picked by the visitors,
it is not possible to say that permission is given to the
flowers to get themselves picked.
Having pointed out some of the complications involved in
the interaction of passivity and modal expressions, complic¬
ations due primarily to discourse and pragmatic factors, I
shall turn to what we now need to focus our attention on,
namely the preservation or non-preservation of epistemic,
deontic and dispositional interpretations of modal verbs
under passivization (again, if it is a process) and the
ability of modal verbs to appear with inanimate subjects
or to appear at all in passive sentences.
With epistemically interpretable modal verbs there is no
apparent difference in acceptability between active and
passive sentences, so I shall not give a paradigm here.
(The results obtained by commuting modal verbs in the frames:
The road be blocked and Harry have been struck
by lightning are essentially identical to those given in
§ 7.1.2). There is no restriction on the nature of the sub¬
ject nominal with regard to animacy. With deontics it is
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worth examining the patterns of 'analytic' and synthetic' con¬





*entitled y to be opened.8.13, The window is^



















In 13 we can see which items do not require that the sub¬
ject of the sentence is also the logical goal of the deont-
ic modality, namely: be allowed, be required, be supposed.
In 14 the additionally acceptable items are those where
the subject of the sentence, which needs to be animate, is
the goal of the deontic modality. These are: be permitted,
be obliged, be requested, be entitled, be expected, be com¬
pelled. In the case of be required it may be claimed there
is ambiguity between senses which may be glossed: 'it is
required that ...' and 'it is required of Harry that ...'.
The behaviour of some of these items under clefting (§ 8.1.3)
is relevant to their semantics.
It should also be noted that the passive verb phrase in
the second paradigm is subject to varying interpretations
according to which modal verb is used, f. ex.
8.14a. Harry is permitted to be visited by his lawyer.
= i) 'Harry has permission to have his lawyer visit
him. '
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= ii) 'Harry has permission to let his lawyer visit
him. '
b. Harry is obliged to be visited by his lawyer.
= 'Harry is obliged to let his lawyer visit him.'
With 'synthetic' modal verbs the paradigms are essentially
the same as those with active sentences when the subject
is II, except that the 'tentative' forms might, could are
somewhat less probable and will seems unhappy with an in¬
animate passive subject. (The frames: The window be
opened and Harry — be invited out by the whole office
may be compared with the paradigms in § 7.2.2) The restrict¬
ion on will is curious: although:
8.15. You will open the window,
may undoubtedly have a deontic interpretation, alongside
an epistemic interpretation (prediction) and, with stress,
a dispositional interpretation (persistance), the passive
version of this utterance:
8.15'. The window will be opened,
whilst acceptable, is not, at least for me, deontic. This
'gap' would have to be covered by either:
8.16a. The window is to be opened.
or:
8.16b. The window shall be opened.
And yet, there are forms containing by you which seem to
be deontically interpretable.
8.17. That window will be opened by you, or else!
Again we see how fluid the line of demarcation between
epistemicity and deonticity can be: in this case, how ad¬
ditional linguistic context can 're-instate' a particular
interpretation. With dispositional modal verbs, which as
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we saw in § 7.3 were subject to considerable restrictions
in active sentences, we find that the animacy or inanimacy
of the subject is a determining factor in acceptability.
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Here the forms: will, will, be able, be willing, be pre¬
pared , be determined, be resolved, mean to, want to are
excluded because the subject is inanimate. The forms: be
apt, be inclined, and tend require either a habitual in¬
terpretation of the complement or a stative one.
8.19a. The window is inclined to get broken.
b. The window is apt to be open in the morning.

























The forms which are of dubious acceptability here are will
and be able.
It has already been noted (§ 7.3.2) that the volitional in¬
terpretation of will (unstressed) is unstable and frequent¬
ly dependent on the nature of the complement. The volition¬
al interpretation is more stable with the negative form
will not won't (see also: § 10.3.1). But even here, as
Huddleston (1969) notes, the volitional interpretation is
not always available:
(75)8.21a. They won't persuade John to go to university,
b. John won't be persuaded to go to university.
The interpretation of won't in 21a is future negative; in
21b it may volitional - at least these seem to be the pre¬
ferred interpretations. The reverse pattern is to be found
in:
8.22a. They won't allow John to go to university,
b. John won't be allowed to go to university.
where 22a is volitional and 22b is future. It is signific¬
ant that wherever a volitional interpretation is unlikely,
a future interpretation is always available. This reinforc¬
es the arguments already made against the independent status
of a volitional interpretation (cp. §§ 6.2.3 and 7.3.2) .
It has also been noted by Huddleston (1969), and also by
Halliday (1970b), that be able may be voice independent.
This is true, however, only for some speakers.
8.23a. He'll be able to sell it.
b. ?* It'll be able to be sold.
8.24a. Someone was able to help them,
b. ?* They were able to be helped.
8.25a. Someone has been able to solve this problem,
b. ?* This problem has been able to be solved.
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The passive forms are not acceptable in my speech, which
requires not only that the subject of be able be animate
but also that the complement be notionally active. Thus a
notionally passive verb, even if active in form, is un¬
acceptable and a notionally active verb, even if passive
in form, is acceptable. Thus:
8.26a. * Harry is able to get the sack,
b. * Harry is able to be sacked.
8.27a. Harry is able to get an acceptance,
b. Harry is able to get accepted.
The general conclusion to be drawn from the above is that
passivity itself (or the 'passive-transformation') is not
an adequate means of explaining restrictions on the use or
interpretation possibilities of modal expressions. More
specifically, we may conclude that the acceptability or
interpretation of a passive-construction containing a mod¬
al expression is not syntactically but semantically determ¬
ined. It is necessary to have semantic information about
the participants, their relations to other participants
and the nature of the predicate involved. Above all, there
is an area of interpretation which involves inferring re¬
lations between a deontic modality and a participant, re¬
lations which, as we have seen, are not necessary relations
- their status as part of the underlying specification is
therefore questionable.
8.1.3 Some of the items I listed in § 7.0 as verbs ex¬
pressing modality my be 'clefted', i.e. put into an It ...
that .., construction. Thus:
8.28a. Mary seems to be mad.
b. It seems that Mary is mad.
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It has been noted by Quirk et al. 1972 that this is true
of a subclass of 'semi-auxiliaries' but not of lexical
verbs like: dance, sing, etc. Such a relationship can, how¬
ever, also be seen in epistemically interpreted 'true aux¬
iliaries ' :
8.29a. It may be that she's going,
b. She may be going.
8.30a. ? It must be that she's going,
b. She must be going.
8.31a. It might be that she's going,
b. She might be going.
8.32a. It could be that she's going,
b. She could be going.
8.33a. ? It needn't be that she's going,
b. She needn't be going.
While such relationships may be appealing as evidence for
a 'two-clause' source for modal verbs (it obviously was to
Ross 1969 and Perlmutter 1972) it is syntactically problem¬
atic. The number of items from the list of modal express¬
ions that may appear in such a relationship is small. I can
count only: appear, seem, be certain, be likely, be requir¬
ed , be requested, be supposed, be said, be permitted in ad¬
dition to may, must, might, could, needn't.
With be required it should be noted there is a slight vari¬
ation, namely that the clefted form has a subjunctive com¬
plement (cp. § 12.2.1).
8.34a. It is required that she (should) go.
b. She is required to go.
With the following items, there seems to be some doubt as
to whether an extraposition relation is evident: be allow-
ed, be sure.
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8.35a. ?* It is allowed that she go.
b. She is allowed to go.
8.36a. ?* It is sure that she's going,
b. She is sure to be going.
For me, the putative clefted forms are either unacceptable
or have rather different interpretations.
In the case of be supposed there is a disturbing semantic
discrepancy:
8.37a. It is supposed that she's going.
'People assume it to be the case ...'
b. She's supposed to be going.
— i) 'She has a certain obligation to go.'
= ii) 'She's (generally/commonly) supposed to be
going' (= a)
37b i is, diachronically, more recent; it represents by far
the most frequent interpretation of be supposed in contemp¬
orary English.
Some other relationships that are to be found are, f. ex.
8.38a. It is possible that she's going.
She's possibly going,
b. She has a tendency to do these things.
She tends to do these things.
The first type (38a) applies also to: be probable but not
(76)
to: be necessary and be impossible . The second type
(38b) may apply in the case of intend: intention of going
(77)
intend to go.
The yield in establishing such relations is, however, so
low and the number of exceptions and variations so high
that it is wrong to see anything more in them than low-level
and arbitrary syntactic behaviour. They are neither convinc¬
ing evidence for the 2-clause structure position, nor are
they, as Hakutani/Hargis 1972 seem to think, reason for ex¬
cluding them from their phrase structure categories modal
or quasi-modal. Moreover, the fact that rather similar
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relationships seem to exist across all syntactic subclass¬
es of modal expression suggests that there is no natural
class (with semantic and syntactic features in common) to
be discovered. Ability to appear in both active and pass¬
ive sentences (what Feltkamp 1969 has termed 'transpassiv-
ity' (Transpassivitat)) is also not a good criterion for
classifying modals and-or auxiliaries, since as we saw in
§ 8.1.2 passivization is fraught with many semantic com¬
plications and restrictions. A more useful criterion for
sub-classifying modal expressions syntactically is their
ability to appear in a non-finite form as second term in
a complex verb-phrase. By this criterion we can separate
off: may, can, must, will, shall, might, could, would,
should, ought to, have got to, be to, needn't, daren't,
had better/best, plus the remaining (contracted) negative
forms: mustn't, won't, shan't, etc. All others may appear
in second position in a verb phrase. Compare:
8.39a. * He may have got to go.
b. He may have to go.
But precisely this example should indicate that the syn¬
tactic classification does not reflect a semantic class,
since have to and have got to are effectively synonymous.
§ 8.2 The combinability of modal expressions
8.2.0 Halliday 1970 claims that a sequence of two or more
epistemic expressions ('modalities' in his terms) have a
reinforcing effect: He might perhaps go there expresses
greater reservation than might alone. On the other hand,
a sequence of deontic expressions ('modulations' in his
terms) is cumulative, thus: Jones may be allowed to go out
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now, nurse means 'You are allowed to allow him to go out.'
(cp. Halliday 1970, p. 339) In the following sections I
shall look at the nature of the combinability of modal ex¬
pressions. Obviously, we could examine the cognitive limits
associated with a long string of modal expressions (especial¬
ly with the added complication of tense and aspect-forms) -
Bierwisch notes for German that a complex verb phrase like:
... korrekt erledigt worden sein konnen wird in: *Ich weifi,
daB der Fall korrekt erledigt worden sein konnen wird is
beyond interpretation (Bierwisch 1967, p. 70) - but I am
more concerned with combinability with regard to two or
three modal items and the type of interpretation possible.
8.2.1 The number of modal expressions I listed in § 7 is
too great for me to test exhaustively all the permutations,
so I have taken a representative selection. Of those that
can only occur in initial position in a verb-phrase I have
taken: will, may, can, must, shall, is to, ought to, had
better, needn't, daren't, would, might, could, should;
and of the others I have taken: be able to, have to, be
supposed to, need to, dare to, be allowed to, be willing
to, be bound to, be obliged to. All three types of inter¬
pretation, epistemic, deontic and dispositional are repre¬










































The only dispositional interpretations of will and would
allowed for are those of 'persistent/insistent behaviour'
(not those of 'willingness', which I argued against in
§ 7.3.2). The paradigms in Table IV reflect the fact that
would may often be used in utterances like:
She ^ would need to go to the loo!
which do not have counterparts with will and whose status
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(be obliged =<Q )
J
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It should be noted that have to as second modal express¬
ion cannot be interpreted epistemically, even though it
normally has both an epistemic and a deontic interpretation.
Taking a rather different tense-form of have to, we may
find marginal cases of an epistemic interpretation, f. ex.:
8.40a. ? He'd better have to have gone there last
Thursday.
b. ? He must have to have gone there last Thurs¬
day .
As suggested below, these are, if acceptable, cases of ob-
jectivized epistemic modality, i.e. part of Prop.
In judging the acceptability or interpretability of could
anc^ might in deontic senses, I was inclined to allow only
'tentative' and 'conditional' senses and not the 'challeng¬
ing' sense of:
8.41a. Well, he might have opened the door!
b. Well, he could at least get up in the morning!
The paradigm with dare to strikes me as allowing rather
more interpretations that all the other paradigms. There
is, of course, an important distinction between dare to
and other items: dare to has questionable status as a dis¬
positional; at least in some cases it implies the factuality
of its complement.
As is usually the case with such paradigms, no clear pattern
emerges immediately. Moreover, there are some sequences that
are simply odd, He may be supposed to go with a deontic in¬
terpretation of may, for example, while others are down¬
right uninterpretable,*He daren't be bound to go, for examp¬
le. Closer examination (relying more on the *-ed items than
the ?-ed items) suggests the following:
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i) There are problems about obliging people to have
a certain disposition, about their being disposed
to have a certain disposition, and about obliging
them to be obliged. The combinations: S + d, d + d,
d + 5 f 5 + 6 , and d +£ , seem, with minimal except¬
ions, to produce *-reactions; with two significant
exceptions (be allowed to and be obliged to) the
combination £ + § produces *-reactions; 6 + 6 , £r + S"
and £ + d seem to be unproblematic. ("78) may 0k_
serve, however, that the combination: £ + £, does
not lead to one modal expression intensifying an¬
other (cp. Halliday's claim § 8.2.0) but to object-
ivization of the second modal item, which is ana¬
lyzed as part of Prop. ("79) j shall have more to
say on 5* + 5 below.
ii) If there is an epistemically interpretable modal
it is generally the first, i.e. we might posit a
natural order of occurrence: 6, S » d.
There are, however, exceptions like: He'd better
be bound to go, where JT precedes 6 . These may be
said to include objectivized epistemic modality:
the deontic expression is glossable as 'it'd better
be the case/true (that he's bound to go)' cp. He'd
better go, which is glossable 'it would be better
if he went', where (he go) does not represent a
prior assertion.
iii) There seems to be a greater chance of interpeting
when the sequence of modal expressions represents
dissimilar degree of modality: A/Q+V or *7+ A./D
as in: He shall be able to go or: He may need to go
(with deontic may) are readily interpretable; A/O.
+ A/a or V+V as in: He shall need to go or: He
may be able to go (with deontic may) are less easi¬
ly interpretable.
These conclusions seem to be borne out by the pattern of
restrictions to be observed when we combine three items.
My test involved adding one of: be able to, have to, be
supposed to, need to, dare to, be allowed to, be willing to,
be bound to, be obliged to to the clearly interpretable
sequences in the foregoing paradigms. Even allowing for
the impossibility of identical second and third modal ex¬
pressions , cp. :
8.42 * He must be able to be able to go there,
there are nonetheless around 1150 possible combinations.
Lack of space is one reason for not citing them all; another
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is the repetitiveness of the restrictions - a very high
number of ?-ed items, a number of *-ed items and very few
readily interpretable sequences. I shall therefore extract
a few interesting and pertinent cases.








There is, however, an interpretation of:
8.44. He may be supposed to be bound to go.
with be supposed to as a kind of epistemic - an interpret¬
ation I did not make provision for - roughly:
8.44'. 'It's possible that people supose that he's
bound to go there.'
Thus 6+ S + £, seems in principle to occur. Sequences of
S + "5 +5 are infrequent: He ought to have to be allowed
to go there, and d + d + d does not seem to occur; in fact
I find no clearly acceptable sequences beginning with d
modal expressions and very few with S. Of the remaining 6
possibilities with initial 6, one is generally ruled out
(6 + d + 5) as in: *He may be able to be allowed to go,
and another ( 6, + d + d) questionable: ?*He may need to be
able to go. The others I find in varying degrees to
be acceptable:
i) 6 + + S*
Ex. He'll have to be allowed to go there.
ii) £ + 6 + S
Ex. He may be bound to have to go there.
iii) £+ 6 + d
Ex. He must be bound to be willing to go there.
iv) £ + 5" + d
Ex. He may have to be able to go there.
- 303 -
In view of what we found with sequences of two modal ex¬
pressions, it is somewhat surprising to find £ + 5" + S' and
£ + S~ + d (though there were some exceptions to my general¬
izations) . It is instructive to look at the nature of the
deontic modality appearing in second position. Compare:
8.45a. He may have to be obliged to go there.
b. He may be supposed to be allowed to go there.
8.46a. ?* He may be obliged to have to go there.
b. * He may be allowed to be supposed to go there.
The difference between the utterances in 45 and those in
46 is that the former have a sequence objective deontic +
subject-oriented (objective) deontic and the latter the re¬
verse sequence. If we look back at the exceptions to the
generalization about * S* + & with sequences of two modal
expressions, we find that they conform to the order in 45
or else have a 'performative' deontic as first modal as in
the case of: He must be obliged to go there. Moreover, there
are more interpretable 'performative' + subject-oriented
(objective) deontics than there are 'performative' + ob¬
jective deontics. Compare:
8.47a. He must be allowed to go there,
b. ?* He must be supposed to go there.
We can, therefore, make a further generalization about com-
binability:
iv) There is apparently a natural order of occurrence
'performative' deontic, objective deontic, subject-
oriented deontic (though a sequence of all three
is scarcely conceivable).
This generalization may be paralleled by the order of
epistemically interpretable modal expressions.
v) A subjective epistemic modality necessarily precedes
an objective epistemic modality.
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This can be demonstrated by utterances like:
8.48. He may be bound to go there.
but it is difficult to prove that this order is a necess¬
ary one, in semantic terms. That it is syntactically foll¬
ows from the fact that the items that can express subject¬
ive epistemicmodality all belong to the set of items that
(81
can only stand in verb-phrase initial position (cp. § 7.1.2).
Apart from the direct conclusions I have drawn above, there
is a general consequence for the form of the grammar. It
is that the semantic specification must reflect participant
relations and modality scope if we are to account for the
acceptability of:
8.49. He may have to be obliged to go.
the marginal acceptability of:
8.50. He may be allowed to be obliged to go.
(acceptable if it is interpreted as: 'it may be allowed
that he is obliged to go', cp. *He may be permitted to be
obliged to go.) and the nonacceptability of:
8.51. * He may be obliged to have to go.
The reason 51 is unacceptable lies in the fact that be
obliged is subject oriented, while have to need not be. An
approximate specification for it might be:
8.51'. * ^may ^11 obliged xhe ^by Pro' ^^ have to
Zpro"(he 9°)))
while an approximate specification for 370 might be:
8.49" ^may ^ have to zPro' ^ obliged Xhe Yby
pro„(he go)))
where Pro' and Pro" may be identical.
An alternative explanation subcategorizing deontic modality
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and leaving the participant relations aside would run into
difficulties, I believe. Since both be obliged and have to
are A modalities, differing only in the fact that be obliged
has logically 2 arguments and have to - at least potential¬
ly - one (indicated above by Pro), a specification which
leaves participants out of account would, I believe, not be
able to distinguish them. An additional problem would be
that items like be allowed can be both 'objective' and 'sub¬
ject-oriented' (unlike be permitted, which is 'subject-orient¬
ed'), so classification is by no means unique.
8.2.2 It was noted in § 7.0 that certain adverbs may modify
the modality expressed in a modal verb (cp. Butler 1 973) .
Here I wish to examine more closely the function of adverbs
(82)
as expressions of modality and their combinability with
modal verbs.
We may dispose immediately of the function of well: it is to
intensify a modality in the direction of greater probability;
it is positionally fixed; and it may only co-occur, in my
speech, with may, might, could (Huddleston 1969 considers it
to co-occur also with can). Considerably more complex is
the case of the following adverbs: naturally, certainly,
surely, definitely, obviously, of course, sure, clearly,
indeed, undoubtedly, necessarily, evidently, seemingly,
apparently, actually, really, probably, possibly, maybe,
could be, chances are, conceivably, etc. I shall look first
at the syntax of such adverbs with non-modal predicates.
There are two medial positions into which these adverbs
naturally fit: (i) after an auxiliary (if there is one)
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and before a 'lexical' verb - normal medial adverbial pos¬
ition; (ii) before an auxiliary - a position which seems
to be restricted to a subset of the adverbs listed above.
The following two paradigms establish which adverbs may
appear in the first kind of medial position. I have assumed,
in judging acceptability, that the utterance constitutes
one tone-group only (cp. Halliday 1967). Many of the ad¬
verbial items may also constitute a separate tone group,
which is generally indicated in writing by commas. Thus al¬
though: She of course told the truth is marginal, its comma'ed





















































Noteworthy are the following restrictions: the marginality
of necessarily, reasons for which are suggested later; the
behaviour of indeed and sure; the non-acceptability of may¬
be , could be, chances are.
Indeed and sure appear more usually with the auxiliary (or
proverb) do or with a stressed auxiliary, thus:
8.53a. She sure did tell the truth.
b. That sure is the truth.
c. She did indeed tell the truth.
d. That indeed is the truth.
e. That is indeed the truth.
Sure, moreover, can only appear in pre-auxiliary position,
as the next paradigm will indicate.
The exclusion of maybe, could be, chances are is presumab¬
ly to be accounted for by their syntactic form; they re¬
present various stages of ellipsis from sentence construct¬
ions of the form: it may be that ... Maybe has become least
transparent and in some dialects may occur in positions
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other than initial positions. In the following two para¬
digms I test whether an adverb placed before an auxiliary
may be stressed or not and whether the auxiliary is re¬







is telling the truth,
She definitely is telling the truth.
















































's/is telling the truth.
In those cases where an unstressed auxiliary is impossible:
with sure, really and indeed, we have an adverb whose
function seems to be that of re-affirmation. We may also
note that sure and perhaps really cannot occur parenthetical¬
ly:
8.56. She -< sur®' > j_s telling the truth.J ?*, really,J
The marginality of surely and of course with a stressed
auxiliary is associated with their illocutionary force.
What in all other cases is a statement is preferably in¬
terpreted as a kind of question:
8.57a. She surely is telling the truth (- I think
she is but ypu seem to be in constant doubt.)
b. She of course is telling the truth? (- Am I
right in my assumption?)
The restriction on naturally and necessarily is a reflex
of properties I shall discuss later.
One of the properties of sentential adverbs is that they
are not restricted to any one position in a sentence. I
will now examine the ability of the set of adverbs above
to appear in initial and final position.
Sentence-initial adverbs may constitute a separate tone
group; this' is generally reflected in writing by a comma.
The following paradigms establish which adverbials require























In the above those marked ?* require a separate tone group;
those marked ? are marginal without a separate tone group;
and necessarily cannot appear, I believe, in any guise at
the beginning of a sentence.
Clearly, there are differences in discourse function among
the adverbs listed. Not all would answer the question: Did
she tell the truth? Among these are: surely, really and may¬
be indeed.
8. 58. ?*Evidently told the truth.
Conceivably
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In the above, where the comma is meant to indicate a sep¬
arate tone group, we in fact have two types of utterance:
(a) with a non-final intonation on the adverb (usually fall-
rise) ; (b) with a final intonation on the adverb. In the
second type the adverb has a discourse function (cp. yes,
no) and does not modify the proposition: (she told the truth),
while in the first the adverb seems clearly to modify the
proposition by judging the likelihood of its being true.
In the paradigm I have only considered the acceptability
of adverbs in the first type of utterance (a). The follow¬
ing brings out more clearly which items comment on a prior
claim in the manner of the second type of utterance (b):
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V Could be.PChances are.nceivably.
Surely does not comment on a prior claim, nor judge the
likelihood of any claim; it invites comment on a question¬
ed or doubted claim. Indeed, actually and really can be
made acceptable by adding: ... she did. Indeed signals con¬
firmation of claim; actually signals the unexpectedness of
b. She told the truth. I
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a claim; really signals surprise at a claim, its normal
intonation being interrogative. (The non-interrogative
really signals a lack of interest in the claim made -
this seems to me to be parasitic upon the more usual con¬
versational use.) These functions are obviously inappro¬
priate in reply to questions.
When the adverbs appear in final position they may have
one or more of three functions: i) as a manner adverbial;
ii) as an afterthought modification of the claim made in
the proposition; iii) as a comment on the logical relation
of the claim made in the proposition to other parts of the
discourse, i.e. the 'discourse function'.
The following, normally without a separate tone group in
speech and without a comma in writing, indicates which ad¬
























8.61 . She told the truth
Indeed is acceptable as a signal of disapproval: She told
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the truth indeed! Necessarily is perhaps acceptable when
interpreted as a reason adverb, i.e. 'out of necessity'.
Definitely and really are interpretable, I think, as 'in
definite/real terms'. In the following I write a comma
for those items that may have the 'discourse function'
and a dash for those that may only be interpreted as 'after¬
thought' modifications. Some items appearing in the 'dis¬
course function' may also be read as 'afterthoughts'; here
























The acceptability of clearly and undoubtedly is increased
by adding ... she did. This addition would also make many
other items candidates for 'afterthought' interpretations,
of course and sure, for example. Surely, as before, has to
have interrogative intonation; so too does perhaps in: She
told the truth, perhaps?, which is interpretable as a
suggestion not a statement.
In all the paradigms I have cited, one item, necessarily,
8.62, She told the truth \
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is consistently unacceptable. There are, however, cases
where its acceptability is beyond doubt:
8.63. That's necessarily true.
This is paraphrasable as: 'that's a necessary truth' and
expresses a purely logical modality. A paradigm can be set
up with contingently.
8.63'. That's •( nec®ssarih )true.,83)1 contingentlyJ
Another case of acceptable necessarily is:
8.64. It isn't necessarily raining in Chicago.
( = Karttunen's (1972) Ex. 47)
which, according to Karttunen 1972, has two interpretat¬
ions:
8.64a. 'For all I know, it doesn't follow that it is
raining in Chicago.' (= epistemic inter¬
pretation)
b. 'Even if it is raining in Chicago, it could as
well be otherwise.' (=logical interpret¬
ation)
(cp. Karttunen 1972, p. 19)
The use of necessarily with negation is by far its most
frequent use.
I have gone into a fair amount of detail on the syntax of
what might loosely be called 'modal adverbs' for two rea¬
sons. Firstly to show that we have considerable diversity
of function and considerable ambiguity amongst the 'modal
adverbs'. This should be viewed in relation to accounts
like those of Anderson 1971b, Butler 1973 and Halliday 1970,
where the same status is accorded to items like: surely
and certainly, (Butler 1973) or where a modal adverb is
regarded as a paraphrase or surface structure variant of
a modal verb, must and surely, for example, (Anderson 1971b,
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Halliday 1970). For semantic and syntactic reasons such
equations are implausible (cp. §§ 6.2.2 and 6.2.5).
Secondly, I wished to establish a realistic set of 'mod¬
al adverbs' with similar syntactic and semantic properties
for the discussion of the combinatorial possibilities of
modal verbs and modal adverbs. In fact, we can establish
several sets of adverbs. Let me trace the arguments lead¬
ing to the establishment of these sets.
Paradigms 52a and b establish which items may appear in
midposition, a position normally reserved for temporal and
degree adverbs. We exclude as 'semi-adverbs' the adverbials:
maybe, could be, chances are, since they cannot occur in
midposition. Paradigm 55a establishes a sub-class of degree
adverbs which can occur in pre-auxiliary position. This pos¬
ition is not normally available to time-adverbs except under
conditions of focus. Paradigm 55b establishes that it is not
just focus that accounts for this pre-auxiliary position;
we can exclude the 'intensifiers': sure, indeed, really -
these involve the Mod node with regard to factuality not
modality. Paradigm 58 establishes which items are integral
to the clause (this paradigm is merely indicative not con¬
clusive) ; we exclude: evidently, seemingly, apparently,
actually, necessarily.
Paradigm 59 complements 58 in indicating which items are
non-integrated. Paradigms 60a and b suggest which items
may primarily have a discourse function. Paradigm 61 estab¬
lishes which items can be manner adverbs, which typically
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have final, clause-integral position; naturally, certainly,
surely, obviously, clearly are shown to be ambiguous be¬
tween manner adverbs and 'modal adverbs'. Paradigm 62 has
a complex interpretation: it establishes (a) which items
may have a discourse function (one that is distinct from
that established by 69 and (b) which items may be tagged
as 'afterthought' modalities. This latter throws doubt on
assigning naturally, obviously, of course, clearly, un¬
doubtedly to the same set as: certainly, definitely, probab¬
ly , perhaps, possibly and conceivably, which I take to be
the 'most modal' of 'modal adverbs'. To these I would add
the negative: not necessarily for semantic reasons (see
below), even though it doesn't figure in the paradigms.
Apart from manner adverbs and intensifiers, I can distinguish
in semantic terms four sets of 'modal adverbs'. Consider the
following utterances:
8.65a. Of course, she told the truth.
b. Of course she told the truth.
c. Evidently, she told the truth.
d. Certainly she told the truth.
We can say that 65a is an 'introducer' of the claim 'she
told the truth' (which is new information). The function
of of course in discourse is glossable 'I hardly/don't need
to tell you (that she told the truth)'. 65b has a different
discourse function; there is a prior claim (i.e. given in¬
formation) 'she told the truth', which is confirmed. This
utterance might follow the question: Did she tell the truth?
The kind of function in 65a should be compared to the re¬
sults of paradigm 62 and that of 65b to paradigm 60a and b.
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In the case of 65c, 'she told the truth' is new information
and the 'modal adverb' indicates that the speaker has rea¬
son to make the claim but is not committed to it (cp. seem
in § 7.1.1). In the case of 65d, however, 'she told the
truth' is not new but given and the speaker expresses his
view of its truth.
We may now list typical items in each set:
a: of course, naturally, obviously
b: of course, naturally, obviously
c: evidently, apparently, seemingly
d: certainly, possibly, definitely, probably,
perhaps, conceivably, not necessarily
a and b should probably be considered as one and the same
set, the difference in discourse function being entirely
predictable.
I shall now examine the behaviour of these items with re¬
spect to the modal verbs: will, may, must, can, shall,
would, might, ought to, could, should, needn't, daren't,
by checking each potential interpretation of the modal ex¬
pressions with a following or preceding adverb is about 44,
each with 9 commutations, I shall again cite only a select¬
ion of the relevant restrictions. Basically, there are
four points to look for: whether the order modal verb +
modal adverb or vice versa is natural; whether the epistem-
icity or deonticity of the modal verb affects its accept¬
ability with a given adverb; whether differing degrees of
modality are incompatible; and whether the combination of
modal verb and modal adverb is cumulative or not, cp. Halli-
day's may possibly example (Halliday 1970b).
had better, Since the number of paradigms produced
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Given an epistemic interpretation of may, must, can, might,
ought to, could, should, a following adverb is generally
preferable to a preceding adverb, or rather, there are


















\ be the truth.













The reason why: That not necessarily must be the truth is
unacceptable is syntactic: the negative expression in Eng¬
lish cannot precede the tense carrying verb in English
(cp. Klima 1964).
(85)
The reason why must perhaps is acceptable while must possib¬
ly is apparently not, I shall leave until later. Compare
also the paradigms with ought to:
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ought to be the truth,
lyj
Here I cannot find a reading for naturally ought to, pro¬
bably ought to, perhaps ought to, and possibly ought to
and still have an epistemic interpretation of ought to.
On the other hand, the predictive sense of will, which I
have included under 'epistemic', seems to be equally happy













8.68a. That'11 \ be the truth.
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b. That \ needn't be the truth,












But again we can attribute this to the effects of negation:
the modal adverb lies in the scope of the negation when it
follows needn't.
The fact that will appears to behave rather differently
from other epistemically interpretable modals could, per¬
haps, be taken as evidence for a categorial distinction be¬
tween it and other epistemic modals, i.e. that it represents
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'future modality' (cp. § 2.2.3).
When we look at deontically interpretable modal verbs, we
find a rather different pattern with items like must and















> tell the truth.
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^ *not necessarily j
With shall (cp. predictive will) we find the restrictions,
though numerous, to be more or less the same whether the
adverb precedes or follows.





*seemingly V,, . . , ,
























7 shall tell the truth.
iy)
The reason why there seem to be so many restrictions on
adverbs with shall lies partly in its speaker-orientation.
Thus, although it is possible to say:
8.72. She may, apparently, tell the truth,
meaning: 'it appears that she is allowed to tell the truth'
(may can be used 'performatively' (cp. § 7.2.2) and thus be
speaker-oriented, but this is not necessary), we cannot say:
8.73. * She shall, apparently, tell the truth.
Since the sense of shall: 'I say she shall ...' is incom¬
patible with apparently: 'it appears ...'. We cannot meaning¬
fully say either: 'It appears I say she shall tell the truth'
or: 'I say it appears she shall tell the truth'.
Let me now look at a few other awkward or impossible com¬
binations. First we have a number of cases where the de¬
grees of modality seem incompatible, for example:
8.74a. * That must possibly be the truth,
b. That may possibly be the truth.
We might, of course, just try to explain this by means of
a restriction: *A. +"V . There are, however, also cases
where the kind of modality (predictive or evidential) leads
to restrictions. Compare:
8.75a. That must seemingly be true,
b. ?* That may seemingly be true.
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An evidential modality like must (cp. § 7.1.2) combines
much more readily with an evidential modality like seeming¬
ly than does the predictive modality may. It is conceivable
that the evidential nature of must may also hinder its
combination with possibly.
I noted earlier that the combination must perhaps is much
more readily interpretable than must possibly. This, I
think, is to be explained in terms of the different typical
functions of perhaps and possibly. It can be argued, I
think, that perhaps may sometimes modify the illocution-
ary force of an utterance (cp. § 1.5.1 and the case of
maybe in Ex. 3.11 a)making what would otherwise be a state¬
ment into tentative statement glossable as 'Have you con¬
sidered the possibility that p' - maybe also has this
function, but possibly does not. Its gloss is something
like: 'it is possible ...', an objective modality and
illocutionarily a statement. Thus, must perhaps is inter¬
pretable as a tentative statement; instead of That must be
the truth, a statement about a logical deduction, we have
in: That must perhaps be the truth a suggestion as to what
logical deduction could be made.
In the case of may possibly we have not a sequence of mod¬
alities 'it is possible that that may be truth' but a cumul¬
ation of congruent modalities (cp. Vp = Wp in some sys¬
tems of modal logic) or else perhaps a downtoning of may:
may possibly seems less likely to be the case than may
alone. Analogously, the combination must possibly would
have to be a cumulation (but the modalities are incongruent)
or a down-toning of must, which, if it is possible, can
only be achieved through the use of presumably or some¬
thing similar.
The behaviour of perhaps that I have discussed above accords,
I believe, with our intuitions. Unfortunately, it doesn't
accord with the syntactic classification of modal adverbs
I arrived at through a process of elimination on the basis
of permutation possibilities. I have further examples of
a distinction between perhaps and possibly, in fact of a
similarity between perhaps and of course, in the paradigms
of modal verb-modal adverb combinations. In the paradigms
of should, ought to, needn't, had better + modal adverb,
we find perhaps to be acceptable when possibly is not in-
terpretable. Moreover in the paradigm of needn't + modal
adverb, we find of course and perhaps (and apparently) to
be the only clearly acceptable adverbs. In the paradigms
of should and ought to + adverb, both of course and perhaps
are acceptable inter alia.
I shall not speculate further on the reliability of syntact¬
ic evidence alone as a basis for classification, but shall
turn to the kind of combinations we can find. For this I
take a few well-selected examples from the paradigms.
Taking first adverb + modal verb combinations, we find
no cases of cumulative modality, irrespective of whether
the modal verb is interpreted epistemically or deontical-
ly. Consider the following pairs:
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8.76a. She certainly must tell the truth,
b. That certainly might be the truth.
8.77a. She evidently must tell the truth,
b. That evidently must be the truth.
8.78a. She naturally must tell the truth,
b. That naturally must be the truth.
8.79a. She perhaps ought to tell the truth,
b. That perhaps may be the truth.
In all these cases, the modality of the adverb is distinct
from the modality of the modal verb. Moreover, the modality
of the adverb is (or can be) subjective; it relates to the
speaker, while the modality of the verb is objectivized.
In the case of perhaps, there is also, as I have suggest¬
ed, a modification of the illocutionary status of the
utterance. I attempt to bring out this differentiation in
the following glosses:
8.76a*. 'It is clear that she must/has to tell the
truth.*
b* 'It is certain/clear \ ,, , ,, . . , . ,
■ -j-. , . , . , V that that might be'I'm certain/convinced | r
the truth.' '
8.77a'. 'There's reason to believe that she must/has
to tell the truth.'
b'. 'There's reason to believe that that must be
the truth.'
8.78a'. 'There's no other way than for her to have to
tell the truth.'





'I thinkSt T S*ie ou1^lt to tell the truth.
'I thinkSt ' that that may be the truth.'
Taking now sequences of modal verb + adverb, we find cases
of both discrete and cumulative modality. Discrete modal¬
ity can be seen in:
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8.80a. She must definitely tell the truth,
b. That must definitely be the truth.
8.81a. She must evidently tell the truth,
b. That must evidently be the truth.
8.82a. She must naturally tell the truth,
b. That must naturally be the truth.
8.83a. She ought perhaps to tell the truth,
b. That must perhaps be the truth.
Comments essentially the same as those on the preceding
set of examples apply here. We may also cite glosses that
are essentially similar.
8.80a'. 'There's no way out of her telling the truth.'
b'. 'There's no other conclusion than that that
is the truth.'
8.81a'. 'It seems that she must tell the truth.'
b'. 'It seems that that must/has to be the truth.'
8.82a'. 'It goes without saying that she must tell the
truth.'
b'. 'It goes without saying that that must be the
truth.'
8.83a'. 'I suggest that she ought to tell the truth.'
b'. 'I suggest that that must be the truth.'
Such sequences are, at least in my interpretation, of the
form:
li (p)
where p itself contains a modality.
The sequences which have cumulative modality are, I think,
few. I consider the following from the paradigm to have it:
may possibly, needn't necessarily. Here the modality itself
is further specified: may possibly indicates that something
is 'just (about) possible'; needn't necessarily indicates
that something could be otherwise, in contradistinction to
needn't, which merely states that something is not necess¬
arily the case. Another candidate for cumulative modality
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is: absolutely must, notably only with a deontic interpret¬
ation of must, which indicates the extreme necessity of
something, for example:
8.84. She absolutely must tell the truth.
Since such cases are often glossable by modified adjectives,
'just possible' for example, I would suggest that they are
of the form:
(b' ) U
where n is the main modality and jj,' restricts or specifies
this in the manner of a degree adverb.
What I have argued here is that many of the cases where
modal adverbs readily combine with modal verbs are not in
fact (irrespective of the epistemicity or deonticity of the
modal verb) cumulative in their effect but cases of discrete
modality, the adverb typically being the superordinate mod¬
ality and analyzable as Mod (or 111 in the case of perhaps)
and the modal verb being objectivized, i.e. part of Prop.
§ 8.3 'Logical' modality
8.3.0 Mention has already been made of logical modalities
like necessarily (cp. § 8.2.2). I wish here to look first
at a claim made about logical modality by Karttunen (1972).
8.3.1 Karttunen (1972) draws attention to a distinction
between logical and epistemic modality, citing as examples:
8.85a. It isn't raining in Chicago, but it could be.
b. * It isn't raining in Chicago, but it may be
raining there.
where 85a involves 'logical modality' and 85b epistemic
modality. This distinction is, in my opinion, categorially
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misleading. Both sentences involve epistemic modality,
but 85a concerns a judgment about a non-actual state of
affairs. 85a is acceptable because it makes a claim about
the actual state of affairs and another claim about what
might be the state of affairs under different conditions;
85b is clearly unacceptable since both claims refer to
the actual state of affairs.
Another example of Karttunen's, which he claims is ambigu¬
ous between 'epistemic' and 'logical' modality, also shows
a distinction between the actual world and some other world.
8.86. It isn't necessarily raining in Chicago.
The two meanings may be glossed:
'epistemic' 'there is no reason to believe it is
raining in Chicago.
'logical' 'the fact that it is raining in Chicago
is accidental.'
or:
'it is possible that it is not raining
in Chicago.'
~ it may not be raining in Chicago.
versus:
'it is possible that things could be other¬
wise than that it is raining in Chicago.'
^ it might not be raining in Chicago.
'Logical' modality is semantically often trivial and far
less frequent (i.e. less conversationally useful) than
'epistemic' modality. Karttunen poses the question as to
what means natural language has for expressing 'logical'
modality, but does not himself attempt to provide an answer.
I shall look briefly at the paradigms involved in what






















It's not raining in Chicago but it<
must






and reversing the negation:
d. It's raining in Chicagoj
but it




























has to not J
In 87b may and have to seem more idiomatic than can and




must; in 87c this situation is reversed. The pattern of
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dubious collocations in 87e and f would bear this out.
(Notice that the acceptable negative collocations are
all cases of propositional negation and not modality ne¬
gation, cp. § 10.3.1.)
Whether or not may and can are equally likely in 87b and
c, they do differ in meaning. May indicates that the speak¬
er thinks it a possible state of affairs that it will rain
in Chicago without knowing that this is true. With can he
knows this state of affairs to be possible and implies
that it is true on some occasions. In 87c, we suppose
that there have been previous occasions when it has in
fact rained in Chicago that the speaker knows about. Unlike
can, may is predictive. It is perhaps not quite so easy
to distinguish must and have to. Must, however, as I in¬
dicated in § 7.1.2, makes what is apparently a necessary
conclusion; again the speaker does not know whether it
ever has or will rain in Chicago. In this sense, must is
relatable to may. Have to indicates what is necessarily
the state of affairs on some occasion on the basis not of
our knowledge of Chicago but of our knowledge of the world
in general. In this, there is a difference between can and
have to: can, I think, relates to knowledge about Chicago
or to the world in general; have to only to the latter.
If the basis for the claim is our knowledge about Chicago,
we would say instead of 87c with have to:
8.87c'. It isn't raining in Chicago, but it does
sometimes.'
(Leech 1969 has used the terms 'theoretical' and 'practic¬
al' to capture this distinction between may and must on
the one hand and can and have to on the other. I discuss
this further in §§ 9.3.2 and 9.4.1).
If this somewhat informal analysis of can is correct, then
it is clear why could is impossible in 87c. (Could here
cannot be interpreted as 'used to be possible': the pre¬
sent tense-form is raining is only interpretable if Chi¬
cago exists; the 'used to be possible' interpretation of
could only if Chicago no longer exists.)
The sentence-frame including sometimes/at times presuppos¬
es that some of the times are prior to the moment of speak¬
ing; the use of can is consistent with the speaker's know¬
ing about these prior occasions; could, however, is contra¬
dictory since the counterfactual form presupposes that the
state of affairs is at all times impossible in the actual
world.
There is a lot that remains unexplained about the para¬
digms, but I shall discuss certain properties relevant to
them in § 13 on conditionals. It has become clear, I think,
that 'logical modality' in Karttunen's sense of things be¬
ing other than they are is expressible by can, have to
and could rather than by may, must and might. The fact
that such 'logical modality' is often conversationally
uninteresting or trivial is perhaps borne out by the re¬
lative infrequency of can and have to in epistemic use.
There are, however, other cases of logical modality. First,
we may note the rare cases in natural language where the
truth of a proposition is specified as necessary or con-
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tingent, etc. This is frequently indicated by modal ad¬
verbs: x is necessarily the case, x is possibly the case,
etc. (cp. § 8.2.1). Under the kind of analysis I propose,
this is analyzable as a special case of objectivized or
propositional modality: it is possible that it will rain,
which may express an objective claim about a particular
world, and may also be interpreted as a statement of log¬
ical possibility about the world in general or a particular
set of worlds.
A more interesting case of logical modality is involved
in sentence and clause relations. For example, in:
8.88. If John's a bachelor, he's unmarried.
the proposition 'he's unmarried' is a necessary consequence
of 'John is a bachelor' being true. In:
8.89. If John works hard, he'll pass his exams,
involves a relationship that is contingent. Since I shall
discuss such relationships in later chapters (§§ 13 and
14), I shall not discuss them further here. It is, how¬
ever, worth noting certain differences between various
kinds of logical modality. In statements about how the
world might otherwise be (Karttunen's sense of 'logical'
modality) possibility and impossibility seem to be prim¬
ary. In clause and sentence relations, it is rather necess¬
ity and its negation contingency that are primary. We may
further note that necessity as expressed by necessarily,
etc. is most frequently to be found with a negative. We
may therefore revise the above claim about statements as
follows: possibility and impossibility are primary in
utterances with positive orientation; necessity and con¬
tingency with utterances of negative orientation.
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